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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effects of Risk Attitude on Competitive Success in the Construction Industry.  
(August 2009) 
Hyung Jin Kim,  
B.S., Konkuk University; M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kenneth F. Reinschmidt 
 
This dissertation investigates the latent but critical effects of risk attitude on 
competitive success in construction applying an evolutionary approach.  The approach 
considers contractors as individual entities competing with each other for common job 
opportunities, and competition as an evolutionary process in the market.   
In construction, competitive bidding is the major mechanism of competition.  
Bidding itself is an important managerial function in a construction organization while it 
is risky since the actual cost of a job is unknown.  Therefore, contractors’ risk-taking in 
competition is an essential element in the construction business.   
Individuals may behave differently in competition depending on their own risk 
attitude which defines what risks can be accepted or not in an organization.  Depending 
on the differences in risk-taking, the result of a competition varies.  How contractors 
compete, that is, how they take risks in competition affects the competition among 
themselves.  Also, contractors’ performance is differentiated through competition to 
 iv
decide successful firms and unsuccessful firms.  The current study investigates the 
effects of risk attitude, which is the latent basis for contractors’ different behaviors in 
competition.     
The current investigation is unique in that it combines: 1) an evolutionary 
approach; 2) behavioral decision-making under uncertainty; 3) multi-level analyses from 
the individual to the aggregate; and 4) a long-term perspective on firms’ success and 
life-cycles (birth, death, survival, growth, contraction, and market diversification).  The 
developed evolutionary model simulates and analyzes competition among contractors in 
the competitive bidding environment.  A new method is proposed to represent 
contractors’ different risk-taking behaviors depending on their own risk attitude.  The 
analysis accounts for contractors’ differences in risk-taking, their performances through 
competition, and corresponding organizational changes in life-cycles at the individual 
level, and aggregate patterns evolving at the population level as resultants of competition 
over long time periods.   
The study finds that risk attitude is a latent but dominant competitive 
characteristic of contractors by identifying the critical effects of risk attitude on 
competitive success.  The results provide new insights on competition and 
recommendations for contractors’ competitive success, which are not available using 
conventional approaches.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background  
Risk is one of the most frequently used terms to describe the characteristics of 
the construction business.  Contractors deal with uncertainties inherent in construction 
projects that frequently result in unfavorable effects, e.g., cost overruns and schedule 
delays.  Also, the construction business is a project-based or contract-based business.  
By contract, a contractor takes responsibility for delivering a project on schedule and on 
budget with specified quality for a contract price, without knowing the actual cost.  The 
inherent uncertainties in the construction business and contractors’ diverse approaches to 
risk management have been key issues in the field of construction engineering and 
management studies.   
In addition to the uncertainties inherent in projects and contractors’ risk 
management at the project level to deal with cost and schedule overruns, contractors face 
competition in the market place.  Contractors compete with each other to obtain jobs 
available in the market.  In many cases of competition, the winner is decided through 
competitive bidding in which bidders come to a critical decision on whether to bid or not 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management. 
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and/or how much to bid.  Competitive bidding is the major mechanism of competition in 
the construction business.  It has been favored in both the private (by clients) sector and 
the public sector (by legislation on competitive procurement).   
In the literature, a go/no-go decision on whether to bid or not is described as a 
complex decision by a contractor since it usually involves multiple decision factors such  
 as current workload, backlog, risks, difficulty of the job, market conditions, relationship 
with clients, etc. (Boughton (1987); Ahmad (1990); Chua and Li (2000);  Lin and Chen 
(2004)).  By making a go decision, if a contractor wins a job, the contractor takes 
responsibility for the project given a contract price which is the contractor’s bid.  At the 
time of bidding, it is unknown whether the job won would be profitable or not.  On the 
other hand, by making a no-go decision, a contractor chooses to wait for new jobs while 
foregoing the current opportunity.  The contractor would not be sure about whether the 
missed job would be profitable or not, as well as whether a future job would be a better 
one or not, resulting in an opportunity cost if the contractor accepts a current job.   
The decision on bid amount (how much to bid) has been studied in many 
competitive bidding models since Friedman (1956).  The decision is one of the most 
important managerial functions by contractors since “much of the profit or loss from a 
project depends upon the bid itself,” as de Neufville et al. (1977) asserted.  Lowering the 
bid amount enhances wining probability while it reduces the profitability of a job.  In 
contrast, a higher bid amount decreases the winning probability while it increases the 
profitability of the job if the job is won.  As a result, most competitive bidding models 
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discuss trade-offs in different combinations of the winning probability and the 
profitability.   
Both the go/no-go decisions and the bid amount or markup decisions are 
essentially risk-taking by contractors under competition since the contractors do not 
know the actual costs when they make their decisions for a job.  In this risk-taking, some 
contractors would take relatively more or less risk than others.  How contractors take 
risks could be considered as an identifier to describe the way they do business.   
Competition causes additional uncertainties to competing contractors since the 
contractors do not know exactly who their competitors are (they may encounter new 
competitors) and how the competitors will bid.  The result of competitive bidding always 
depends on the participating bidders, especially their risk-taking behaviors: how much 
risk the individual bidders are willing to take in the competition to obtain a job.  
Alternates to competitive bidding include negotiated price contracts, which eliminate 
risk due to competition among contractors but retain the risks of cost overrun, and cost-
plus contracts, that put the cost risks on the owner.  Even using different contract 
methods, the competition between a contractor and an owner and the competition 
between contractors still exist, although in different forms.   
Based on the discussion above, contractors’ risk-taking under competition can be 
considered as an essential element of the construction business.  However, there have 
been few studies about contractors’ risk-taking behavior within the domain of 
competition at the market level.  Most previous competition studies have not considered 
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enough about competitors or have treated risk attitude as a single decision factor to be 
considered for an individual contractor’s bid decision.   
The relevant previous studies maintain that an individual contractor may change 
its bid decision depending on its own risk attitude or preference (Benjamin (1969); de 
Neufville et al. (1977); Ahmad and Minkarah (1987); Dozzi et al. (1996); Marzhouk and 
Moselhi (2003)).  But, in addition, competitors (other contractors) also may have their 
own risk attitudes and then this heterogeneity in risk attitude among contractors could 
affect the results of their competition.   
Little attention has been paid to this hidden linkage between contractors’ risk-
taking attitudes and their competition in the market: contractors’ different risk-taking 
behaviors can affect the competition among themselves.  The reason for the deficiency 
in the literature is due to the impossibility of measuring individual contractors’ risk 
attitudes and in finding available data for such analyses.   
 
 
1.2  Organizational Risk Attitudes 
Organizations develop their own cultures.  A firm’s culture, especially risk 
culture or attitude, defines its own approach to dealing with uncertainty (Hillson and 
Murray-Webster, 2005).  Corporate culture determines a firm’s risk management in its 
business decisions.   
There have been studies about different risk attitudes among organizations as 
well as among individuals (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944); Kahneman and 
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Tversky (1979); Walls and Dyer (1996); Pennings and Smidts (2000, 2003); Hillson and 
Murray-Webster (2005)).  The heterogeneity in risk attitude has been described using 
expected utility theory and utility functions (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).  In 
the theory, different risk attitudes are classified into three generic types: risk-averse, 
risk-neutral, and risk-seeking.  Individuals having different risk attitudes behave 
differently to maximize their own utilities, not to maximize expected monetary value as 
propounded by expected value theory.  A detailed discussion on expected utility theory 
and utility functions is presented in Chapter V.   
By expected value theory, individuals are expected to be indifferent between 
different outcomes if the expected values of the uncertain events are the same.  All firms 
or individuals should make the same decisions under the same circumstances.  So, 
expected value theory does not allow different decisions among individuals under an 
identical uncertain condition, which however are observed in the real situations.   
Regarding risk management, its importance has been emphasized in construction 
as well as other industries.  And, relevant risk management tools and techniques have 
been developed and used by researchers in academia and by practitioners in industry.  
An important fact should be emphasized: in general, different individuals may use the 
same tool differently.  Similarly, depending on their risk attitude, individual firms may 
have different perceptions on an identical risky event, which lead to different evaluations 
of the risk and corresponding different actions.  In competitive bidding for a job, 
contractors that have different risk attitudes could behave differently in their risk-taking.  
Also, bidding is influenced by the particular circumstances of different contractors.  
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Contractors with large backlogs of work will bid differently from contractors with small 
backlogs, due to the risks of business failures.   
 
 
1.3  Risk Attitude and Firm Performance 
Over time and through competition in the market, contractors compete to obtain 
jobs and earn profits or losses, and in the mean time contractors are differentiated to be 
successful or unsuccessful ones.  Contractor’s different risk-taking behaviors depending 
on their own risk attitude could affect their competition and further the individual 
contractors’ performance.  An interesting question can be raised about the relationships 
between risk attitude and contractor’s performance: “Is there an appropriate level of risk 
attitude for contractors in favor of survival and long-term success in construction?”   
In an extension, an individual firm’s life-cycle (its growth/contraction, 
death/birth, and diversification) also needs to be analyzed since the changes in the firm’s 
life-cycle must have been caused by the firm’s varying performance through competition 
over time.  For growing or large firms, market diversification is usually considered as 
one corporate strategy for growth.  Empirical studies in strategic management have tried 
to identify the relationship between diversification and firm performance.  However, 
these studies provide controversial results:  positive relationships vs. no significant 
relationship, and even negative relationships between diversification and profitability 
(Chang and Thomas, 1989).   
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In addition to the controversial results from the empirical studies, there are 
somewhat divergent views on diversification.  Diversification is a departure from a 
firm’s current experience base.  Then, it can be a riskier strategic choice than improving 
its performance in the current market a firm knows best.  Meanwhile, in modern 
portfolio theory, diversification is described as a way to reduce market risk and risk-
averse investors are expected or want to be diversified (Rubinstein, 2002).  These 
divergent views lead to questions about the relationship between organizational risk 
attitude that affects a firm’s risk management and diversification.  The relationship has 
been not confirmed in the literature.   
 
 
1.4  Hidden Aspects of Risk Attitude 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the hidden aspects of risk attitude for the construction 
contractors investigated in the current study.  High levels of risk (business failure) and 
competition (number of firms) characterize the construction business in which risk-
taking under competition is an essential element.  Competition will differentiate 
contractors in the market into successful or unsuccessful ones.  Growth and success 
depend on their individual performances though competition in this highly competitive 
business environment.  Meanwhile, diversification is considered as a corporate strategy 
for growth and risk management where the effects of differences in risk-taking behavior 
among contractors could be identified.  Most importantly, the basis of contractors’ risk-
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taking behaviors in competition is their own risk attitude, which is a part of their 
organizational culture.   
 
Risk Attitude
Organizational Culture
High Level of Competition 
In the Market Place
Firm Performance: 
Successful Firms vs.
Unsuccessful Firms
Inherent Uncertainties
in the Construction 
Business
Diversification:
Risk Management and 
Growth Strategy
Contractors' Risk Taking
in Competition
Industry Characteristics Differentiation among Firms
 
Figure 1.1  Hidden Aspects of Risk Attitude 
 
Analytical studies on organizational risk attitudes and their effects on 
competition have been limited due to the impossibility of measuring individual firms’ 
risk attitudes and the limited available data for such analyses.  However, since risk-
taking under competition is essential and universal to any industry member in 
construction, it is valuable to understand how contractors behave differently depending 
on their risk attitudes and how their risk-taking affect the competition between all these 
firms and their performance in the competitive market.   The current investigation of the 
hidden aspects of risk attitude provides specific and useful insights about competition in 
the construction industry. 
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1.5  Multiple Perspectives – Through Individual to Aggregate Levels 
Selection, in an evolutionary sense, operates through competition among 
individuals for resources.  Competition among individual contractors affects even the 
population of the individuals.  Organizations can affect their own environment as well as 
their own selection regimes (Erwin and Krakauer, 2004), and how they compete defines 
the structure of a market (Besanko et al., 1996).  Consequently, one can hypothesize that 
contractors’ risk attitude, as the universal trait to define how individual contractors 
behave in risk-taking under competition, affects the characteristics of the market through 
the competition among themselves.   
Previous competition studies have neglected this point by simply taking account 
of risk attitude as an individual contractor’s decision factor in a bid decision, not as a 
potentially critical factor universal among contractors.  To implement this 
comprehensive view, the current study takes multiple perspectives to consider the 
possible causes and effects at different levels from individuals to a population.  
At the individual level, contractors have different traits, i.e., their own risk 
attitudes, which affect their risk-taking behaviors.  Through competition among multiple 
contractors in the market, their performances are differentiated, which leads to different 
organizational changes in their life-cycles (birth, death, growth, contraction, and market 
diversification).  Over time, some aggregate effects or patterns as resultants of 
competition, if there are any, could evolve at the population level.   
For this comprehensive investigation, an evolutionary approach has been applied.  
It enables the current study to consider contractors as entities competing with each other 
 
 
 
10
for common job opportunities in a population.  In this approach, competition among 
contractors is expected to drive a selection mechanism in the market.  This competition 
and selection determines the success of a firm over the long-term.     
 
 
1.6  Study Scope and Objectives 
The main research goal is investigating the effects of organizational risk attitude 
on contractors’ competitive success in the construction industry by uncovering whether 
there is an appropriate level of risk attitude in favor of survival/growth, whether there are 
relationships between risk attitude and firm performance regarding survival, growth, and 
diversification, and what effects or patterns evolve at the industry level through the 
competitive process.  As a result, the current study provides recommendations on what 
contractors can do regarding their survival, growth, and diversification.  
The following tasks are performed to achieve the research goal: 
 Review relevant competition studies in construction and other areas, and 
identify what points are missing in previous competition studies in construction 
and what are applicable to the current study from the relevant studies in other 
areas for a better analysis;   
 Analyze real construction industry data (from Engineering News-Record (ENR) 
and the U.S. Census Bureau) to identify aggregate patterns that are considered as 
the resultants of competition, which include the frequency distribution of firm 
sizes, diversification patterns, and industry capacity changes.   
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 Propose hypotheses focusing on the effects of risk attitude on competitive 
success for construction contractors with respect to their economic performance, 
survival, growth, and diversification;  
 Develop an efficient method to represent construction contractors’ different 
risk-taking behaviors in competition depending on their heterogeneous risk 
attitudes;   
 Develop a simulation model based on an evolutionary principle.  The model 
simulates competition among contractors, and tracks the success and failure of 
construction firms with various genetic risk attitudes over a long period, while 
monitoring aggregate patterns at the population level that evolves through the 
competition;   
 Validate the simulation results to the actual construction industry data;  
 Test the proposed hypotheses using the simulation model; and make 
recommendations for construction contractors regarding their survival, growth, 
and diversification.   
 
 
1.7  Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of eight chapters.  Chapter I discusses the background 
of the problem and the research objectives.  Chapter II provides a literature review of 
previous competition studies in construction as well as in other areas.  In Chapter II, the 
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current study identifies missing concepts in the previous competition studies and 
proposes an efficient approach to resolve the missing concepts.   
Chapter III provides a literature review of previous studies regarding 
organizational culture and risk attitude, and analyses of firm performance conducted in 
the field of strategic management.  Also, competition and other characteristics of the 
construction industry are discussed together with several studies focusing on contractors’ 
business failures.  The discussion emphasizes the significance of competition and 
organizational issues in the construction business.   
Chapter IV performs quantitative analyses using the U.S. construction industry 
data to identify aggregate patterns in the industry, which are resultants of the 
competition among individual contractors in the market place.  The analyses identify the 
size distribution of construction firms, diversification patterns, and industry capacity 
changes due to individual contractors’ employment changes by their expansions, 
contractions, deaths, and births.    
Chapter V details the research methodology developed for the investigation.  
Multi-level analyses within the evolutionary approach are discussed.  The chapter also 
introduces a new method developed to represent contractors’ different risk-taking 
behaviors in competition depending on their own attitudes using the newly defined 
metrics of Maximum Loss Allowance (MLA) and Value at Risk (VaR).  Research 
hypotheses are developed in this chapter.  
Chapter VI describes the structure and algorithms used in the evolutionary model 
developed.  The descriptions cover scope and development of the model, application of 
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the new representation method developed in Chapter V to the model, decision rules for 
firms’ strategic behaviors, and model parameters.   
Chapter VII conducts validation of the model and tests the hypotheses developed 
in Chapter V.  Comparisons are made between the simulation results and empirical 
findings from the actual U.S. construction industry data analyzed in Chapter IV.  The 
results of the hypothesis tests reveal critical effects of risk attitude on competition among 
contractors and, even further, on aggregate industry patterns.  The new method to 
represent contractors’ risk attitude is tested by comparing it to the conventional method 
using expected utility.  Also, sensitivity analyses are performed to confirm the validity of 
the results of simulation.  
Chapter VIII discusses the achievements of research goals, conclusions, and 
contributions.  The chapter provides recommendations for construction contractors 
regarding competitive success in the construction market.  In addition, the chapter 
proposes potential further studies to investigate other aspects of competition in 
construction.  
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CHAPTER II 
COMPETITION STUDIES 
 
 The current study takes a more comprehensive perspective than previous 
competitive bidding studies.  Beyond making improvements on the previous studies in 
construction, the current study reviews other approaches used in different competition 
studies in other research areas and develops its own efficient approach for the 
investigation.  Literature reviews in the current chapter include the following:    
 Competition studies in construction and missing concepts; 
 Competition studies in other areas;  
 Empirical findings from the competition studies in other areas; and  
 Size distribution of firms, an aggregate pattern in an economic market.  
 
 
2.1  Competition Studies in Construction 
Competition studies in construction have focused on competitive bidding that is 
the major mechanism in which contractors compete with each other to obtain jobs in the 
market.  The focus on competitive bidding is due to the characteristics of the 
construction business described below.   
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Construction contractors obtain their jobs from the demand available in the 
market and few jobs are generated by contractors themselves.  About 99% of the 
construction work by contractors is generated from owners in the industry (Rice and 
Heimbach, 2007).  In this project-oriented or contract-based business, every single 
project is essential input for a firm’s business operation.  Acquisition of new contracts is 
a critical managerial function in a construction organization (Willenbrock, 1973).  
There have been a significant number of competitive bidding models in the 
literature, starting from Friedman’s model (1956), which is the origin of this field of 
study.  It is a probability model to find the optimum markup to maximize the expected 
profit from a job.  Hence, the model does not include risk attitudes.  Since Friedman’s 
model, various enrichments have been built by applying new and different ideas.  The 
following sections review the previous competition studies in construction.  
 
2.1.1 Classification of Bidding Models and Strategic Studies 
Due to the variety of methods and approaches proposed in previous studies, there 
is no agreed classification of the competition studies for construction in the literature.  
Different classifications are found as below.   
Benjamin (1969) and Griffis (1971) classify the literature on competitive bidding 
into two major streams:  
 Decision theoretic approach; and  
 Game theoretic approach.   
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Models using the decision theoretic approach follow the concepts in Friedman’s 
model.  They rely on probability theory while taking the individual perspective for a firm.  
In many cases, it is assumed that bidders’ bids (competitors’ behaviors) can be described 
by probability distributions.  Also, it is assumed that competitors’ bids are independent, 
business conditions are static, and all bidders are risk-neutral.   
On the other hand, the game theoretic approach takes the market perspective by 
considering competitors’ different actions (Weverbergh, 2002).  In construction, there 
are a very small number of studies taking the market perspective compared to the 
number of studies taking the individual perspectives.   
Boughton (1987) proposes a different classification for the bidding strategies or 
competitive bidding studies into the three categories:  
 Adaptive approach; 
 Quantitative approach; and 
 Strategic approach.  
The adaptive approach considers individual contractors’ learning from previous 
bid experience as an effective factor for contractors’ bid decisions.  Contractors adapt 
their bids depending on their recent performance in bids.  In this approach, each job is a 
single business opportunity and contractors try to win more jobs up to the limits of their 
capacity.   
Secondly and differently, the quantitative approach takes decision approaches 
similar to the concepts of the theoretical competitive bidding models.  This approach 
requires historical data of bids (for a contractor as well as its competitors) to determine 
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the probability of winning and estimate profitability under static conditions, i.e., bidders 
behave as they have done and business conditions are static.   
Finally, the strategic approach considers contractor’s short or long-term strategy.  
A contractor considers bidding as a continuous process and selects jobs based on the 
value of the job to the contractor, which is determined based on the contractor’s business 
factors such as business objectives (short/long-term), risk, competitors, the contractor’s 
current workload, etc.  
Recently, Marzouk and Moselhi (2003) classified previous competitive bidding 
models into the following three categories:  
 Statistical models;  
 Multi-attribute utility theory and analytic hierarchy process type models; and 
 Artificial intelligence models.   
Statistical models are similar to the decision theoretic approach or the 
quantitative approach in the previous classifications.  Multi-attribute or analytic 
hierarchy process type models quantitatively evaluate multiple decision factors under 
consideration for the contractor’s bid decision.  And, artificial intelligence models are to 
develop an agent or artificial intelligence that can solve decision problems on behalf of 
humans.  Among these, the utility theory type models consider contractors’ risk attitude 
(Ahmad and Minkarah (1987); Dozzi et al. (1996); and Marzouk and Moselhi (2003)).  
These models emphasize that individual contractors may have different preferences on 
their decision factors and a competitive bidding model should represent the differences.   
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As discussed above, the literature provides different classifications of previous 
competition studies.  The previous approaches have been devised in a divergent way.  
Nevertheless, as de Neufville et al. (1977), Ahmad (1990), and Mayo (1992) asserted, 
most competitive bidding models for the construction industry follow Friedman’s model 
with some modifications or extensions.   
In addition to the competitive bidding models that aim at finding optimum 
markups or bid amounts, there is a different type of competition studies on contractors’ 
go/no-go decision in bid.  These studies pay more attention to contractors’ screening of 
jobs based on their decision factors such as profitability, the level of risk, current 
workload, difficulty of job, etc.   
The following sections provide descriptions of Friedman’s original work and 
later competitive bidding models, as well as the studies on contractors’ go/no-go 
decisions.  Instead of classifying the previous studies by methodology or approach 
applied, the following discussions are listed by what improvements have been made.  
After the review of these studies, tabulated summaries are provided in tables on pages 37 
and 38.      
 
2.1.2 Original Work by Friedman 
Friedman (1956) provided the basic conceptual structure for many of the later 
competitive bidding models and studies.  In this section, Friedman’s model is discussed 
in detail as the original work in this field of study.  The major objective of Friedman’s 
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model is to maximize expected profit from a job from an individual contractor’s 
perspective.  Friedman’s model is described below.   
True cost (actual cost) of a job under bid is unknown when the bidders submit 
their bids.  The unknown true cost could be different from a contractor’s estimate (c) due 
to the contractor’s own bias, inaccuracy or variability of the cost estimate, or 
uncertainties inherent in the job.  ( )H s dS  is defined as the probability that the ratio of 
the true cost to the estimated cost (c) is between S and S dS+ .  When x is the bid 
amount for the contract, the profit will be [x – Sc] conditional on x being the winning bid.  
P(x) is defined as the probability that a bid of x will be the lowest and win the contract.   
A contractor can predict P(x) by studying previous bidding data for the 
contractor itself as well as its competitors.  Using previous bidding data, a pattern of the 
contractor’s behavior relative to its competitor’s cost estimate can be drawn as a distinct 
probability distribution.  Friedman proposes to apply this method for all potential 
competitors assuming independence between competitors’ bids.  P(x), if the competitors 
are known, is simply the product of the probabilities of defeating each of the known 
competitors under the independence assumption.  Friedman considered a situation when 
a contractor does not know the identity of its competitors and the number of competitors 
and suggested using the average of the competitors’ bid distributions.   
The expected profit from a job under bid can be expressed as in Equation 2.1. 
 
0
( ) ( )[ ] ( )E x P x x Sc H S dS
∞= −∫      [2.1] 
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Equation 2.1 provides a rational basis for the analysis of competitive bidding: the 
probability of winning ( )P x  increases by decreasing the amount of bid x, however the 
decreased amount of bid x reduces profitability [x – Sc] for the contract, and vice versa.  
Therefore, as described in Figure 2.1, the optimum value for x may exist to find the best 
combination of the probability of winning P(x) and the profitability [x – Sc], which 
maximizes the expected profit from a job.    
 
x: Bid Amount
E(x): Expected Profit
Profit (+)
Loss (-)
Optimum
Value for x
Maximum Value
of Expected Profit
 
Figure 2.1  Expected Profit and Optimum Value for x 
 
Friedman’s model can be criticized due to the assumptions used: it assumes that 
competitors will continue to bid as they have in the past and the sequence of bids is 
statistically independent.  Therefore, Friedman’s model is static.  Nevertheless, his 
model is the origin of this field of studies on competitive bidding and has provided later 
studies with the conceptual framework.  
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2.1.3 Estimation of the Probability of Winning 
The fundamental concept in most competitive bidding models is finding the best 
combination of the probability of winning and the profitability from a job.  As to the 
estimation of the winning probability, different methods have been proposed and tested 
in the literature.  
 
Controversies on the Independence Assumptions 
There have been controversies on the estimation of winning probability, 
especially between two methods proposed by Friedman (1956) and Gates (1967) (Fuerst 
(1976); Weverbergh (2002)).  Gates used almost the same conceptual approaches and 
assumptions, but contrary to Friedman’s model, he rejected the independence 
assumption.   
According to Gates (1967), the probability of winning over n equally matched 
competitors can be defined as 1/ (n+1).  The probability of winning over competitor i is 
P(i) and the probability of winning over each of competitors is a different value.  Then, 
the probability of winning P against n  number of competitors can be estimated as in 
Equation 2.2.   
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∑
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On the other hand, Morin and Clough (1969) proposed a modified version of 
Friedman’s method to estimate the winning probability.  They developed a computer 
program, OPBID (Optimum Bid), which was applied to an actual contractor’s real 
business.  Three years’ actual bid data of a contractor were analyzed.  It was the first 
computer application of competitive bidding model.   
They suggested classifying competitors into key competitors and average 
competitors.  The classification is based on the frequency of encountering the 
competitors in previous bids.  Their winning probability is estimated using Equation 2.3.  
The proposed method also assumes independence among competitors as in Friedman’s 
approach.  However, in their analysis, a weighting method was used to give more 
importance to the recent data, which considers changes in competitive situation in the 
market.  
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=
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ×⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∏                          [2.3] 
Where keyN = the predicted number of key competitors;  
( )rP E = the probability of submitting a lower bid than competitor r, one of key 
competitors; 
( )avrgP E  = the probability of submitting a lower bid than an average competitor; 
and  
avrgN = the predicted number of average competitors.  
 
Empirical Tests 
Besides the theoretical development of models, there have been empirical tests of 
the developed models using actual historical data.  Benjamin (1972) tested the validity of 
competitive bidding models using 3 years’ data from a middle-size general building 
contractor.  Especially, he tested the estimation of the probability of winning using the 
probability distribution of competitors bid ratios, which was proposed by Friedman 
(1956) and later competitive bidding models.   
The contractor in the data participated in bids for 131 jobs over the time period, 
won 17 jobs, and encountered 189 different competitors.  Among them, 97 different 
competitors bid once and 153 different competitors bid five or fewer times against the 
contractor.  So, there were 36 different competitors that bid more than five times against 
the contractor.  Using the data, Benjamin (1972) constructed bid distributions.  However, 
the distributions showed apparent random variances due to the large number of different 
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competitors and the variations in their bids.  Benjamin questioned the validity of 
estimation of the probability of winning proposed by competitive bidding models.   
On the other hand, de Neufville et al. (1977) analyzed a larger amount of 
historical bid data from the Massachusetts Department of Public Works.  Their data 
cover 3,262 bids for 691 highway projects from 1966 to 1974.  Using the pubic record, 
cumulative distribution functions were constructed for different numbers of bidders.  
They found that the probability of winning a job against n number of competitors can be 
accurately predicted using the method proposed by Friedman, which is based on the 
independence assumption.   
Compared to the test by Bengamin (1972) that found large variances using a 
relatively small amount of historical data, the empirical tests by de Neufville et al. 
(1977) can be considered more reliable since they used a large amount of historical data.  
However, it indicates that application of the proposed method to real business by 
individual contractors would not be easy since the method requires a significant amount 
of historical data.   
 
2.1.4 Multiple Regression Techniques 
Instead of using probability distributions of bids by competitors, multiple 
regression techniques have been proposed for contractor’s bid decision.  Carr and 
Sandahl (1978) proposed a multiple regression technique to determine the value of the 
lowest bid.  In their multiple regressions, the dependent variable is the value of the 
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lowest bid and the independent variables are other various factors that affect the winning 
probability.  The factors are classified into three categories:   
 Characteristic of the particular job;  
 Economic environment; and  
 Level of competition.   
They proposed a list of 33 potential independent variables that could have 
direct/indirect relationships with the lowest bid value.  Similarly, Seydel (1994) also 
proposed use of multiple regression techniques for contractors’ bid decisions.  These 
approaches assume that a contractor maintains sufficient data on its own bids as well as 
its competitors to develop a regression model.  The validity of real application of these 
methods requiring sufficient data is questioned.  Benjamin (1972) asserts that it would 
be very difficult for an individual contractor to attain all relevant bid data to use the 
competitive bidding models.  It would be more difficult for contractors to obtain the 
relevant data in the private sector where winning and losing bids are usually not made 
publicly available.   
Also, using the regression technique can be criticized due to its static attributes: 
competition is dynamic in a market and it would be difficult to apply a regression model 
to the dynamic situation.  A regression model explains associations between variables, 
but not causal relationships (effects and causes) of a change that might occur in a 
dynamic situation.  Also, adding more independent variables increases the size of the 
data set needed.   
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2.1.5 Internal Conditions, Market Conditions, and Competitors 
The conventional competitive bidding models can be criticized due to static 
assumptions.  Some competitive bidding models consider dynamic factors that can affect 
contractors’ bid decisions over time periods such as individual contractor’s internal 
conditions (e.g., current workload or backlog), changes in the market conditions, 
competitors’ different behaviors, etc. 
 
Contractor’s Internal Conditions 
Griffis (1971) and Mayo (1992) pointed out that a contractor’s markup decisions 
and its objective may vary over time periods depending on its own business condition.  
Griffis (1971) introduced a representation of the volume of work versus time for 
individual contractors with the lower and the upper bounds to describe changes in 
contractors’ desire to obtain jobs over time.  The lower bound is set based on the fact 
that a contractor wants to keep its current volume of work above a certain level to pay its 
necessary overhead.  The upper bound is set by the contractor’s bonding capacity or 
operational capacity constraints.  A contractor is expected to behave in such a way as to 
keep its current and projected workload at some desired level.   
Mayo (1992) applied a similar concept to develop a competitor’s workload 
related utility functions.  In the proposed model, the contractor bids in order to maximize 
its own utility function depending on the contractor’s current workload.   
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Market Conditions 
The dynamic aspects of competition in construction are also discussed by de 
Neufville et al. (1977).  In their analysis using historical bid data, they found an inverse 
relationship between the amount of job opportunities and intensity of competition and 
different bidding patterns depending on economic conditions.  
They found that the number of bidders per job tends to increase when the number 
of jobs decreases in a market.  Contractors are usually reluctant to shrink in size even in 
a market downturn when available jobs in a market decrease (Kim, 2004).  Contractors 
want to maintain their workload in balance with their current operational capacity, which 
increases the number of bidders per job and reduces markups.   
In addition, de Neufville et al. (1977) found that contractors bid lower in bad 
market conditions to be more competitive.  In a bad market condition, reduced job 
opportunities lead to an increased number of bidders per job as discussed above, and a 
winner is decided at a higher level of competition with a lower bid.  These market 
dynamics are also discussed by Kim and Reinschmidt (2006).   
 
Changes in Competitors’ Behaviors Associated with Market Conditions 
Most competitive bidding models use the static assumptions: competitors bid as 
they did in the past and the market condition is stable.  These assumptions ignore the fact 
that competition would become more severe when the market goes down (de Neufville 
et al. (1977); Kim (2004)) and competitors would behave differently depending on their 
own business conditions (Griffis (1971); Mayo (1992)).   
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The consideration of competitors needs to take a comprehensive market 
perspective or a game theoretic approach.  In game theory, it is assumed that players are 
rational and intelligent, and their interests are opposed to competitors (Benjamin, 1969). 
Runeson and Skitmore (1999) pinpoint the differences between the game theoretical 
approach and conventional decision theory (tendering theory) used in most competitive 
bidding models as below:  
“Game theory requires that all players consider their respective strategies and 
select the most appropriate strategy assuming that all other players do the same.  It does 
not apply to a situation where one player alone is allowed to adopt a preferred strategy 
without any attempts from other players to modify their strategies in response.  The 
assumption in tendering theory that there is no response, no modification of the behavior 
of other players violates the most fundamental assumption of game theory.” 
There are a very small number of competition studies in construction using a 
game theoretic approach (Benjamin (1969); Griffis (1971)).  Among these few studies, 
Kim and Reinschmidt (2006) simulated competition among multiple contractors to 
represent (re)actions and interactions among contractors in an assumed market by 
allowing individual contractors to control their markup levels depending on their own 
conditions based on common decision rules.   
In the model by Kim and Reinschmidt (2006), a contractor can enhance its 
marketing efforts or lower its markup level to obtain more jobs and also can increase its 
capacity to perform the increased volume of jobs obtained and vice versa, depending on 
market conditions or an individual firm’s own short/long-term strategy (i.e., in the 
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responses to demand change in the market as well as to strategic deviation by 
competitors).  Three important managerial functions (marketing function, markup 
control, and capacity control) are integrated for individual firms’ responses which are 
made to keep their own balance between workload and capacity.  In addition, firms’ 
growth and contraction are represented in the model by the capacity control, which has 
not been considered in previous competitive bidding models.  This study provides a 
comprehensive market perspective on the competition among contractors and dynamics 
in a market, and considerations of different long-term and short-term competitive 
strategies.   
 
2.1.6 Individual Preferences 
de Neufville et al. (1977), Shash (1993), and Christodoulou (1998) point out that 
existing bidding models are not in much use because the models fail in representing how 
contractors actually behave in the real business situations.  Benjamin (1969) and 
Boughton (1987) also criticize the limits of the competitive bidding models by 
emphasizing that individual contractors would evaluate differently the worth of varying 
bid opportunities.  To account for these problems, some competitive bidding models 
have considered the individuality in contractors’ preferences.  
Benjamin (1969) maintained that contractors’ attitudes toward winning and risk 
vary with their own condition since they evaluate each job differently depending on the 
condition.  He suggested using utility values to represent different risk attitudes of 
contractors, but applying the same fundamental concept in most competitive bidding 
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models.  Using utility functions, the optimum bid amount is found for a contractor by 
maximizing the product of expected utility conditional on the probability of winning 
with given bid amounts.   
de Neufville et al. (1977) conducted a questionnaire survey to measure risk-
aversion of five contractors.  Contractors’ risk-aversion was measured assuming 
different hypothetical conditions with respect to job size (large vs. small) and market 
conditions (good vs. bad).  They found different degrees of risk-aversion of the 
contractors.  Based on the findings, they asserted that current bidding models need to 
account for contractor’s risk attitude.   
Ahmad and Minkarah (1987) extended the concept of individual preference and 
considered that contractors would have different preferences on each of profit, loss, and 
general overhead.  The different preferences are represented using three separate utility 
functions which are integrated into one expected utility function through normalization 
for the decision maker’s bid decision.   
Dozzi et al. (1996) developed a utility theory model considering twenty one 
decision criteria in the bidding situation.  The proposed model allows individual decision 
maker’s different preferences on each of the multiple criteria, which are represented by 
assigning different weights over the multiple criteria.  Similarly, a decision support tool 
proposed by Marzhouk and Moselhi (2003) uses the multi-attribute utility theory and 
analytic hierarchy process (AHP).   
The above models or studies maintain that bid decisions should be made based 
on individual contractors’ preference or risk attitude and their own condition.  However, 
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most studies do not consider that competition is developed by multiple competitors and 
each of the competitors also has its own preference, and result of a competition is always 
relative depending on how individual competitors behave in the competition.   
 
2.1.7 Go/No-go Decision 
A contractor would make sequential decisions for a job in a competitive bidding: 
a go/no-go decision and then a markup decision.  Upon that, previous studies can be 
classified by the decision process on which the study focused: 1) studies about go/no-go 
decision and 2) studies about decision on markup/bid amount.  The studies about 
contractors’ go/no-go decisions discuss more about multiple decision factors for the 
decision on whether to bid or not.  However, it is not easy to clearly differentiate 
between the markup decision models and the go/no-go decision models since there are 
models to consider both decision processes.    
The importance of go/no-go decision is emphasized in the literature since even a 
single bad project could significantly damage a contractor’s business.  However, in 
practice, bid decisions are based on intuition, gut feelings, experiences, and guesses 
(Ahmad (1990); Mochtar and Arditi (2001); Rice and Heimbach (2007)).  Rice and 
Heimbach (2007) highlight this problem as “Many contractors do not have a well-
defined process for making go/no-go decisions when deciding whether to take on a 
project.  In a highly competitive business, one bad project can mean an unprofitable year, 
or worse.”  
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Mochtar and Arditi (2001) performed a questionnaire survey for the US top 400 
contractors regarding their current pricing practices and found most contractors use their 
intuition after subjective assessment on competition for their bid decisions.  Their 
finding can be summarized as shown in Table 2.1.  The scores are based on contractors’ 
multiple choices.   
Boughton (1987) also performed a questionnaire survey to identify what factors 
are considered important by U.S. general contractors in their bidding strategies.  A total 
of 126 firms responded among the randomly sampled 400 firms.  Table 2.2 lists the 
identified important factors.  Each factor shows the weighted mean on a 7-point scale, 
where 7 is most important and 1 is most unimportant.  
 
Table 2.1  Major Assessments in Bid Decision (from Mochtar and Arditi (2001)) 
Rank Type of Assessment Score (multiple choices) 
1 Intuition 50.5% 
2 Subjective assessment of the competition 60.4% 
3 Empirical models 24.2% 
4 Probability/mathematical models  14.3% 
5 Risk/value of project  12.1% 
6 Current workload 13.2% 
 
In addition, Chua and Li (2000) focused on underlying determining factors rather 
than the decision itself.  They also conducted a questionnaire survey to identify decision 
factors considered in go/no-go decision and classified them into four categories: 
competition, risk, need for work, and company’s position in bidding (suitability of jobs 
to company’s specialty and resource).  Total twenty eight key determining factors were 
identified.  Refer to Chua and Li (2000) for the details.  
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Table 2.2  Factors in Bidding Strategy (from Boughton (1987)) 
Rank Factor Score 
1 Clearness of detail of specifications 5.37 
2 Past experience with similar work 5.19 
3 Confidence in subcontractor bids 4.97 
4 Location of project 4.90 
5 Number of competitors 4.87 
6 Duration of project 4.57 
7 Workload 4.56 
8 Market condition 4.54 
9 Size of bid 4.51 
10 Opportunity for follow-on work 4.32 
11 Relationship with architect and owner 4.02 
12 Competitors’ bid history 3.56 
13 Confidence 3.41 
 
As discussed above, a bid decision requires consideration of multiple decision 
factors and it evolves unclear evaluations such as intuition, subjective assessment of 
competition, risk, confidence, etc.  Due to complexity in the consideration of multiple 
factors and vagueness in the evaluation of them, how a go/no-go decision is made within 
a construction organization is not clear (Lin and Chen, 2004).  Thus, the main goal of 
most go/no-go decision studies is providing a rational basis for project evaluation and 
clarifying the decision procedure by quantifying qualitative issues under consideration.   
Lin and Chen (2004) classify different approaches to the bid evaluation into four 
categories: 1) scoring methods; 2) multi-attribute decision making; 3) the analytic 
hierarchy process method, and 4) fuzzy set approaches.  A common approach proposed 
in the literature can be described using a study by Ahmad (1990).  Ahmad proposed a 
weight additive model, in which the individual worth of different business factors is 
weighted based on decision maker’s preference and summed additively to obtain an 
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overall score.  To make a go decision in the approach, the overall score should be greater 
than a desired minimum score that is set by the decision maker.  
 
2.1.8 Other Approaches 
This section reviews other approaches in the literature that were not discussed 
above.  Broemser (1968) proposed a sequential bid model to overcome the deficiency of 
the single bid model which does not consider contractors’ bonding capacity and loss of 
opportunity of future projects.  The proposed model aims at maximizing economic 
welfare of the firm using an integer program.  The objective function is to maximize the 
expected discounted present value of the bids under constraints that are based on 
bonding capacity and opportunity losses.  The proposed model considers a relatively 
longer time-frame for contractors’ business operation.   
Chen (1991) suggests that contractors make bid decisions considering projects as 
a portfolio at the firm level assuming correlations between multiple projects.  So, a bid 
decision should be made to maximize the overall present value of potential portfolio that 
will consist of the existing portfolio and an additional new project.  Han et al. (2004) 
take a similar approach for international contractors to consider projects as a portfolio at 
the firm level focusing on financial risks.   
Some approaches have been proposed to deal with the characteristics of 
contractors’ bid decision: subjective and qualitative.  Christodoulou (1998) developed an 
artificial intelligence model to decide optimum bid markup.  The proposed fuzzy 
artificial neural networks account for fuzzyness in qualitative factors and the complexity 
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in bid decision problems with multiple factors.  Lin and Chen (2004) proposed a fuzzy 
linguistic approach to quantify and incorporate multiple qualitative factors in decision 
making process.  Similarly, linguistic terms are used to overcome vagueness and 
subjectiveness in evaluation of each of decision criteria.  Relative importance of each of 
screening criteria and corresponding rates are expressed by decision makers in linguistic 
terms that are assigned appropriate fuzzy numbers, which are aggregated to decide an 
attractive rating for a job under consideration.   
Most of previous competitive bidding models assume cost-based pricing: a 
contractor estimates project cost for a job and adds a markup to the estimated cost to 
decide a bid amount.  Mochtar and Arditi (2001) proposed to use a market-based pricing 
strategy by criticizing that cost-based pricing cannot account for dynamic competition in 
the market.  According to them, the market condition in construction is ever changing, 
which develops different levels of competition.  So, contractors need to pay attention to 
changes in the market condition rather than relying too much on cost-based approach for 
their pricing.   
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Lowering price is a common business strategy by contractors since it is easy.  
Also, this practice becomes more prevalent among contractors when the market goes 
down.  Chao and Liou (2007) recognized that, from contractors’ perspective, survival 
outweighs making a profit in such a situation.  Then, a contractor’s objective could be 
obtaining jobs while minimizing losses.  In that, they proposed a probability model that 
determines the lower limit of the bid by maximizing the expected probability of not 
making a loss within the project period while considering opportunity loss conditional 
on losing the job.  The approach aims at minimizing a contractor’s overall risk of loss.   
 
2.1.9 Summary of Previous Models and Approaches 
Previous competition studies in construction have been performed in divergent 
ways so that it is difficult to classify them.  Nevertheless, Tables 2.3 and 2.4 summarize 
the various studies by their specific ideas and additional considerations that each study 
proposed.   
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Table 2.3  Summary of Previous Studies - I 
Unique 
Feature 
Studies Main Ideas and Considerations 
Origin Friedman (1956) Original probabilistic model assuming contractors’ bids are independent over time. 
Gates’ Model (1967) Rejected the independence assumption from Friedman’s model. 
Morin and Clough 
(1969) 
Developed a computer program of a 
probabilistic model. 
Benjamin (1972) 
Analyzed three years’ bid data and tested 
validity of the winning probability estimation 
proposed. 
de Neufville et al. 
(1977) 
Analyzed historical bid data to test validity of 
the winning probability estimation proposed.  
Estimation of 
Wining 
Probability 
Carr and Sandahl 
(1978) 
Seydel (1994) 
Proposed multiple regression techniques using 
actual data to estimate the optimum bid amount 
assuming sufficient data.  
Different 
Business 
Conditions 
Griffis (1971) 
Mayo (1992) 
Considered contractors’ varying objectives 
depending on contractors’ internal conditions 
such as current workload and market conditions.
Interactions 
among 
Contractors 
Kim and Reinschmidt 
(2006) 
Developed a game theoretic approach 
considering interactions among contractors in 
competitive bidding situation. 
de Neufville et al. 
(1977) 
Measured contractors’ risk-aversion based on 
their questionnaire survey. Individual 
Preferences 
Benjamin (1969) Considered differences in project evaluation and attitude among contractors. 
Ahmad and Minkarah 
(1987) 
Considered contractors’ different preferences on 
profit, loss, and general overhead using utility 
functions.  
Dozzi et al. (1996) 
Proposed a utility theory model to represent a 
contractor’s individual preferences on multiple 
decision criteria.  
Utility theory 
And Multi-
Attribute 
Utility 
Marzhouk and Moselhi 
(2003) 
Proposed a decision support tool using the 
multi-attribute utility theory and AHP.  
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Table 2.4  Summary of Previous Studies – II 
Unique 
Feature 
Studies Main Ideas and Considerations 
Boughton (1987) 
Conducted a survey to identify multiple 
decision factors considered by U.S. general 
contractors. 
Mochtar and Arditi 
(2001) 
Conducted a survey regarding current pricing 
practices.  Found most contractors use intuition 
after subjective assessment on competition. 
Ahmad (1990) Considered decision maker’s preference over multiple business factors. 
Multiple 
Decision 
Factors 
Chua and Li (2000) 
Considered underlying determining factors 
rather than the decision itself.  Identified 
multiple decision factors for go/no-go decision. 
Mochtar and Arditi 
(2001) 
Emphasized market-based pricing against cost-
based pricing considering that actual winning a 
job depends on competition itself more than 
absolute level of price. Market-based 
Pricing 
Chao and Liou (2007) 
Proposed a risk-minimizing approach for a 
contractor to determine the lower limit of the 
bid.  
Broemser (1968) 
Developed a model for sequential bidding.  
Considered contractors’ bonding capacity and 
loss of opportunity of future projects. 
Chen (1991) 
Proposed a portfolio approach for multiple 
projects in bid decision considering correlations 
between projects.  
Han et al. (2004) Proposed a portfolio approach for international projects focusing on financial risks.  
Christodoulou (1998) Developed an artificial intelligence model using fuzzy artificial neural networks 
Other 
Approaches 
Lin and Chen (2004) 
Developed a fuzzy linguistic approach to 
quantify and incorporate multiple qualitative 
factors 
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2.2  Missing Concept in Competition Studies in Construction 
In construction, competition studies have focused on competitive bidding, which 
is the major mechanism of competition in the market where contractors obtain their jobs.  
Even though there have been numerous improvements since Friedman’s original work, 
the previous competitive bidding models and proposed approaches are criticized 
regarding their difficulty in the implementation for real business (de Neufville et al. 
(1977), Shash (1993), Christodoulou (1998), and Fayek (1998)).  By implementing new 
and additional ideas and considerations, proposed approaches come to have more 
sophisticate structures in decision process, but at the same time they have become more 
complex and difficult to implement in the real business decisions.   
Competitive bidding studies emphasize the importance of bidding strategies to 
contractors, and they propose using quantitative analyses and measures to make the 
decision process objective and clear.  However, in the real situations, subjective 
assessment is the most commonly used method by contractors (Shash, 1995).  Many 
researchers agree that there are broad gaps between theoretical approaches proposed in 
the literature and application in the real situation (Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994).  The 
criticisms relate to the static assumptions and the narrow perspectives taken.   
There are important points that have not been fully considered in previous studies 
even though they could have significant effects on competition among contractors.  They 
are:  
 Risk-taking under competition is an essential element in the construction 
business: bidding is risk-taking since bidders do not know the true cost of job; 
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 Contractors may have their own risk attitude which affects organizational 
behaviors, in particular risk-taking behaviors.  Risk attitude is a part of 
organizational culture and it is universal to all contractors; 
 Competition is developed by multiple competitors.  Result of a competition is 
always relative depending on competitors’ risk-taking behavior.  Ultimately, 
different risk attitudes among contractors could affect competition among 
themselves.    
Previous studies have considered risk attitude as a single decision factor for an 
individual contractor’s bid decision.  Less attention has been paid to competition among 
multiple contractors that may behave differently in their risk-taking depending on their 
own organizational risk attitudes.   
 
 
2.3  Competition Studies in Other Areas 
This section provides literature reviews on competition studies in other fields 
such as biology, ecology, economics, management, and so on.  Through the literature 
review, it searches for an efficient methodology for the current investigation.  
 
2.3.1 Studies in Biology and Ecology 
Since the theory of evolution was presented in a book, On the Origin of Species 
by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for 
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Life (1859), Darwin’s scientific discovery has revolutionized biology.  Also, various 
applications of his idea can be found in other scientific areas.   
In his theory, natural selection occurs over successive generations among species 
in competition when there are heritable variations for some trait and differential survival 
and reproduction process associated with the possession of that trait.  Individuals with 
favored traits survive and reproduce and their offspring inherit parents’ traits that 
influence success in survival and reproduction.  Next generations consist of a higher 
proportion of individuals that possess the favored traits, while others without the favored 
traits disappear (Allan, 2005).   
In biology and ecology, competition is one of the key issues.  Studies in these 
areas discuss competition within a species or between species as the relationship 
between individuals who compete for common living requirements, such as energy or 
space (Carbone and Gittleman (2002); Marquet (2002)).  Individuals’ energy 
consumption and limited resources are considered as basic elements of competition and 
the selection evolves through competition (Marquet (2000); Schmid et al., (2000)).  One 
may find an analogy in the construction business to this biological phenomenon in the 
nature: contractors competing with each other for common job opportunities available in 
the market.   
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2.3.2 Competition and Mode of Competition 
Keddy (1989) provides a broad definition of competition as “The negative effects 
which one organism has upon another by consuming, or controlling access to, a resource 
that is limited in availability.”   
Competition is classified into different modes.  Depending on the mechanism in 
it, competition is categorized as below (Molles, 2005).   
 Interference competition: it occurs directly between individuals via aggression 
when the individuals interfere with each other.  For example, three-spot 
damselfish, which inhabit lagoons and coral reefs, guard a certain territory and 
intensely compete for space between individuals.  
 Exploitation competition: this competition occurs indirectly through a common 
limiting resource.  For example, individual plants in a local population consume 
more amounts of nutrients, water, and space as they grow while the resources are 
limited.  Direct interactions are not obvious as much as the interference 
competition, but the competition occurs underground where the roots of plants 
compete for the resources.  
 Apparent competition: it occurs indirectly between two species when both of 
them are preyed on by the same predator.  For instance, species A and species B 
are both prey for predator C.  The increase of species A will cause the decrease of 
species B because the increase of A increases the number of predator Cs which in 
turn will hunt more of species B.  
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The above competitions also can be classified into direct and indirect 
competitions.  In addition, the classification applies equally to intraspecific and 
interspecific competition.  Intraspecific competition occurs when members of the same 
species compete with each other for the same resources in an ecosystem.  Interspecific 
competition occurs when individuals of two separate species share a limiting resource in 
a same area.   
It is not easy to define one specific type of competition for the competition in the 
construction market.  Contractors compete with each other for common job opportunities 
similar to the exploitation competition.  But, sometimes, contractors may try to prevent 
their competitors’ expansion to their current market segments, which would be similar to 
interference competition.  A contractor’s competitive strategy could be directed against 
its competitors or less specific just considering general competition in the market place.   
Meanwhile, many contractors in the construction industry are often considered 
simply reactive since clients initiate construction projects and contractors do not have 
much control over their jobs (Ramsay, 1989).  Due to this reason, Ramsay (1989) 
maintained that some aspects of business strategy developed mainly for manufacturing 
industries that have relatively higher control over their products in the market are not 
suitable for the construction industry.  
 
2.3.3 Empirical Findings 
Probably, it is considered quite obvious that small organisms generally live at 
higher population densities than larger ones.  But, why does this phenomenon evolve?   
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Damuth (1981) questioned the relationship between population density and 
organisms’ body size and found that the population density of 307 species of 
herbivorous mammals decreases with increased body size.  In a log-log plot of 
population density against body size, he found an apparent straight linear trend.  He 
asserted this general rule can be applied to individual species.   
Peters and Wassenberg (1983) extended Damuth’s study (1981) to a greater 
variety of animals: including invertebrates, aquatic invertebrates, mammals, birds, and 
poikilothermic vertebrates.  Their study confirmed the findings by Damuth (1981).  They 
found some differences in the slope of the linear trends between species in log-log plots, 
but the overall patterns are similar to each other.  
In these empirical studies, researchers in biology and ecology have found a 
ubiquitous phenomenon in a variety of systems: the power law (Marquet (2002); White 
and Seymour (2005)).  According to the study results, dimensional analysis of the 
relationship between population density (D) and body size (mass, M) finds an 
exponential relationship as in Equation 2.4.  
 
D M βα= or log logD Mα β= +      [2.4] 
 
The relationship is linear on a logarithmic scale.  The value of β is negative, 
indicating an inverse proportionality (Schmid et al., 2000): population density decreases 
as body size increases, and vice versa.  Many ecology studies reported β  values around 
-3/4 (Damuth (1981); Peters and Wassenberg (1983)), but there are differences of 
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opinion and different values have been found (Schmid et al. (2002); White and Seymour 
(2005)).  Figure 2.2 provides an example of power law in nature, captured from Marquet 
et al. (2005).  In the figure, open circles represent primary consumers (herbivores) and 
filled circles represent secondary consumers (carnivores).  Note the scatter in Figure 2.2: 
even though power law applies in the aggregates, different species have different 
parameters α andβ .  
 
 
2( / ; )) (bDensity Individuals km M kg  
Figure 2.2  Power Law in Mammalian Population (Marquet et al., 2005) 
 
Marquet (2002) describes the power law as below. 
“Energy that organisms need… scales with body mass... A limited amount of 
available energy per unit will sustain a larger number of individuals of a small-sized 
species than of a bigger species… Assuming energy limitations, population densities of 
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large species are expected to be lower than those of smaller ones because of their higher 
total metabolic demand...”  
A fundamental interpretation of power law is from Kleiber’s law: the amount of 
energy that organisms need to sustain themselves, metabolism, scales with body mass 
according to 3/4( )Metabolism Body Mass∝ (Marquet, 2002).  Individuals’ rate of resource 
use and availability of resources are considered as critical factors in the development of 
the power law (Carbone and Gittleman, 2002).  The existence of the power law has been 
found in various areas other than biology and ecology.  Examples of the power law 
include the frequency of earthquakes of different magnitudes, the distribution of 
individual incomes, and the size distribution of organizations.   
 
2.3.4 Studies in Economics and Organization Theory 
In economics and market ecology, researchers have applied the biological 
competitive relationship to the population of economic organizations (firms) or 
individuals in the market place to identify mechanisms that construct some aggregate 
pattern or phenomenon in different industries (Singh, 1990).  One of the promising 
methodologies that have been applied in these areas is the evolutionary approach.  
Schumpeter (1912) presented the first evolutionary theory of economy in his 
book, Theory of Economic Development.  The critical idea in his theory is creative 
destruction based on innovation in economic organization.  The innovation is defined as 
an evolutionary process which creates new markets while destroying existing 
organizations.  The extinction of the horse and buggy industry due to the birth of the 
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automobile industry is an example.  Schumpeter’s evolutionary theory considers 
organizations as individuals that initiate innovation, which is considered as an 
exogenous variable in neoclassical economics.   
There are two opposing forces in his evolutionary theory: adaptation and 
innovation.  Adaptation is a process in which a market becomes stable.  Stability through 
adaptation is a conservative force in a market.  Opposing to the adaptation process, 
innovation is a disruptive force but endogenous (generated by organizations themselves).  
The entrepreneur disturbs the stability by his or her innovation.  If the innovation is 
successful, the entrepreneur creates new value and this success induces others to follow, 
which leads to a new adaptation process.  Organizations that succeed in the adaption 
survive and others that fail disappear (Summers, 1997).  
Nelson and Winter (1982) led the development of an evolutionary approach.  
They published a book, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change.  Nelson and 
Winter argue that a firm’s behavior is determined by the firm’s routines, which play the 
central role similar to the genes in biological evolution.  A firm’s routine is a persistent 
organizational feature that defines how they do business, and it governs the firm’s 
behavior.  They maintained that firms may have different routines and some firms 
outperform others due to better routines, which derive selective force in competition in a 
market.   
On the other hand, in organization theory, the two major mechanisms of changes 
in business organization are discussed in the literature: adaptation and selection (Singh, 
1990).  Earlier studies in organization studies emphasized adaptive change in business 
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organizations: organizations themselves modify their features to fit with environmental 
conditions.  Later, a selection approach by Hannan and Freeman (1977) has become 
dominant in this field of study (Singh, 1990).   
Hannan and Freeman (1977) proposed a population ecology perspective focusing 
on the mechanism of selection as an alternative to adaptation perspective.  They 
criticized the overemphasis of adaptive capability of organization.  According to them, 
organizations have limited ability to adapt.  Structural inertia in organizations restricts 
the organizations’ adaptive flexibility.  In addition, the organization’s capability to adapt 
is also subject to systematic selection through the competition among organizations in a 
population.   
These conflicting concepts between adaptations and selection have brought 
different views on the major mechanisms of organizational changes.  Scott (1987) 
asserted the two mechanisms are not incompatible, but complementary.  According to 
Scott, the selection mechanism is more favored by the population ecology while the 
adaptation mechanism by the resource dependency approach in which organizations are 
viewed as more active in determining their own fate than population ecology.  He 
maintained that the selection in population ecology is efficient to study core features 
(directly related to organization survival) of organizations, survival of smaller and more 
numerous organizations, and changes in organizational forms over long periods.  
Meanwhile, resource dependency approach that favors the adaptation mechanism 
emphasizes peripheral (non-core) features of organizations.   
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Meanwhile, Levinthal (1991) maintained that the two mechanisms for 
organizational changes are not mutually exclusive, but interrelated.  Organizational 
changes generate two types of risks; 1) uncertainty of the change (adaption) and 2) 
uncertainty regarding the organizational fitness (selection).  These two types of 
uncertainties are interrelated.  Adaption process affects organizations’ survival by 
making improvements presumably through organizational learning while reorganization 
against environmental changes to survive can accelerate organizational failure, which 
relates to selection process.  
The studies have proposed different concepts on evolutionary process in a market.  
Regardless of what mechanisms were adopted in these studies, the common goal of these 
studies is to understand the mechanism of organizational changes in a market.  The 
changes of interests include organizational birth, death, expansion (growth), contraction, 
and aggregate patterns or effects that emerge at the population level.  These studies 
consider the identified patterns as resultants of competition among individuals in a 
population and investigate underlying mechanisms of them.     
 
 
2.4  Size Distribution of Firms 
Economic researchers have questioned the hidden mechanism of the invariant 
phenomena in industrial structures, i.e., shapes in the size distributions of business 
organizations in different industries.  The findings are so widespread in different 
industries that researchers named these phenomena ‘stylized fact.’  Meanwhile, however 
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there are also many empirical findings different from the ‘stylized fact’ ( Kwasnicki& , 
1998).  The size distributions of firms in the question are usually highly skewed, but 
economic theory does not explain much about these observations (Simon and Bonini, 
1958).  
Literature review on the size distribution of business firms finds that there have 
been different explanations about the hidden mechanism questioned, but not confirmed:  
 Long-run average cost curves;  
 Gibrat’s law of proportionate effect; 
 Allocation of scare factors of production; and 
 Evolutionary process among heterogeneous organizations.  
Among these explanations, some of them already lost validity of their 
explanations due to the conflicting evidence found in later empirical studies.  Dispersed 
ideas are discussed in the literature for the explanations without provision of a 
confirmative answer.  Following is the description of the historical reviews on the 
relevant studies about the size distribution of business organizations in the economic 
market.  
 
2.4.1 Approaches Using Long-run Average Cost Curves 
It seems that the first effort to explain the size distribution of firms was by Viner 
(1932).  He proposed a theory of firm size using the concept of long-run average cost 
curves (LRAC).  His theory says that individual firms have U-shaped long-run average 
cost functions as they increase their production: economies of scale are effective up to a 
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certain amount of production, but diseconomies of scale prevail as production increases 
beyond a certain point.  So, there is the optimum level of production to have minimum 
unit cost per production.   
Based on the theory, firms produce at the minimum point of the curve while 
adjusting total industry production to market demand and at the aggregate level of a 
market, the size distribution of firms evolves through the allocation of production over 
firms to minimize total cost.  However, Viner’s theory has been weighed down by 
different explanations on the size distribution of firms proposed by the later studies 
(Lucas, 1978), which include following.   
 
2.4.2 Stochastic Approaches Using Gibrat’s Law 
Simon and Bonini (1958) proposed a new approach to the question.  They 
presented a stochastic mechanism using Gibrat’s law (1931) for firm growth to explain 
the highly skewed distribution of firm sizes.  The law states that the distribution of 
percentage changes in size of firms in a given size class is the same for firms in all size 
classes (Simon and Bonini, 1959).  Therefore, the rates of firm growth are independent 
of firm size.  The law can be explained using Equation 2.5 below: 
 
( ) ( 1) ( )i i i ix t x t tα β ε= + − +       [2.5] 
Where, ( )ix t is the log size of firm i at time t ,  
α is a growth component common to all firms, and 
ε is i.i.d (independent and identically distributed) random terms.  
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For all i , iβ is equal to 1, which means the expected rate of growth is 
independent of the current size of firms.   
After Simon and Bonini (1958), different stochastic models have been proposed.  
However, many of them simply applied modified forms of Gibrat’s law of proportionate 
effect (Ijiri and Simon, 1967).  Empirical findings in later studies have challenged 
Gibrat’s law.  Some empirical studies found that firm growth rate and their variations 
somewhat relate to firm size and age.  Meanwhile, other studies show small size firms 
grow faster and have low survival rates (Jovanovic (1982); Dosi et al. (1995)).    
 
2.4.3 Equilibrium Approaches 
Some later studies proposed different approaches that do not rely on Gibrat’s law.  
These studies consider the stability in size distribution of business firms as a realization 
of equilibrium in a market.  Lucas (1978) considered the stability in size distribution of 
firms as a competitive equilibrium.  He maintained the size distribution of firms emerges 
based on underlying distribution that is derived through optimum allocation of 
managerial talents and production factors across managers over firms while maximizing 
total output.  The proposed approach is resource-based.  In the model, a firm is defined 
as a collection of assets and the matching of managers (managerial talent) to asset 
collections can change over time periods.   
Similarly, Jovanovic (1982) considered competition and resultant market 
selection among heterogeneous individuals (they are different in terms of efficiency in 
production) as a process toward equilibrium.  Firms make production decisions under 
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imperfect information to maximize expected profits in an industry with a homogeneous 
output.  Both studies by Lucas (1978) and Jovanovic (1982) provide mathematical 
solution for the equilibrium problems.    
 
2.4.4 Evolutionary Approaches 
Recent studies have applied evolutionary approaches to model competition.  Dosi 
et al. (1995) questioned the invariant phenomena observed in a population of 
organizations: the invariant size distribution of organizations, the persistence of 
asymmetric firm performances, and the dynamics of entry and exit.  They developed an 
evolutionary model in which firms perform technical learning and competitiveness of a 
firm in a market depends on its learning.  Major features in the model can be 
summarized in Table 2.5.   
 
Table 2.5  Main Features in the Evolutionary Model by Dosi et al. (1995) 
Features Descriptions 
Firms’ 
Learning  Firms perform technical learning through a stochastic process. 
Heterogeneity 
among Firms 
 Heterogeneous firms have their own competitiveness, which is 
dependent on firms’ learning and the level of market selection specified 
in the model.  
Firm Size 
 Market share of a firm is relatively decided using the firm’s own 
competitiveness and the industry average competitiveness, which is 
affected by the degree of market selection. 
Firm Exit  An exit occurs when an individual firm’s competitiveness is below a certain level or its market share falls below a certain minimum level. 
Firm Entry 
 The number of entrants is random but proportional to the number of 
incumbents allowing possible spin-offs from incumbents.   
 Entrant’s competitiveness is randomly decided, but affected by level of 
entry barrier and level of opportunities in the market.   
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As recognized in Table 2.5, their evolutionary model requires specification of 
multiple model parameters which are qualitative such as the degree of market selection, 
the degree of entry barrier, and the level of opportunities in the market.  Dosi et al. 
(1995) maintained that the regularities in industrial structures are emergent properties 
derived through non-equilibrium interactions among heterogeneous firms that perform 
technological learning.   
Kwasnicki&  (1998) developed another evolutionary model to investigate the 
stability in skewed size distribution of firms relying on the genetic algorithm for the 
evolution process.  In his model, individual firms have their own routines and pursue 
innovations by spending research and development (R&D) funds.  Thus, this model 
basically follows Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction in the evolutionary process 
using innovation as driving force.  Individual firms make their own decision on price, 
production, and investment in a competitive environment.  Success in the search for 
innovation depends on R&D funds spent as well as publicized knowledge (firms 
publicize their own technique to the public, which enhances overall technology level in 
the market).   
Table 2.6 summarizes the main features in the evolutionary model.  Kwasnicki&  
(1998) asserted that the evolutionary process through the innovations in cost reduction 
and/or improvement of product technical performance results in the skewed distributions 
without specifying any role of economics of scale (i.e., the long-run average cost curves) 
and any rules for firm growth rates (i.e., Gibrat’s law).  Since construction firms do not 
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spend significant research and development funds, the evolutionary mechanism 
in Kwasnicki& ’s model is not applicable for construction firms.   
 
Table 2.6  Main Features in the Evolutionary Model by Kwasnicki&  (1998) 
Features Descriptions 
Firm’s routine 
 Firm routine decides variable costs of production, productivity of 
capital, and product characteristics for the firm.   
 The routines function like genes as in biology.  
 Firms’ routines evolve over time periods through mutation, 
recombination, transition, and transposition.   
Firm’s 
decisions 
 Individual firms make predictions about future markets.    
 Individual firms make decisions on price, production, and investment 
based on their own expectations expected profit and previous 
performances to maximize own objective functions.  
Innovation  An innovation occurs in unit cost reduction, growth of productivity of capital, and improvement of the product’s technical performance.  
Entrants and 
exits 
 A firm enters the market when its expected value of its objective 
function is greater than industry average.  
 A firm exit occurs in the opposite condition among existing firms.  
 
As found in the relevant studies, some entities having a better trait survive and 
others disappear in a competitive market.  However, in theoretical foundation, there are 
still disagreements: organisms influence their own environments and selection regimes, 
therefore in such cases boundaries between environmental development and 
organizational selection are not clear (Erwin and Krakauer, 2004).  There is a need of 
such competition study for construction contractors.  
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2.5  Discussion and Lessons from Other Competition Studies 
Competition studies in other areas provide more comprehensive perspectives on 
competition in a population of organizations than the competition studies in construction 
that mainly focused on competitive bidding while taking narrow or individual 
perspectives.  The comprehensive views are favored in investigating competition in a 
market or a population since they consider changes in organizational life-cycle (birth, 
expansion, contraction, and death) and aggregate industry patterns, which are resultants 
of competition.  Organizations’ expansion, contraction, and death are derived by a 
selection process that decides winners and losers in the market place.  The selection 
evolves through competition among individual organizations in a population.   
Especially, evolutionary approach is considered as one of the promising 
methodologies that can be used for the current investigation since it allows more 
comprehensive and long-term views on competition among contractors.  In the 
evolutionary approach, winners survive and prosper since they possess something unique 
compared to losers.     
Most of previous studies in construction missed an important question: How is 
success of a contractor defined?  Friedman (1956) specified the objective of a 
construction contractor in his model as maximization of total wealth of the firm.  
However, there is no specific representation of the maximization of firm wealth in the 
model.  Later models adopting the same conceptual framework also assume similar 
objectives for a firm.  Since the objective of these models is finding optimum markup or 
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bid amount for an individual firm for a job, their perspectives are narrow and limited.  In 
these studies, success of a firm is defined for a short-term.   
However, wining one profitable job does not guarantee a firm’s success.  Success 
can be attained through profitable and continuous business operations over time periods 
while competing with its competitors in a market place.  This fact is more critical in 
construction where contractors themselves do not generate market demand and they 
compete with each other to obtain job opportunities available in the market.  In the 
market, competition decides winners and losers.  Success of a firm should be analyzed 
within the domain of competition in a market place considering a long-term time frame, 
not for a single job.   
 
 
2.6  Summary 
Chapter II reviewed competition studies in construction as well as in other areas 
such as biology, ecology, economics, and management.  First, as to the competition 
studies in construction, they have focused on contractors’ decision problems in 
competitive bidding.  Various approaches and models have been proposed for better 
solutions; however there are still vacancies to be filled as summarized in Section 2.2.   
The missing concept can be filled out by investigating the effects of risk attitude.   
On the other hand, as to the competition studies in other areas, different 
mechanisms for organizational changes and industry evolution have been studied.  One 
of common approaches in these studies is analyzing empirical patterns externally 
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observed in different populations and figuring out the underlying mechanisms of the 
aggregate patterns.  The patterns are considered as resultants of competition among 
individuals in a population.  Relevant studies have investigated different organizational 
factors as hidden mechanisms or driving forces.  They include organizational innovation 
(Nelson and Winter (1977); Kwasnicki& (1998)), organizational learning, adaptation, or 
mutation (Fiol and Lyles (1985); Levinthal (1991); Dosi et al. (1995)), and so on.   
Most competition studies in construction can be criticized due to the static 
assumptions and the narrow perspective.  One needs to take a new and comprehensive 
perspective on the competition among heterogeneous contractors in risk attitude and 
their success in the market.  Competition studies in other areas provide new perspectives 
that have been not considered for the construction industry: broader view on a 
population of multiple individuals competing with each other and long-term view on an 
organization’s life cycle.  Success of a contractor needs to be defined within competition 
and analyzed for the long-term.     
Most of competition studies in other areas have been performed for other 
industries, mostly manufacturing industries.  To fill the missing concepts in the 
competition studies in construction and to have a better understanding of contractors’ 
competition in the industry, the current investigation needs to be conducted for the 
construction industry by considering the unique characteristics of the construction 
business.   
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CHAPTER III 
RISK ATTITUDE AND FIRM PERFORMANCES 
 
Chapter III reviews studies on organizational risk attitude and firm performances 
and discusses the construction industry characteristics and contractors’ business failure.  
The discussion reveals the criticality of contractors’ risk-taking behavior and 
competition in the construction business.   
 
3.1  Organizational Culture and Risk Attitude 
In management and organization studies, organizational culture has been studied 
to identify relationships between organizational culture and individual firms’ 
performances.  This section reviews the relevant studies.     
 
3.1.1 Organizational Culture 
Organizations develop their own culture.  Organizational culture is considered as 
an organization’s inherent characteristics that govern its business pattern or behavior.  
Culture of an organization is a trait that characterizes the organization.  Studies found 
that culture varies across organizations, even in homogeneous industries (Chatman and 
Jehn, 1994).    
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Many organization studies have been conducted to figure out what organizational 
cultures are, why organizations have different cultures, how culture affects individual 
firm’s behavior and their performance, and whether organizational culture can be a 
source of competitive advantage (Barney (1986); Camerer and Vepsalainen (1988)).  
These organization studies are based on the intuitive idea that an organization will 
perform better when its employees are highly motivated and dedicated to common goals 
under its culture.  One general hypothesis in organizational studies is that strong culture 
enhances firm performance ( S rensenφ , 2002). 
Barney (1986) asserted that a firm’s culture can be a sustainable competitive 
advantage if the culture is valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable.  Firms are expected 
to be effective if they have the right traits that fit to other organizational features within 
an organization that include structure, systems, and people.  However, cultural risks 
evolve if they do not match (Schwartz and Davis, 1981).   
Definitions of organizational culture are divergent and competing in the literature 
(Barney, 1986).  Following are examples of definitions of organizational culture and 
characteristics of organizational culture available in the literature.  
Barney (1986) defines organizational culture as “It is typically defined as a 
complex set of values, beliefs, assumptions, and symbols that define the way which a 
firm conducts its business.”   
Schein (2004) defines organizational culture as “A pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation 
and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
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therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems.”  
According to Schein (2004), organizational culture has the following four major 
characteristics: 1) structural stability; 2) depth; 3) breadth; and 4) integration and 
patterning.  Each of them can be shortly described as below.  
 Structural stability: an organizational culture becomes a stabilizing force within 
an organization when the organization develops its own sense of group identity. 
Then, it is difficult to give up the culture developed.  
 Depth: organizational culture is less tangible and less visible because it is the 
unconscious and deep part of a group.  Therefore, outsiders would have difficulty 
to figure out others’ organizational culture.   
 Breadth: organizational culture is so pervasive that all aspects of organizational 
activities are influenced by it.   
 Integration and patterning: organizational culture integrates organizational 
climate, values, and behaviors together into a whole while developing patterns 
within an organization.  
In short, organizational culture deeply governs organizational activities through 
integration and patterning the organization’s behaviors and rationales while developing 
organizational stability so that it is not easy to change.  These definitions and 
characteristics remind one of the firms’ routines in Nelson and Winter (1982) discussed 
in Chapter II.   
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Based on the above definitions and the characteristics of organizational culture, 
organizational culture plays critical roles in an organization.  In that, many studies have 
been conducted to identify the relationships between organizational culture and firm 
performance: what differences in culture among firms exist and how the differences 
explain variations in performance among the firms.   
However, it is very difficult to quantify or measure organizational culture of 
individual firms.  Calori and Sarnin (1991) explain the difficulties in studying the effects 
of organizational culture on firm performance as “the evaluation of organizational 
culture requires in-depth and long-term longitudinal studies for individual firms and it 
requires a large sample size to derive a statistically meaningful result.”  Due to the 
difficulty, questionnaire survey has been favored in many empirical studies.   
Calori and Sarnin (1991) performed a limited case study using a questionnaire 
survey for five French business firms.  They surveyed 260 individuals in the five firms 
regarding individual perceptions on organizational practices to investigate the 
relationship between firm culture and performances.  In their study, firm performance 
was measured based on return on investment, return on equity, and return on sales using 
financial data of the firms.  They found that the intensity and homogeneity of the firm 
culture are positively correlated with firms’ relative growth and also that some cultural 
attributes and associated management practices are positively correlated with firms’ 
performance.  However, their study is limited due to the small number of firms.   
Chatman and Jehn (1994) also performed a questionnaire survey to figure out 
whether differences in organizational culture exist between industries.  It aimed at 
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identifying relationships between organizational culture and different industry 
characteristics.  Levels of technological innovation and growth rate were assumed to be 
the major differences in industry characteristics.  The questionnaire survey was 
conducted for fifteen U.S. firms in four different industries, which however are all 
service industries.  Surveyed firms are major players in their industries.  The survey 
results found that industry membership accounts for differences in organizational culture 
of firms, but with high variance.  They could not confirm any causal relationship 
between organizational culture and the industry characteristics, i.e., growth and 
innovation which they assumed as major differentiators.  
S rensenφ (2002) questioned environmental effects regarding organizational 
culture.  He viewed organizational culture of a firm as the product of histories of 
organizational learning over time periods and future capability in learning.  Assuming 
that strong culture would not be efficient in adaption since strong culture cannot be 
easily changed, S rensenφ  hypothesized that the relationship between firms’ 
performance and firms’ culture would depend on different environmental conditions.  
Relying on a previous study by Kotter and Heskett (1992) which was a questionnaire 
survey for multiple firms on the cultural strength of organizations, S rensenφ (2002) 
combined his analysis on firms’ performances using COMPUSTAT data with Kotter and 
Heskett’s survey results.  S rensenφ  found that firms that have strong cultures have less 
variable performance than other firms in stable business environments while the benefit 
of strong culture decreases as environmental volatility increases.   
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Despite some differences in findings, these studies identify the existence of the 
effects of organizational culture on firm performances focusing on the strength of 
organizational culture and differences in industry characteristics.   
 
3.1.2 Organizational Risk Attitude 
Schein (2004) provides another definition of organizational culture, “the 
accumulated shared learning of a group covering behavioral, emotional, and cognitive 
elements of the group members’ total psychological functions.”  Then, organizational 
risk attitude, a part of organizational culture, can be defined as a shared preference 
toward uncertainties, covering behavioral, emotional, and cognitive elements in an 
organization’s business decisions and activities when the organization faces uncertain 
situation.   
Organizational risk attitude is also subconscious within an organization.  Hillson 
and Murray-Webster (2005) provides a definition of risk attitude, “a chosen state of 
mind with regard to uncertainties that could have positive or negative effect on 
objectives … risk attitudes are usually adopted sub-consciously.“   
The risk attitude of an organization defines what risks can be accepted and what 
risks cannot be accepted within the organization.  In a risky situation, individuals or 
organizations perceive the situation in their own ways, which are affected by their own 
risk attitude.  Therefore, depending on their own perceptions, individuals or 
organizations may make different responses even to an identical uncertain situation.   
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It has been recognized in the literature that individuals and organizations may 
have different risk attitudes.  Traditionally, the differences in risk attitude have been 
represented using utility theory and utility functions (von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944).  Walls and Dyer (1996) and Pennings and Smidts (2000; 2003) found the 
presence of heterogeneity in risk attitude using utility functions among petroleum firms 
and agricultural organizations, respectively.   
Pennings and Smidts (2000) assert that different risk attitudes can explain the 
differences in how firms do their businesses based on their computer-assisted interviews 
of 346 Dutch owner-managers of hog farms.  The study measured different risk attitudes 
among firms and identified/categorized different ways the firms conduct business in 
terms of risk management.  They found that risk-averse managers appear to be less 
innovative and more intent on reducing fluctuations in net income and profit margin.  
Similarly, Pennings and Smidts (2003) found differences in utility functions among the 
different managers based on measurements among 332 owner-managers.   
In management, many studies assume that business managers are somewhat risk-
averse.  Meanwhile, there are researchers questioning the assumption of global risk-
aversion (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988).  However, in general the literature provides 
evidences of heterogeneity in risk attitude among organizations (Walls and Dyer (1996); 
Pennings and Smidts (2000, 2003)).  These findings of heterogeneity in risk attitude and 
resultant differences in the ways they do business lead to other research questions about 
the relationships between risk attitude and firm performance.  
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3.2  Strategic Management Studies 
Strategic management studies in this review focus on firm performances with 
respect to firms’ risk-return association and diversification.  Organizational risk-taking 
and its effects on firm’s performance have been critical issues in strategic management 
(Bromiley, 1991).  There are a significant amount of studies investigating risk-return 
association, mainly focusing on relationships between average returns and variance in 
returns.  Also, related studies have been performed about firms’ diversification as a 
corporate strategy for growth and risk management.    
 
3.2.1 Risk-return Association 
Question in the management studies about risk-return association is how much 
firms earn at what levels of risk in their investments.  These studies have tried to identify 
relationships between firms’ average returns and variance in the returns using firms’ 
historical data.   
Earlier studies found positive correlations between average returns and variance 
(heteroskedasiticity) in the returns, which was presumably based on conventional 
wisdom in economics (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1985).  However, recent empirical 
results have been varying and conflicting.  Some studies found positive relationships 
while others found negative or non-significant relationships.  As explained in detail 
below, different studies provide controversial results depending on the data used, time 
periods covered by data, and measurements applied in their analyses.    
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The series of finding negative relationships in risk-return association have been 
led by Bowman (1980).  Bowman (1980) found negative relationship between the level 
of return and variance in the returns.  His analysis found that low performance firms take 
more risks (later studies name it Bowman’s Paradox or Risk-return Paradox).  It is a 
paradox since risky tasks or jobs are supposed to be more profitable in order to be 
attractive to firms: higher profits are expected to be associated with high risks (greater 
variances): positive association.  Before Bowman, most of previous empirical studies 
reported positive relationships.   
On the other hand, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1985) found the relationship in 
risk-return association to vary over time.  In their analysis using COMPUSTAT data, 
they found that the relationship was negative during the first time period (1960s) and it 
was positive during the second period (1970s).  In addition, they found differences in the 
risk-return association in different industries, which lead to questions about underlying 
factors related to industry specific environment and characteristics.  
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1985) showed instability of relationship depending on 
data periods as well as instability of results using different risk measures: accounting-
based measure (average ROE and ROE variance) vs. market-based measure (variance in 
returns to market investors).  Based on these variant results, they asserted that the studies 
on risk-return association depend on the measurement of risk applied in analysis.  They 
pointed out the problem in ex-post measure of risk (variance in realized results) while 
risk is an ex-ante concept.   
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In many empirical studies using actual data, risk is usually measured as variance 
of outcome (ex-post measure).  However, a decision is made before the outcome is 
realized (ex ante).  Therefore, the measurement of risk in these studies is variability of 
realized outcomes, not risk that a decision maker perceives at the time of decision 
making.   
Bromiley (1991) applied a different approach to risk measurement.  He 
developed a dynamic model that constitutes two multiple regression sub-models (risk 
model and performance model) which have lagged variables to investigate the 
relationships between the amount of risk taken by firms and firm performance.  He 
measured, for an ex-ante measure of risk, variances in the securities analysts’ forecasts 
of earnings per share for the year instead of using the conventional measure of risk (ex-
post: variances in realized returns).  Two sources of data were used: accounting data 
from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT and the analyst forecast data from Institutional 
Brokers' Estimate System, IBES.  The data cover 288 companies from 1976 to 1987.  
The result presents a causal relationship that states poor past performance increases risk-
taking and the increased risk-taking results in another poor performance in next years.   
Besides the studies discussed above, there are many studies on risk-return 
association, but providing controversial results.  Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) 
provide an extensive survey of studies on the risk-return association by tabulating major 
studies historically performed.  Their survey confirms the existence of controversies on 
risk-return association. 
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3.2.2 Diversification 
The association of risk-return performance with corporate strategies, especially 
diversification as a risk management strategy, has been investigated in empirical studies 
for industrial organizations (Palepu (1985); Chang and Thomas (1989)).  In many 
industries, it is easy to find that large firms usually diversify in their growth.  However, 
there are somewhat divergent views on firms’ diversification, as discussed below.  
Diversification, especially market diversification, is a departure from a firm’s 
current experience base and it can be a riskier choice than improving its current 
performance in the current market a specialized firm knows best.  Meanwhile, in modern 
portfolio theory, diversification is described as a way to reduce risk and risk-averse 
investors are expected or want to be diversified (Rubinstein, 2002).  
There have been many empirical studies on the relationship between 
diversification and firm performances.  However, similar to the studies on risk-return 
association, no consensus has been reached about the relationship between firm 
diversification and firm performance (Pandya and Rao (1998); Chang and Thomas 
(1989)).   
In construction, there are a relatively very small number of strategic studies and 
most of them, unfortunately, borrow theories and recommendations directly or indirectly 
from management studies.  Regarding firm diversification, there are few studies.  
Nevertheless, following are several studies in construction regarding to firm 
diversification as a corporate strategy.   
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For construction, Heney (1985) asserted that the best strategy for construction 
firms would be the combination of specialization and diverse market segments.  In 
addition, Tasi (1994) developed multiple regression models using the data of 100 
construction firms and concluded that specialization would be favorable to maximize 
expected return while diversification would result in lower risk.  However, Choi and 
Russell (2005) performed a longitudinal data analysis using 12 years’ data of 108 public 
construction firms and found no significant difference in performance between high and 
low diversification firms.  
On the other hand, there are many studies regarding the relationship between 
firm diversification and performance for other industries.  However, their study results 
also vary.  Palepu (1985) found no significant profitability difference between firms with 
high and low diversification using data of 30 firms from the food products industry. 
Chang and Thomas (1989) also found no significant difference and suggested that firm 
size better explains the differences in firm performance than diversification, using data 
of 64 firms (in multiple industries) from the COMPUSTAT database.  
There are more instances showing controversial results.  Gort (1962) examined 
diversified firms’ profitability using 111 large U.S. firms and found no significant 
relationship between diversification and firm performance.  On the contrary, Pandya and 
Rao (1998) found using a large sample of firm data (about 2,000 firms in multiple 
industries from the Compustat database) that the group of diversified firms tends to 
perform better on average, but the best performing firms are specialized.  Also, they 
 
 
 
71
found that specialized firms show higher performance in average return on equity, but 
they have high volatility in performance comparing with the diversified firms. 
 
3.2.3 Limits of Empirical Studies  
Previous empirical studies provide controversial results.  Chang and Thomas 
(1989) maintained that a causal linkage between diversification strategy and risk-return 
performance is still not confirmed, and they proposed to consider managerial risk 
attitude for future studies.  
Walls and Dyer (1996) pointed out a critical problem in the empirical studies on 
risk-return association.  Risk is usually measured as variance of outcome (ex-post 
measure), which becomes available after the outcome of an event is realized. But, a 
decision is made before the outcome is realized (ex-ante).  It is difficult to figure out 
how the decision maker perceived a risky situation and made a decision at the time of 
decision making.  This problem has been discussed in the literature by other researchers 
(Bowman (1982), Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1985, 1988), and Bromiley (1991)). 
Thus, empirical studies using ex-post measures have limitations and their results 
may be unreliable.  To resolve this problem, Walls and Dyer (1996) reconstructed risky 
alternatives that firms might have considered at the time of investment decision using the 
historical data of petroleum firms.  As a result, they derived an inference of the 
relationship between firm performance and risk attitude: moderately risk-taking firms 
show better return on assets.  
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Most of strategic management studies have been performed for other industries 
than construction.  Unfortunately, in construction, it is difficult to find longitudinal data 
on contractors’ performances since many contractors are privately owned and do not 
publicize their business information.  The current study performed a data search to find 
that only a small number of construction firms’ financial data are available in 
COMPUSTAT database, which have been frequently used in many strategic 
management studies discussed above.  
 
 
3.3  Characteristics of the Construction Industry 
As found in the literature review in Chapter II, there have been many studies on 
competitive bidding for construction contractors.  However, there are relatively small 
amount of studies focusing on other industry level problems and other aspects of 
competition in the industry.  Meanwhile, strategic management studies on relevant issues 
have been conducted for other industries than construction.  As Ramsay (1989) asserted, 
some aspects of business strategies developed for manufacturing firms have little 
relevance to construction contractors.   
Characteristics of the construction industry differentiate the industry from most 
other industries (Hillebrandt and Cannon, 1989).  The current section discusses unique 
characteristics of the construction industry and reviews the industry level problems with 
respect to competition.  It is valuable to review the unique characteristics of the 
 
 
 
73
construction industry since it helps understand the criticality of construction contractors’ 
risk-taking and competition in the construction industry.      
 
3.3.1 Fragmentation 
The construction industry is highly fragmented (Drew and Skitmore, 1997).  
Consider other industries such as car manufacturing industry.  There are a relatively 
small number of firms occupying large shares of the market.  Comparing to this type of 
industries that have high levels of concentration, in construction, even the largest firms 
are small in their shares of the market (Broemser, 1968).  Why there are not such large 
construction firms?   
A market structure evolves through competition in a market.  In economics, 
market structure, or called market form, describes the state of a market regarding 
competition within the market.  In theory, different conditions of competition in the 
market are described by monopoly, oligopoly, perfect competition, and monopolistic 
competition (Forgang and Einolf, 2006).  In monopoly, only one provider occupies a 
market.  In oligopoly, a small number of firms own major percentages of the market 
share.  In the opposite of the monopoly, perfect competition describes a market where 
there are a very large number of firms compete with each other producing a 
homogeneous product.  Monopolistic competition describes a market where there are a 
large number of independent firms which have a very small proportion of the market 
share and the competition is not focused on pricing.   
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In the construction industry, there are a large number of firms occupying a very 
small fraction of the market share.  Some similarities are found in perfect competition 
and monopolistic competition for the construction industry.  However, the both 
descriptions do not exactly fit to the construction industry.  In construction, every 
construction project is different and unique, information in the market is not perfect, and 
a competition occurs among multiple contractors for a job that is initiated by one client, 
while pricing is one of the most frequently used marketing strategies by contractors in 
the competition.   
In this fragmented market, contractors (producers) do not have control over their 
jobs (products) as much as other manufacturing firms have.  Possible reasons for the 
fragmentation of this industry include the low entry barrier in the construction business.  
The low entry barrier allows many new entrants to a market, which raises the level of 
competition unless the available job opportunities increase in the market.   
 
3.3.2 High Entry and Exit Rates 
The construction industry is one of the weakest industries with respect to 
corporate insolvency risk (Hall (1994); Power (2002)).  The construction industry is 
infamous for high exit rates.  According to Dun and Bradstreet’s 1997 data, business 
failure rate was 88 among 10,000 firms for the all U.S. industry and it was 116 for 
construction (Koksal and Arditi, 2004).  Meanwhile construction market has low entry 
and exit barriers (Drew and Skitmore, 1997).   
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Major causes of the high exit rate include low profitability, high level of risks, 
and severe competition in the construction business, and high dependency on general 
economic condition.  The industry is subjective to general economic condition so that it 
is not easy for construction contractors to avoid the negative effects when there are 
unfavorable impacts in economy.   
Also, it would be in part due to the high entry rate, which keeps increasing the 
total volume of the industry capacity even though the industry has the highest exit rate.  
Construction is a labor intensive industry.  It is relatively easy to start a business with 
little or no capital, which causes the high entry rate.  An increased industry capacity can 
cause a higher level of competition in the market when market demand does not increase 
enough.   
 
3.3.3 Derived Demand 
Construction business is sometimes described by its high dependency on general 
economic conditions since construction demand is a derived demand depending on 
general economic conditions.  And, construction demand is usually considered to be 
relatively inelastic to changes in construction price (Rawlinson and Raftery, 1997).   
Differently from other types of business which can create the demand for their 
new product or service, construction demands are not generated by construction firms 
and contractors only respond to the derived demand.  About 99% of the work is from 
derived demand in the construction industry (Rice and Heimbach, 2007).  In 
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construction, contractors obtain their jobs by contract.  In contracting, contractors have 
limited control over their contracts (Ramsay, 1989).   
Since every single project is essential input for firm’s operation in construction 
business, acquisition of new contracts is a critical managerial function in a construction 
organization (Willenbrock, 1973).  Contractors have to pursue for jobs available in the 
market (Rice and Heimbach, 2007).  These facts and the large number of small firms 
explain the high level of competition in the construction market.   
In general, there is a typical time lag between demand cycle and the industry 
capacity cycle due to imperfect information or forecast of market changes (Dearden et 
al., 1999).  This time lag also can be exaggerated by firms’ reluctance to shrink in size 
while desiring to grow.  With changes in market demand, imbalances between industry 
capacity and market demand are observed in this industry.   
 
3.3.4 High Risks to Contractors 
Also, the industry is commonly characterized by high level of risks and low 
profitability due to high competition.  With regard to the high level of risks in the 
business, owners are in most cases protected by bonding when contractors fail while 
contractors themselves have no such protection (Rice and Heimbach, 2007).   
Contractors take risks in their business.  Their compensations for delivering a 
complete facility are based on their winning bids, especially in competitive bidding 
environment.  That is, the profits of a construction firm are not determined by that firm 
itself.  They are determined by competition with the firm’s competitors.     
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In order to win a job, contractors compete with their peers.  In competitive 
bidding, price is the most critical factor in competition among contractors.  Wining jobs 
with low bids lowers contractors’ profitability, which is observed more often, especially 
when market conditions go down and so the level of competition becomes high.     
 
3.3.5 Low Level of Innovation and Inefficiency in Learning 
Industries differ in terms of the level of innovative efforts, how to pursue 
innovation, and significance of output from the innovation (Dosi et al., 1995).  Pries and 
Janszen (1995) analyzed the 46 years historical data of Dutch construction to figure out 
the trend of innovations in the industry.  They found that Dutch construction industry has 
experienced slow changes compared to other industries.  In their findings, the major 
contributor of industry innovations is suppliers, not contractors.  Over 70% of all 
innovations originate from supply industries.  The findings by Pries and Janszen (1995) 
would be applicable to other countries since construction business is not significantly 
different between countries.   
The low level of innovation and inefficiency in learning would be due to the 
unique characteristics of the construction business.  At the project level, each 
construction project is a different mix of labor, materials, equipment, supervision, 
subcontracted work, etc. (Benjamin, 1969).  A project is delivered by a cooperation of 
different organizations including general contractor, subcontractors, material producers 
and/or suppliers.  The cooperation ends at the completion of the project and thus there 
exist no efficient learning mechanism.  Hegazy and Moselhi (1995) pointed out the 
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limited exchange of information and the industry fragmentation for no agreed general 
rules for cost estimation among contractors.   
An innovation, whatever it is (for example, a better risk management, a better 
estimation technique, or an innovative project delivery system), could be attained more 
and often when learning by industry participants is accumulated in an efficient way.  
However, it seems not easy due to the unique industry characteristics in construction.  
Also, any innovation developed by contraction firms cannot be appropriated by that firm 
because the knowledge is immediately available to the firm’s competitors due to 
interchange of people.  Hence there is no way to sustain competitive advantage from 
technology.   
 
3.3.6 Risk and Competition, the Unchanged Characteristics 
It is quietly sure that the construction industry has been and will change and 
improve by applying new materials, new construction methods, advanced project 
delivery methods, etc.  However, there is one thing that has not changed: contractors 
have to deal with risks inherent in their jobs and they always face competition in the 
market.   
Competitive bidding is the major mechanism where contractors compete with 
each other to obtain jobs.  According to a questionnaire survey performed by Hegazy 
and Modelhi (1995) for large general contractors in the U.S. and Canada, the majority of 
the contractors obtain their jobs through competitive bidding, as shown in Table 3.1.  
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Overall, about 73% of the contractors obtain more than 50% of their work through 
competitive bidding.   
 
Table 3.1  Work from Competitive Bidding 
Percentage of Work Percentage of Respondents 
76~100% of work 46% 
51~75% of work 27% 
25~50% of work 17% 
0~10% of work 10% 
 
Of course, competitive bidding is not the only mechanism in which contractors 
obtain jobs in the construction market.  There are different contract methods and project 
delivery methods.  However, even in other methods, there are still competitions among 
contractors and contractors need to take risks in different forms.  The other mechanisms 
usually involve some assumption of risks by the client.   
The characteristics of the industry discussed in previous sections may be 
considered just as unfavorable phenomena in construction.  However, one can see 
potential improvements and large opportunities by making risk management and 
competition strategy more efficient.   
 
 
3.4  Contractors’ Business Failure 
Construction contractors’ business failure has been seriously recognized.  
However, many business failure studies have been performed for other industries than 
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construction such as manufacturing industry.  Many of failure studies aim at predicting 
individual firms’ bankruptcy using firms’ financial ratios.   
The prediction models by Altman (1968, 1983) and Edmister (1971) showed 
good performance in predicting business bankruptcy for firms in other industries.  The 
famous Altman’s Z-scores have been tested in many empirical studies.  However, there 
are criticisms on the usage of these models.  From a manager’s perspective, it would be 
too late to make corrective actions to avoid the predicted failure when the prediction is 
available.    
In construction, Kangari (1988) reported that the major causes/symptoms of 
business failure in construction include bad economic performance, management 
incompetence and lack of experience, inadequate sales, loss of market and economic 
decline, and difficulty collecting from customers.  He developed a macroeconomic 
model (a regression model) to predict business failures in the construction industry 
considering overall external factors influencing contractors.   
Meanwhile, Arditi et al. (2000) found that about eighty percent of the 
construction business failures find their main causes in the budgetary and 
macroeconomic issues that include insufficient profits (26.7%), industry weakness 
(22.7%), heavy operating expenses (17.8%), insufficient capital (8.29%) and 
burdensome institutional debt (5.93%).  
Some studies paid attentions to nonfinancial or organizational aspects.  Koksal 
and Arditi (2004) developed a statistical model to predict construction firms’ decline.  
From the analysis based on questionnaire survey, they found that organizational 
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structure, human capital issues, and strategic posture are important in evaluation of a 
construction firm’s condition.   
A recent study by Rice and Heimbach (2007) provides more advanced views on 
contractors’ business failures.  Differently from previous studies which identify “surface 
level causes”, the study tried to reach a deeper understanding of contractors’ failure by 
identifying “causal roots of failure.”  They performed an extensive study over a variety 
of sources including industry financial data, case studies, consulting reports, failure 
prediction models, executive interviews, etc.  The study categorizes failure causes into 
four groups:  
 General economic conditions; 
 Nature of the construction industry; 
 Culture and systems of the organization; and 
 Mind of the contractor.  
These factors are interacting with each other leading to contractor’s failure.  
Notably, organizational characteristics such as culture of the organization and 
contractors’ mindset are identified as critical factors.  The mind of the contractor 
includes followings: 
 Driven to grow and unwilling to contract: most contractors by nature desire to 
grow business and they are reluctant to contract in size. 
 Numb to risk: getting insensitive to high risk in the construction business. 
 Hyper-optimistic and overconfident: can-do attitude, they believe they can 
control the risks. 
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 Project manager vs. CEO: most leaders were former project managers or 
superintendents who do not have knowledge of business.  This problem is usually 
found in small construction firms.   
This in-depth reasoning for the contractors’ business failure reveals that 
organizational culture and risk attitude are critical root causes that lead to surface-level 
failure factors that have been identified as major causes by many previous failure studies.   
 
 
3.5  Summary 
The chapter provides literature reviews of the organizational issues: 
organizational culture and risk attitude, and the strategic management issues: the 
relationships between firm performance and firm risk-taking behavior (risk-return 
association) and between firm performance and firm diversification (diversification as a 
corporate risk management).  The reviews confirm that organizations have different risk 
attitudes.  And, the risk attitude as well as environmental risk factors and competition 
governs an organization’s business decision and risk-taking behaviors.   
Many empirical studies have been conducted to identify the relationships 
between firm performance and risk-taking behavior and/or firm diversification in the 
market.  However, unfortunately, these studies provide controversial results that vary 
depending on the data they used for the analyses.  Major limits in these empirical studies 
are 1) measurement of risk (ex-ante measure vs. ex-post measure) and 2) the data used in 
different studies.  To obtain statistically reliable results, a large size of longitudinal data 
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for a large number of firms is required.  However, it is difficult to obtain such a set of 
large longitudinal data.  For construction, such data are even more limited.  Many 
empirical studies have such limitations.   
Competition and other characteristics of the construction industry were reviewed.  
The industry is characterized by various unfavorable terms: fragmentation, high exit rate, 
bankruptcy, high dependency on general economic condition, high risks, high level of 
competition, low innovation by contractors, etc.  Risk management and competition are 
in the center of these characteristics of the industry.  In this fragmented, risky, and 
highly competitive business environment, one could see potential improvements and 
large opportunities by making risk management and competition strategy more efficient.   
Regarding contractors’ business failure, most of the previous failure studies have 
paid attention to surface-level problems that are observable externally.  A recent study 
by Rice and Heimbach (2007) provides new and different views on the causes of 
contractors’ business failure: organizational issues were identified as critical underlying 
factors.  Organizational behaviors and business patterns are affected by their own culture.  
Especially, risk attitude will a play critical role when contractors make risky choice 
facing uncertain environment.  Their risk attitude as the basis of their risk perception and 
corresponding decisions could have critical effects on their performance: success vs. 
failure.   
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSES OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY DATA 
 
It is difficult to measure individual contractors’ risk attitudes and it is more 
different to evaluate the combined effects of different risk attitudes among multiple 
individuals in competition.  Also, there are few available data for such an analysis.  
When selection drives evolution through the competition in a market, the effects of 
competition are expected to evolve in some forms at the aggregate level.  Then, the 
effects of risk attitude on competition can be identified by analyzing the aggregate 
patterns.  These facts lead to the need to infer risk attitudes from aggregate industry data 
that are available with respect to competition.   
The current chapter performs analyses of the construction industry data to 
identify the aggregate patterns that are the resultants of competition among contractors.  
In construction, most of the available data are cross-sectional, and longitudinal data are 
limited.  Construction industry data used in the analyses include:   
 U.S. Top 400 Contractors by Engineering News-Record (from 1995 to 2007) 
 2002 Economic Census by the U.S. Census Bureau 
 Statistics of U.S. Business (SUSB) by the U.S. Census Bureau  
o Dynamic Data (from 1995 to 2004) 
o Static Data (from 1997 to 2005) 
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The phenomena or aggregate effects of interest are the size distribution of firms, 
organizational capacity changes by birth, death, expansion, and contraction, and market 
diversification.  Size distributions of construction contractors are computed using the 
ENR data and the 2002 Economic Census data, separately.  Organizational capacity 
changes are computed using the SUSB data which comprise annual data consisting of 
dynamic data and static data.  And, contractors’ diversification patterns are identified 
using the ENR data.  The following sections provide descriptions about each of the 
industry data sets and the empirical findings through the analyses performed using the 
data.   
 
 
4.1  Size Distribution - ENR US Top 400 Contractors 
The size distribution of firms has been studied in economics since it provides a 
view on market structure (sometimes called market form): how much market share is 
obtained by various firms.  Market structure describes the state of a market with respect 
to competition in the market.  The construction industry is not concentrated but highly 
fragmented, as discussed in Section 3.3.1.    
 
4.1.1 Size Distribution of ENR Contractors 
Engineering News-Record (ENR, 2008) publishes summary data about the U.S. 
top 400 contractors every year.  It has been 50 years since 1958 when ENR first ranked 
 
 
 
86
construction contractors.  In the first list of 1958, there were only sixty two contractors 
ranked based on their 1956 domestic new contract awards.  At that time, the firm 
rankings were based on the data for contractors’ domestic new contract awards 
published in Construction Daily (ENR, 2008).   
Tabulations of top contractors’ data that are self-reported have been improved 
over years.  The recent data provide firms’ rankings by total gross revenue, the ranked 
firms’ international revenues, new contract awards, and previous year rank.  The data 
also classify the construction industry into different sectors and provide the ranked 
firms’ percent of total revenues in each sector.   
The current format of the data tabulation has been used since 1995.  Before 1995, 
firms were ranked based on new contract volume and there were no revenue data for 
each sector.  Each annual publication of the ENR U.S. top 400 contractors is based on 
the previous-year data of the contractors, i.e., firm ranks and revenues data published in 
year 2008 are based on their business operations in year 2007.   
The current analysis uses only the data set in which contractors are ranked based 
on their gross revenues since firm ranks based on new contract volumes are often 
inconsistent as a measure of firm size: sometimes, firms obtain large projects that will be 
performed over several years and then with a large backlog to work off they do not 
obtain many jobs during the next several years.  As a result, available data for the current 
analysis cover 14 years from 1994 (published in May 1995) to 2007 (published in May 
2008).   
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Currently, the ENR data classify the industry into eight sectors: 1) general 
building; 2) manufacturing; 3) power; 4) water supply and sewerage/solid waste; 5) 
industrial process and petroleum; 6) transportation; 7) hazardous waste; and 8) 
telecommunications.  Descriptions of these classified sectors are in Appendix 1.  The last 
sector, telecommunications, has appeared in the data only since the year 2000.  The 
industry had been classified into seven sectors before year 2000.  The change is due to 
the significant increase of construction work in the telecommunications market.   
In the data, each ranked firm reports its total gross revenues and revenue 
percentages in each sector.  There are cases that revenue percentages in different sectors 
do not add up to 100% due to the other miscellaneous market category.  However, it was 
found that over the last 14 years, on average, 98.2% of the total revenues of the 400 
firms are accounted in the data.  
Using these ENR data, the size distribution of the contractors can be measured by 
their gross revenues.  Figure 4.1 shows the size distribution of the ENR 400 contractors 
on a logarithmic scale (log-log plot), which is the common method that biologists and 
market ecologists apply in many competition studies as discussed in Chapter II.  The size 
distribution of organizations has been considered as a resultant aggregate pattern 
evolving through competition in a population.   
In Figure 4.1, the R-squared value of the trend line of 14 years average is very 
high, about 0.94, which is considered very good for data of this kind.  Note that the 
contractors in the list change every year depending on their annual gross revenues.  
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Therefore, the samples (the contractors) vary over years while the total number of 
samples is constant at 400.    
Contractors with various sizes measured by their gross revenues have different 
frequencies.  The largest contractors that have gross revenues greater than $3,000M 
(about 8.0 in the logarithm) have very small frequencies, i.e., 1, 2, or 3 (zero, 0.7, or 1.1 
in the logarithm).  The 14-year average line shows negative values of the natural log of 
the number of firms.  It is because the small frequencies of the largest firms were 
averaged for the 14 years.  Note that the natural log of value x is negative when 0 < x < 1.  
Refer to Appendix 2 for a better view of the size distribution for each year.  
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Figure 4.1  Size Distribution of ENR U.S. Top 400 Contractors 
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The largest contractors have high percentages of their total revenues from 
international projects while showing very small frequencies over 14 years.  Their sparse 
patterns can be removed to construct the size distribution of firms to represent the 
competition among the remaining firms.  Figure 4.2 shows the size distribution of firms 
without the largest firms that make negative logarithm values in the 14 years average 
trend line in Figure 4.2.  Without the largest firms, R-squared is improved to 0.986 and 
the regression coefficients are essentially unchanged.  On an annual average over the 14 
years, 394 firms (98.5% of the total 400 firms) in the data are accounted for in Figure 4.2.   
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Figure 4.2  Size Distribution of ENR Contractors w/o the Largest Firms 
 
The high values of 2R in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 confirm the presence of the power 
law in construction.  This empirical finding links competition in construction to 
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competition studies in ecology or biology: the power law governs the population of 
construction contractors and this would be the aggregate pattern that evolves through the 
contractors’ (organizations’) competition for common job opportunities (resources) 
available in the market (environment).   
 
4.1.2 Normalization of the ENR Data 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 use fixed intervals to construct the size distributions.  So, 
there are multiple values corresponding to one value on the x axis.  Also, there are 
deviations from the average line.  Following is the additional analysis performed to 
investigate the causes of the deviations.  Based on the analyses, it was found that the 
deviations are due to the increases in the total industry gross revenues over the years.   
 
Increasing Pattern in the Total Gross Revenues 
The total sum of gross revenues of the ENR top 400 contractors has been 
increasing and these increases match with the historical changes in Value of 
Construction Put in Place published by the U.S. Census Bureau as shown in Figure 4.3.  
The two different measures (total revenues of the ENR contractors and total value of 
construction) were normalized for an easy comparison by setting their initial values in 
1994 at 1.0.  The ratios of ENR total revenues to the U.S. total revenues have been 
relatively stable and the average is about 0.227 (22.7%).  Note that Figure 4.3 has two y-
axes.  It is reasonable to assume that the increases in the ENR contractors’ overall 
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revenues relate to the overall increases in market demand assuming that inflation affects 
them equally.   
In a close look at the ENR data, it is found that the range of gross revenues by the 
400 ranked firms varies with the overall increase of total industry gross revenues.  Figure 
4.4 shows historical changes in the maximum gross revenues (of the 1st ranked firm) and 
the minimum gross revenues (of the 400th ranked firm) on the ENR lists over the 14 
years.  Both the maximum revenues and the minimum revenues increased.  The 
increases of the maximum revenues have been more significant.  So, the range made by 
the maximum and the minimum revenues has widened over the years.  Note that Figure 
4.4 also has two different y-axes for the maximum revenues and the minimum revenues.   
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Figure 4.3  ENR Revenues vs. US Total Revenues 
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Figure 4.4  Increases in Gross Revenues on the ENR List 
 
Varying Intervals for Different Years 
The ranges from the minimum to the minimum revenues have widened over the 
years.  In order to resolve these differences, varying intervals can be used to measure the 
firm frequency in different years.  The varying intervals are determined by Equation 4.1.   
 
( )i i
i
Max R Min RI
N
−=       [4.1] 
Where, iI = the size of interval for year i 
iMax R = the gross revenues of the 1
st ranked firm in year i 
iMin R = the gross revenues of the 400
th ranked firm in year i 
N = the number of size intervals (50, same for all 14 years) 
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Figure 4.5 shows the size distributions of the ENR top 400 contractors over the 
14 years based on firm frequencies measured using varying intervals.  Now, the 
distributions have different x ordinates for each year.  The effects of the increases in the 
overall revenues are apparent in Figure 4.5: the movements of distributions toward the 
right hand side (larger gross revenues) over the years.  This pattern was not identifiable 
in Figure 4.2 using fixed intervals.  However, the linear patterns in these distributions are 
still similar between different years.  Table 4.1 provides the slopes, intercepts, and 
values of R-squared of the linear trend lines found in size distributions shown in Figure 
4.5.  For the 14 years, the average slope is about -1.83, the average intercept is about 
14.9, and the average R-squared is about 0.94, using the varying intervals.   
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Figure 4.5  Size Distribution of the ENR Contractors Using Varying Intervals 
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Table 4.1  Slopes and Values of R-squared of the Linear Trend Lines  
Year Slope Intercept R-squared 
1994 -1.75 13.48 0.96 
1995 -1.85 14.26 0.97 
1996 -1.89 14.78 0.95 
1997 -1.91 15.20 0.94 
1998 -1.89 15.00 0.94 
1999 -1.94 15.62 0.96 
2000 -1.89 15.52 0.97 
2001 -1.71 14.25 0.98 
2002 -1.81 14.61 0.92 
2003 -1.91 15.64 0.96 
2004 -1.88 15.58 0.90 
2005 -1.81 15.21 0.95 
2006 -1.69 14.57 0.90 
2007 -1.77 15.32 0.89 
Average -1.83 14.93 0.94 
 
In order to check the statistical stability of the slopes and intercepts over multiple 
years, control charts were constructed as shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 using the data in 
Table 4.1.  The control charts were constructed with natural process limits calculated 
based on mean range since there is only one observation for each time period.  The 
natural process limits are defined by the mean plus and minus three standard deviations 
(for six-sigma limits).  As found in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, there is no specific pattern in the 
control charts.  It can be concluded that the slopes and the intercepts are under statistical 
control and these variations in the size distribution of the ENR 400 contractors are 
random.   
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Figure 4.6  Control Chart for Slopes 
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Figure 4.7  Control Chart for Intercepts 
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Application of the Mean Intervals 
The analysis takes an additional step to confirm the similarity among the size 
distributions over the 14 years.  Figure 4.8 shows the size distributions of the ENR top 
400 contractors using the mean of the varying intervals.  The mean is the 14 years 
average of the varying intervals.  Using the mean intervals, the distributions have 
multiple y values for one x ordinate.  The size distributions become more stable and 
more similar by reducing the size of deviations caused by the increasing pattern in the 
firm gross revenues in the data, resulting in a high 2R value, 0.98.  The distributions in 
Figure 4.8 confirm again the presence of the power law in the population of large 
contractors.  The line’s slope and intercept are -1.836 and 15.05, respectively.  Refer to 
Appendix 2 for a better view of the size distribution in each year.  
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Figure 4.8  Size Distribution Using the Mean Intervals 
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4.1.3 International Revenues vs. Domestic Revenues 
Internationalization in the construction business has been a common 
phenomenon for large contractors in the U.S. over recent decades.  Table 4.2 provides an 
analysis of the international and domestic revenues by the ENR contractors.  The 
number of the international revenue firms has been stable among the 400 firms.  On 
average, about 80 contractors obtained some of their revenues from international 
projects each year.   
As shown in Table 4.2, the percentages of international revenues and domestic 
revenues by the ENR 400 contractors have been stable.  But, the total volume of 
international revenues has increased.  In year 1994, the total sum of international 
revenues was $16,519 million ($ 109,735.3 ×15.1%).  In year 2007, the total sum of 
international revenues was $47,499 million ($ 304,360.9 ×  15.6%), which is 2.9 times 
the 1994 international revenues.  More than 90% of the total international revenues have 
been earned by the largest firms that have been ranked between 1st and 50th as shown on 
the most right hand side column in Table 4.2.  However, the percentages have decreased 
slightly over the years from about 95% to 91%.   
Among the ENR 400 contractors, large firms (mostly, highly-ranked firms) have 
international revenues and small firms (mostly, low-ranked firms) have small or no 
international revenues.  Then, it can be questioned whether the size distribution of firms 
would change when only the domestic revenue firms are considered for the distribution  
since the international revenue firms might have different types of competition in 
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international markets, for example, from large international contractors based in other 
countries rather than smaller domestic contractors.   
 
Table 4.2  Analysis on International Revenues by the ENR Contractors 
 Year Total Gross Revenues 
International
Revenues 
Domestic
Revenues
Number of Firms
having 
Intl. Revenues 
% of the Total Intl. 
Revenues by the highly-
ranked firms (1 - 50) 
1994  $ 109,735.3  15.1% 84.9% 80 94.6% 
1995  $ 121,648.8  16.4% 83.6% 79 95.6% 
1996  $ 133,350.4  17.8% 82.2% 72 94.1% 
1997  $ 138,344.3  18.4% 81.6% 77 92.3% 
1998  $ 156,130.9  18.2% 81.8% 82 91.4% 
1999  $ 173,292.1  17.1% 82.9% 88 92.7% 
2000  $ 194,637.3  13.1% 86.9% 83 92.7% 
2001  $ 201,002.1  11.0% 89.0% 81 90.8% 
2002  $ 194,390.2  10.1% 89.9% 80 92.4% 
2003  $ 193,352.9  13.9% 86.1% 75 92.8% 
2004  $ 209,737.0  15.6% 84.4% 79 91.3% 
2005  $ 235,562.7  15.1% 84.9% 78 90.2% 
2006  $ 262,759.6  15.0% 85.0% 80 91.2% 
2007  $ 304,360.9  15.6% 84.4% 75 91.6% 
 
To resolve the possible difference, the size distributions of domestic revenue 
firms were constructed.  The same method was applied to measure firm frequencies 
using the varying intervals and the mean intervals (the means of the varying intervals), 
shown in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10, respectively.  Again, Figure 4.9 shows the effects 
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of the increased total revenues of the ENR 400 contractors over the 14 years.  Refer to 
Appendix 2 for a better view of the size distribution for each year in Figure 4.10. 
From Figures 4.8 and 4.10, there are no significant differences between domestic 
competition and international competition.  No significant changes were found in the 
size distributions of firms regardless of whether the data include all 400 firms or only 
domestic revenue firms.   
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Figure 4.9  Size Distribution of ENR Domestic Firms Using Varying Intervals 
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Figure 4.10  Size Distribution of ENR Domestic Firms Using Mean Intervals 
 
Table 4.3 below provides a comparison of the two size distributions between 
using all 400 firms and using only domestic revenue firms.  The values of their slopes, 
intercepts, and R-squared are similar to each other.  There is no apparent difference 
between the two size distributions.  Therefore, they are drawn from the same population. 
So, domestic firms are not significantly different from all firms and firms that work 
internationally are not different from those that don’t.   
 
Table 4.3  Comparison of 14 years Average Trend lines 
Size Distribution Slope Intercept 2R  
Total 400 Firms (Figure 4.8) -1.8362 15.046 0.985 
Domestic Revenue Firms (Figure 4.10) -1.8488 15.108 0.985 
 
 
 
 
101
4.2  Size Distribution - 2002 Economic Census  
The Economic Census data also can be used to construct the size distribution of 
business organizations.  The 2002 Economic Census is another source of construction 
industry data.  These data are published by the U.S. Census Bureau every five years.  
The 2002 Economic Census provides information about business organizations at the 
establishment level for all U.S. industries classified based on NAICS (North American 
Industry Classification System).  In the data set for each industry, business organizations 
are classified at the establishment level by the number of employees, the location, and 
the business volume done.  The data also provide additional information such as the 
amount of payroll, specialization level, industry statistics, etc.  
 
4.2.1 Size Distribution of Establishments in Construction 
While the ENR data provide information about large construction firms that are 
ranked 1st to 400th based on firm gross revenues, the 2002 Economic Census data count 
business organizations at the establishment level and the size of an establishment is 
measured by its employment size, i.e., the number of employees.  An establishment is 
defined as a single physical location where business is performed.  A firm can have more 
than one establishment.  Multiple establishments controlled by one firm may locate in 
more than one market sector.   
In construction, firms that have multiple establishments are usually large in size.  
According to an analysis using the Statistics of US Business which will be discussed in a 
later section in detail, during the 9 years from 1997 to 2005, the average number of 
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establishments per construction firm was 1.01.  Meanwhile, for large construction firms 
that have more than 500 employees, the average number of establishments per firm is 
6.94.  
Table 4.4 shows the classification of the construction industry by 2002 NAICS, 
the construction industry is classified largely into three major sectors: 1) building 
construction; 2) heavy and civil engineering construction; and 3) specialty trade 
contractors.  Refer to the website of the U.S. Census Bureau for details on sub-
classifications. 
 
Table 4.4  2002 NAICS Classification for the Construction Industry 
 NAICS 
 23 Construction 
 236  Construction of Buildings 
  2361  Residential Building Construction 
   236115  New Single-Family Housing Construction 
   236116  New Multifamily Housing Construction  
   236117  New Housing Operative Builders 
   236118  Residential Remodelers 
  2362  Nonresidential Building Construction 
   23621  Industrial Building Construction 
   23622  Commercial and Institutional Building Construction 
 237 Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction 
  2371  Utility System Construction 
   23711  Water and Sewer Line and Related Structures Construction 
   23712  Oil and Gas Pipeline and Related Structures Construction 
   23713  Power and Communication Line and Related Structures Construction
  2372  Land Subdivision 
  2373  Highway, Street, and Bridge Construction 
  2379  Other Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction 
 238  Specialty Trade Contractors 
  2381  Building foundation and exterior contractors 
  2382  Building equipment contractors  
  2383  Building finishing contractors  
  2389  Other specialty trade contractors  
 
 
 
103
Using 2002 Economic Census data, size distributions of establishments for 
construction can be constructed for the total industry, as well as each of three major 
sectors classified in Table 4.4.  Figure 4.11 shows the four different size distributions of 
establishments (measured by the employment size).  Power laws are observed again in 
the log-log plots for total general contractors and each group of general building 
contractors, heavy contractors, and specialty trade contractors.  The linear trend lines 
have negative values for the slopes and positive values for the intercepts.  Also, they all 
have very high R-squared values. 
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Figure 4.11  Size Distribution of Establishments in Construction 
 
The slopes of linear trend lines in Figure 4.11 are lower than the slope found 
using the ENR top 400 Contractors data, which is -1.836 as shown in Figure 4.8.  These 
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differences between the ENR data and the Economic Census data would be due to the 
differences in the size measurement of organizations and the level of data.  The ENR 
U.S. top 400 Contractors data take into account firms and the size of a firm as measured 
by firm gross revenues in U.S. dollars.  Also, the firms in the ENR data are all large 
firms in the U.S. construction industry (having more than 500 employees).  On the other 
hand, the 2002 Economic Census data count establishments and the size of an 
establishment is measured by the number of employees.  And, the data include 
establishments of all sizes.   
However, the size distributions using two different industry data sets have one 
common characteristic, which is linearity with negative slopes.  Moreover, using the 
2002 Economic Census data, a similar slope (to the slope using the ENR data) is found 
when only large establishments (more than 100 employees) are used to construct the size 
distribution, which is shown in Figure 4.12.   
Table 4.5 provides a comparison of the size distributions using different 
construction industry data, for different market sectors and different size groups.  There 
are small differences in slopes.  The differences might be due to some specific 
characteristics between sectors.  Different characteristics could be found in the level of 
risk in jobs and competition, different overhead expenditures or capital needs, higher or 
lower entry barrier, level of equipment uses, etc.  The identified differences in the size 
distribution among different market sectors are left for future investigation.   
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Figure 4.12  Size Distribution of Large Establishments in Construction 
 
 
Table 4.5  Comparison of Size Distributions for Different Market Sectors 
Data Population in the Data Slope Intercept R2 
ENR top 400 
Contractors Large firms -1.836 15.05 0.985 
Total establishments in construction -1.226 14.52 0.976 
Establishments in building 
construction -1.268 13.24 0.990 
Establishments in heavy and civil 
construction -0.906 11.28 0.952 
Establishments in specialty trades -1.317 14.32 0.962 
2002 
Economic 
Census 
Only large establishments -1.730 17.63 0.993 
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4.2.2 Size Distribution of Establishments in Other Industries 
Different shapes for the size distribution are found in other industries.  The 2002 
Economic Census also provides other industries data.  For the purpose of comparison, 
establishment data on the total manufacturing industry and the paper manufacturing 
industry were analyzed.  Figures 4.13 and 4.14 provide the size distributions of 
establishments in these industries.   
The two distributions are different from the construction industry.  For the total 
manufacturing industry in Figure 4.13, the data (frequency of firms) are deficient at the 
small firm level compared to the linear fit.  That is, large firms have driven small firms 
out of business, but this is not true in construction.  Meanwhile, in Figure 4.14, a 
significant curvature is found for firms in paper manufacturing, which is a capital-
intensive industry.  In general, paper manufacturers utilize large automated machines 
that are expensive and they need little labor to manage the machines.  So, the number of 
establishments with small employment sizes is less than the power law would predict.   
The differences in the size distributions of firms in different industries, especially 
the slopes, might be due to differences in the characteristics of their businesses.  As 
discussed earlier, the differences would be found in the level of capital needs (labor-
intensive or capital-intensive), overhead, different market risks, etc.  And, due to these 
differences in business environment, organizations in an industry could compete with 
each other in different ways.  It will be an interesting topic for future investigation.  The 
current study leaves it behind to focus on the investigation of competition in the 
construction industry.  
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Figure 4.13  Size Distribution in the Manufacturing Industry 
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Figure 4.14  Size Distribution in the Paper Manufacturing Industry 
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4.3  Interpretation of Power Law in the Size Distribution 
There have been many empirical findings regarding the power law in different 
systems: biology, ecology, and industry organization studies.  However, there are few 
explanations about what underlies the power law.  This section provides an interpretation 
of the power law found in the size distribution of construction firms.   
Define elasticity in general as the percentage change in one variable for a given 
percentage change in another.  Also, define construction firm elasticity as the percentage 
change in the number of firms (N) for a given change in firm revenues (R).  Hence, the 
elasticity can be expressed as in Equation 4.2.  
 
  dN R dN RElasticity
N dR dR N
= =      [4.2] 
 
As found in Equation 2.4 in Chapter II, a power law relation can be defined as 
N Rβα=  or LogN LogRα β= + .  Then,  
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1 0
N R
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= = = <
    [4.3] 
 
Therefore, the power law relation gives a constant elasticity.  Figure 4.15 
provides a graphical representation of the power law relation: elasticity governs the 
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percentage changes in the number of firms ( NΔ ) and the firm revenue ( RΔ ).  If the 
revenue per firm is decreased by 1%, the number of firms increases by β %.  This is 
perhaps the reason behind the ubiquity of power law relations shown by biological, 
ecological, and organizational data.  The construction value of elasticity indicates that 
the tradeoff between firm size (revenue) and number of firms that size is independent of 
firm size. 
Conversely, for some manufacturing sectors as shown Figures 4.13 and 4.14, the 
elasticity varies.  There can be a range of zero elasticity at which the number of firms is 
inelastic to changes in firm size and even a region of positive elasticity, in which there 
are few smaller firms (possibly a threshold effect).  But, in construction, constant 
elasticity implies that, if a firm can raise its revenues by 1%, it will encounter β % 
fewer competitors, for all sizes of firms.  With a computed value of 1.84β ≅ − as found 
in Figure 4.8, number of construction firms is much more sensitive to revenue (size) 
changes than manufacturing firms with 0.79β ≅ − as found in Figure 4.13.  
 
Δ N
Δ R
N
R
N Rβα=
 
Figure 4.15  Elasticity by the Power Law 
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4.4  Organizational Changes in Employment  
The U.S. Census Bureau publishes Statistics of U.S. Business (SUSB) annually in 
cooperation with the Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration 
(SBA) (http://www.census.gov/).  The SUSB provides macro economic data on the U.S. 
economy.  The tabulations started in 1989.  There are two types of data sets in the 
Statistics of U.S. Business: dynamic data and static data.  
 Dynamic data: the data provide dynamic information about employment 
changes in business organizations: the number of establishments and changes in 
employment size (the number of employees) by births, deaths, expansions, and 
contractions at the establishment level.   
 Static data: the data provide static information about the state of industries 
measured at a certain time of each year (in the mid-March pay period).  The data 
tabulate the number of firms, establishments, employments, and annual payroll 
by the enterprise employment size.  
For both data sets, the employment size is determined by the number of 
employees (full and part-term employees, including salaried officers and executives of 
corporations) who were on the payroll in the pay period including March 12.  
There exist comparability problems in the data due to the changes in industry 
definitions and classifications.  The most recent changes in the industry classification for 
construction were made in 1998.  Before 1998, the construction industry had code 
number SIC15 based on Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).  Currently, the code 
number is NAICS23 based on North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).  
 
 
 
111
In 2002, there were small modifications in NAICS, but the code number and 
classification for the construction industry has maintained the same structure since 1998.  
The industry classification based on the 2002 NAICS is shown in Table 4.4.  Since the 
current study analyzes the data sets at the total industry level, the comparability 
problems are avoided.   
For use in the current study, the available dynamic data cover 1995 to 2004 and 
the available static data cover 1997 to 2005.  These data are available from the official 
website of the U.S. Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/).  The SUSB classifies 
establishments and firms by enterprise employment size and define establishment, firm, 
and enterprise as follows:   
 An establishment: a single physical location at which business is conducted or 
where services or industrial operations are performed.  
 A firm: a part of an enterprise tabulated within a particular industry, state or 
metropolitan area.  A firm can have multiple establishments. 
 An enterprise: a business organization consisting of one or more domestic 
establishments under common ownership or control.  An enterprise can have 
multiple firms in different states.  
In the SUSB, the enterprise, the firm, and the establishment are the same 
organization if an enterprise has one establishment.  An enterprise with establishments in 
more than one state is counted as a firm in each state where it operates an establishment.  
But, the enterprise is counted as only one firm in national all-industry tabulations.  
Therefore, an enterprise is identical to a firm in national all-industry tabulations, but they 
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are not identical in state tabulations.  The size of a firm or an enterprise is determined by 
the total sum of employment in all associated establishments.  For the current study, all 
analyses are performed using national all-industry tabulations so that a firm and an 
enterprise are identical.   
 
4.4.1 Dynamic Data of the SUSB  
The dynamic data provide the number of establishments and employment 
changes at the establishment level.  The general rule used in the data tabulation is that 
the state of an establishment is determined by the initial year data for establishment 
deaths and continuing establishments and by the subsequent year data for establishment 
births.  Organizational changes at the establishment level are defined as below 
(http://www.census.gov): 
 Births: establishments that have zero employment in the first quarter of the 
initial year and positive employment in the first quarter of the subsequent year.  
 Deaths: establishments that have positive employment in the first quarter of the 
initial year and zero employment in the first quarter of the subsequent year. 
 Expansions: establishments that have positive first quarter employment in both 
the initial and subsequent years and increased employment during the time period 
between the first quarter of the initial year and the first quarter of the subsequent 
year. 
 Contractions: establishments that have positive first quarter employment in both 
the initial and subsequent years and decreased employment during the time 
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period between the first quarter of the initial year and the first quarter of the 
subsequent year. 
The following analysis using the dynamic data reveals that employment changes 
by expansions and contractions are very significant.  Table 4.6 shows the frequencies 
Number of Establishments with Certain Type of Change
Total Number of Establishments
⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and the amounts of 
employment changes by births, deaths, expansions, and contractions at the establishment 
level for the construction industry.  Table 4.7 provides the same type of information for 
the U.S. total industry.  The tabulated data include all establishments in these industries.   
 
Table 4.6  Employment Changes in the Construction Industry 
Frequency of Changes % Changes in Employment Size 
 
Births Deaths Expansions Contractions Births Deaths Expansions Contractions
1995-1996 15.2% 13.0% 30.9% 27.8% 6.7% 6.1% 16.9% 14.4% 
1996-1997 15.0% 12.5% 32.7% 26.2% 6.8% 6.4% 18.5% 13.2% 
1997-1998 14.1% 12.9% 30.7% 27.4% 6.4% 6.3% 16.9% 13.3% 
1998-1999 14.1% 12.1% 33.0% 25.1% 6.6% 6.1% 18.4% 11.7% 
1999-2000 13.5% 12.0% 32.7% 25.7% 6.1% 5.8% 18.2% 12.0% 
2000-2001 12.5% 12.4% 28.6% 28.6% 5.5% 6.0% 14.9% 13.3% 
2001-2002 13.4% 13.7% 28.7% 28.1% 6.7% 6.6% 13.3% 16.0% 
2002-2003 14.8% 13.2% 29.0% 28.1% 6.4% 6.0% 14.5% 14.9% 
2003-2004 16.3% 12.7% 31.9% 25.4% 6.4% 6.2% 16.7% 12.7% 
2004-2005 16.2% 13.0% 29.6% 27.4% 7.0% 5.9% 15.0% 14.2% 
10 years 
Average 14.5% 12.8% 30.8% 27.0% 6.4% 6.2% 16.3% 13.6% 
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Table 4.7  Employment Changes in the U.S. Total Industry 
Frequency of Changes % Changes in Employment Size 
 
Births Deaths Expansions Contractions Births Deaths Expansions Contractions
1995-1996 11.9% 10.3% 29.2% 26.7% 5.9% 5.0% 10.3% 9.3% 
1996-1997 13.8% 11.3% 29.8% 26.3% 7.5% 5.8% 11.6% 10.2% 
1997-1998 11.8% 10.7% 29.8% 25.9% 6.0% 5.4% 11.2% 9.1% 
1998-1999 11.5% 10.6% 29.2% 26.0% 5.9% 5.3% 10.8% 9.1% 
1999-2000 11.3% 10.6% 29.8% 25.4% 5.9% 5.4% 11.3% 8.8% 
2000-2001 11.5% 10.8% 28.1% 26.9% 5.9% 5.3% 10.2% 9.9% 
2001-2002 12.4% 11.8% 27.4% 28.4% 6.7% 6.1% 9.6% 12.5% 
2002-2003 11.5% 10.4% 28.4% 26.6% 5.7% 5.4% 10.6% 10.0% 
2003-2004 11.6% 10.2% 28.5% 25.9% 5.5% 5.2% 10.3% 9.2% 
2004-2005 11.7% 10.3% 27.5% 27.1% 5.6% 4.8% 9.7% 9.4% 
10 years 
Average 11.9% 10.7% 28.8% 26.5% 6.1% 5.4% 10.6% 9.7% 
 
As shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, business organizations in construction have 
higher frequencies and percent changes in employment compared to those in the U.S. 
total industry.  It can be easily found in the 10 year averages.  It is well known that the 
construction industry has high entry and exit rates.  There are few entry barriers because 
there are low capital requirements to enter into the construction business.  Due to the 
high entry rates and inherent high level of business risks, the industry also has a high exit 
rate (Broemser, 1968).  
The analysis was performed further for a group of large business organizations 
that have more than 500 employees since the ENR U.S. Top 400 contractors belong to 
this size group.  The analysis finds the large construction contractors have experienced 
annual averages of 13.7% and 14.9% in employment changes by their expansions and 
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contractions, respectively.  It indicates significant moves of people between construction 
firms.  These rates are much higher than the U.S. total industry averages: 8.9% and 9.4% 
for the class of all large establishments.  The large construction contractors’ average 
employment changes by births and deaths are 5.4% and 4.9%, respectively, which are 
close to the U.S. total averages: 5.4% and 4.7%.  Over the years, the rates of 
organizational changes have been relatively stable with small fluctuations.   
 
4.4.2 Static Data of the SUSB  
While the dynamic data provide meaningful information on employment changes 
related to organizational changes, the static data provide information about the state of 
the U.S. industries: how many firms and establishments exist and how many employees 
work for the establishments and firms.  The measures are made at a certain time of each 
year (in the mid-March pay period) so that the measures are static.  
Using these static data, the average number of establishments per firm can be 
measured.  Table 4.8 shows the average number of establishments per firm measured 
over the 10 years from 1995 to 2005.  For all construction firms in the industry, the 
average number of establishments per firm is 1.01, which is much lower than the other 
two averages for the U.S. total industries and the manufacturing industry.  For large 
firms, large construction contractors have about 6.9 establishments on average, which is 
also smaller than the other industry averages.  On average, a large manufacturing firm 
has 8.7 establishments and a large business firm in the U.S. has 58.83 establishments.  
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Table 4.8  Average Number of Establishments per Firm 
Industry All Firms Only Large Firms (more than 500 employees) 
U.S. Total Industries 1.25 58.83 
Manufacturing Industry 1.16 8.65 
Construction Industry 1.01 6.94 
 
 
4.5  Contractors’ Market Diversification 
The current study pays attention to the market diversification of construction 
contractors.  Using the static data of the SUSB, it was found that large construction 
contractors have about seven establishments on average.  However, there is no 
information about market diversification in the SUSB data.  A contractor may have 
multiple establishments in only one market sector through geographical diversification, 
or have multiple establishments in different market sectors as market diversification.  
The current study focuses on contractors’ market diversification.  
Even though competitive strategies are considered to be critical to construction 
firms, strategic management has not received much attention due to the concentration on 
project management and competitive bidding problems.  Betts and Ofori (1992) 
identified several hindrances in strategic planning in construction.  The hindrances 
include organizational fragmentation, inefficient feedback, low level of technology, and 
low entry barriers.   
Nevertheless, market diversification is considered a major strategy for 
contractors’ growth (Hillebrandt and Cannon, 1989).  Junnonen (1998) asserted that 
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contractors spread their risk by diversifying in more than one business sector, preferably 
contra-cyclical.  However, no significant performance difference was found between 
contractors with high and low diversification (Choi and Russell, 2005).  The current 
literature in construction does not provide consistent recommendations about market 
diversification.  
 
4.5.1 Measure of Diversification 
There have been many studies on firm diversification in strategic management 
but there are only a few studies about construction firms’ diversification.  However, as 
discussed in Chapter III, these management studies also do not provide a consensus in 
their empirical tests.  One of the most critical questions in the literature is about the 
relationships between a firm’s diversification and its economic performance.    
In the literature, different measures of firm diversification have been used.  Most 
of these measures have direct counterparts in similar measures of industrial/market 
structure (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979).  According to Jacquemin and Berry, three 
measures are mostly used: concentration ratio; Herfindahl index; and entropy measure. 
Each of them is discussed below.   
 
Concentration Ratio 
1
n
i i
i
I p w
=
=∑         [4.4] 
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In Equation 4.4, ip is the share of either the 
thi firm (for industry concentration) 
or the thi industry (for firm market diversification),  
iw is an assigned weight (percentage of total revenues or production), and 
n  is the number of firms or products.   
 
This concentration ratio has been used in many studies because of its historical 
availability from the Bureau of the Census.  Different measures of concentration ratio 
are found in the literature.  Curry and George (1981) provide an extensive review on 
concentration ratio.  
 
Herfindahl Index 
2
1
1
N
i
i
HI p
=
= −∑         [4.5] 
In Equation 4.5, ip is revenue share of the 
thi  market segment in the firm’s total 
revenues and N is the number of segments.  If the Herfindahl index for a firm is 
close to 1.0, the firm is more diversified than another firm with Herfindahl index 
close to 0.0.   
 
Entropy Measure  
1
1ln
N
i
i i
Entropy p
p=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑       [4.6] 
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In Equation 4.6, ip  is revenue share of the 
thi segment in the firm’s total 
revenues. and N is the number of market segments.  Entropy measure is also 
known as Shannon Index or Shannon Information Content to measure diversity 
in data (Shannon, 1948).   
 
In addition to these three measures, there are other measures in the literature.  For 
example, Gort (1962) defined the ratio of the firm’s sales within the firm’s primary 
industry (having the largest share) to the firm’s total sales as one measure of firm 
diversification.   
Among these available measures, the current study uses entropy measure as a 
firm diversity index, which is mostly favored due to its mathematical advantages: the 
measure is additive (it can be decomposed into additive elements that contribute to the 
total) and sensitive (it accounts better for low levels of diversification compared to other 
measures) (Jacquemin and Berry (1979); Palepu (1985)).  
In Equation 4.6, the maximum value of firm diversity index using the entropy 
measure may vary depending on the size of N .  Maximum diversity index value can be 
calculated assuming a uniform distribution of revenue fractions cross over all sectors. 
Fortunately, the maximum value is equal to log[ ]N .  Therefore, it is easy to normalize 
entropy measures by dividing by the logarithmic value of the total number of sectors, 
log[ ]N  so that all measures are scaled onto the interval [0.0, 1.0].   
Table 4.9 provides an example of the entropy measure for a firm assuming there 
are only two market segments, A and B for simplicity.  Different combinations of 
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revenue fractions in each segment are tested.  In this example, there are only two market 
segments so the maximum entropy that is possible when the firm has even amounts of its 
revenues in each sector is log[ 2]N = .   
For the normalization of entropy measures, all measures are divided by 
log[2] 0.6931= .  When the firm has uniform distribution of its gross revenues (50:50) in 
different sectors A and B, the firm’s diversity index equals 1.0.  In contrast, the firm’s 
diversity index decreases as the distribution of firm’s gross revenues are skewed.  The 
firm’s diversity index is zero when it has all gross revenues in only one sector A or B as 
shown in Table 4.9.   
 
Table 4.9  Example of Calculation of Diversity Index – Two Sectors A & B 
Different combinations 
of revenue fractions 1
1ln
N
i
i i
Entropy p
p=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
Sector A Sector B Contribution bySector A 
Contribution by
Sector B 
Entropy for the Firm 
(Sum of 
contributions) 
Normalized 
Entropy 
0% 100% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
10% 90% 0.2303 0.0948 0.3251 0.4690 
20% 80% 0.3219 0.1785 0.5004 0.7219 
30% 70% 0.3612 0.2497 0.6109 0.8813 
40% 60% 0.3665 0.3065 0.6730 0.9710 
50% 50% 0.3466 0.3466 0.6931 1.0000 
60% 40% 0.3065 0.3665 0.6730 0.9710 
70% 30% 0.2497 0.3612 0.6109 0.8813 
80% 20% 0.1785 0.3219 0.5004 0.7219 
90% 10% 0.0948 0.2303 0.3251 0.4690 
100% 0% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Figure 4.16 depicts a graphical representation of various levels of diversification 
for a firm, assuming different combinations of revenue fractions in Table 4.9.  As 
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discussed, using the entropy measure is advantageous compared with other measures 
thanks to the mathematical advantages, i.e., to be additive and sensitive.  Using other 
measures, it is not easy to normalize different firms’ diversification level for comparison.  
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Figure 4.16  Diversity Index for a Firm Operating in Two Sectors 
 
4.5.2 Diversification Pattern of Contractors  
The current study analyzes the diversification pattern of large construction 
contractors using the ENR top 400 Contractors data over the last 14 years from 1994 to 
2007.  As discussed earlier, the ENR data provide information about each individual 
firm’s gross revenues over eight different market sectors.  The entropy measure is 
applied to measure individual firm’s diversification level, which is named firm diversity 
index.   
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Figure 4.17 shows the distribution of the ENR top 400 contractors’ diversity 
index.  The diversification pattern of the ENR firms has been stable over the last 14 
years.  In Figure 4.17, low entropy connotes higher specialization and lower market 
diversification, high entropy indicates the opposite.   
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Figure 4.17  Distribution of the ENR Contractors’ Diversity Index 
 
On average, over 14 years, about 35% of the firms were fully specialized and 
about 65% of the firms performed their business in more than one industry sector.  Refer 
to Appendix 3 to have a better view of diversification patterns for each year.   
As done for the size distribution of the ENR 400 contractors, the distribution of 
firm diversity indices can be constructed for only domestic revenue firms to identify any 
differences that may exist.  Figure 4.18 shows the diversity index distributions of the 
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domestic revenue firms.  There are more specialized and less diversified firms among 
the domestic revenue firms.  However, the overall patterns are very similar to each other.  
Over 14 years, the average number of domestic revenue firms was about 321 of the total 
400.  Also, refer to Appendix 3 to have a better view of diversification patterns by 
domestic revenue firms for each year.   
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Figure 4.18  Distribution of the ENR Firms Diversity Index (Domestic) 
 
Other than the diversity index, there is a simple way to describe how much the 
ENR top 400 contractors are diversified into different market sectors: counting the 
number of sectors in which a firm has revenues.  Figure 4.19 shows the distribution of 
firms by the number of sectors in which firms operate.   
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Figure 4.19  Distribution of Firms by the Number of Sectors per Firm 
 
About 35% of the ENR Top 400 contractors have their establishment(s) in only 
one sector while about 65% of them have establishments across different sectors, which 
is the same result using the entropy measure (See Figure 4.17).  The distributions of the 
number of establishments per firm are stable over 14 years similar to the diversity index 
distributions shown in Figures 4.17 and 4.18.  
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4.6  Summary 
To identify aggregate patterns that can be considered as the resultants of 
competition among individual contractors in a population, Chapter IV analyzed different 
sources of the U.S. construction industry data:  
 ENR U.S. Top 400 Contractors  
 2002 Economic Census by the U.S. Census Bureau 
 Statistics of U.S. Business (SUSB) by the U.S. Census Bureau 
Using the ENR data and 2002 Economic Census data, the current study found a 
linear pattern in the size distribution of construction firms or establishments.  The 
identified pattern is similar to the pattern that has been found in many biology or ecology 
studies, indicating that the aggregate pattern is based on competitive processes in the 
population.   
The analysis using the 2002 Economic Census data showed the size distributions 
for the establishments in the total construction industry as well as in the classified 
market sectors: building construction, heavy construction, and specialty trades.  The 
same linear patterns were found in each market sector with small differences in slope.  
On the other hand, different shapes in the size distributions were found for 
manufacturing firms.  For an explanation of the differences found in other industries 
compared to the construction industry, further investigation would be required.    
Contractors’ expansion, contraction, death, and birth occur as the results of 
competition among contractors.  Another analysis was performed to identify contractors’ 
organizational changes in employment using the dynamic data in the SUSB.  It was 
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found that construction contractors have higher frequencies and percent changes in 
employment by all categories of deaths, births, expansions, and contractions compared 
to the averages for the U.S. total industry.  Large contractors that have more than 500 
employees experience significant employment expansions and contractions, which 
indicate significant moves of people between construction firms.  The rates are much 
higher than the U.S. total industry averages for the class of all large firms.   
Also, large contractors’ market diversification pattern was identified by applying 
the entropy measure to the ENR U.S. Top 400 Contractors data.  About 65% of large 
contractors among the ENR contractors perform their businesses in more than one 
industry sector.  The other 35% of contractors are specialized in one market sector.  The 
analysis confirms that the diversification pattern is stable over the data periods and is not 
sensitive by differentiating the population of contractors, i.e., all 400 firms vs. domestic 
revenue firms.   
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CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGIES AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
Chapter V discusses methodologies used in the current investigation and the 
hypotheses to be tested.  The methodologies to be discussed are the evolutionary 
approach and representation of construction contractors’ different risk attitudes.  Two 
methods to represent different risk attitudes are discussed for contractors’ go/no-go 
decisions in competitive bidding.  Five hypotheses are proposed to clarify the possibly 
significant effects of risk attitude on contractors’ competitive success.   
The procedure in the current investigation can be summarized as follows: 
 Develop a new and simple method to represent contractors’ risk-taking 
depending on their own risk attitudes and compare it with the conventional 
method using expected utility; 
 Build a simulation model based on evolutionary theory and represent 
competition among contractors having different risk attitudes in the model;  
 Observe the effects of risk attitude in terms of industry-wide patterns that 
evolve as results of competition among multiple contractors in the model; 
 Compare the model results to the patterns observed in the actual U.S. 
construction industry data in Chapter IV and confirm that the model successfully 
predicts industry-wide outcomes based on the comparison; and   
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 Test hypotheses using the developed evolutionary model and make 
recommendations for construction contractors.  
 
5.1  Evolutionary Approach 
5.1.1 Evolutionary Approach: General 
One promising methodology that has been applied in the competition studies is 
the evolutionary approach, especially in biology, ecology, and market ecology.  In this 
approach, organizations are considered as individual entities competing with each other 
for common resources for survival.  The common resources are limited in their 
environment, hence scarcity drives the competition among individuals.  While being 
exposed to competitive pressure or selection process, some entities survive and thrive 
while others shrink or disappear.  Differentiation between surviving individuals and 
failing individuals is determined by organizational or genetic traits in biology or by 
different economic performances in market ecology.  The individuals can be members 
within a species or between species in biology, firms in organizational ecology, and 
economic decision makers in economics.   
The general approach in these evolutionary studies is to observe aggregate 
patterns such as distribution of organizations by size or other attributes of individuals in 
a population and to infer the competitive forces and responses of these individuals from 
the identified patterns and attributes.  Depending on study purposes, interests focused on 
different issues such as the underlying mechanism of evolution, organizational changes, 
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entry and exit rates, aggregate patterns that evolve at the population level, and so on.  
Different mechanisms for organizational changes and industry evolution have been 
considered.  They include organizational innovation (Nelson and Winter (1977); 
Kwasnicki&  (1998)), organizational learning, adaptation, or mutation (Fiol and Lyles 
(1985); Levinthal (1991)), technical learning (Dosi et al., 1995), etc.   
In theoretical foundation, there are still vague concepts or disagreements on the 
process of selection.  Organisms influence their own environments and selection regimes, 
therefore in such cases boundaries between environmental development and 
organizational selection are not clear (Erwin and Krakauer, 2004).  So, competing 
individuals could affect the selection process in a population of individuals while the 
environment affects individual entities in it.   
Recently, researchers started paying attention to evolutionary analysis of decision 
marking in competitive environments (Sounderpandian, 2007).  Sounderpandian (2007) 
proposed an evolutionary game theoretic approach assuming competitive bidding 
situations.  The proposed approach allows interactions among players by representing 
each player’s adjustment of his own risk attitudes depending on the actions of neighbors.  
Sounderpandian (2007) admits that his model is simple and the presented simulations 
were too simple to produce normative results and proposes extensions of his approach 
for future studies.  Also, it would not be realistic for an organization to change its risk 
attitude as easily as represented in his approach.   
Organizational risk attitude as a part of organizational culture governs 
organizational activities through integration and patterning an organization’s behaviors 
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and rationales while it is an unconscious and deep part of an organization (Schein, 2004).  
Risk attitude is embedded in the people in the firm.  The firm does not attempt to change 
people’s risk attitude.  It hires those with compatible risk attitudes and does not hire 
(fires) those that do not match the culture.  These cultural attributes may be subconscious 
rather than conscious decision.  Therefore, the culture persists and can be changed only 
with difficulty.   
Consider for example a construction firm that is highly risk-averse and does not 
take jobs using fixed price contracts.  For such a firm to change its culture from one in 
which the contractor takes no risk (using cost plus fee contracts) to one in which the 
contractor takes all the cost risk (using fixed price contracts) is difficult.  Nevertheless, it 
may be necessary for the firm’s survival.   
 
5.1.2 Evolutionary Approach in the Current Study 
The current study investigates the effects of organizational risk attitude on 
competition in the construction industry.  Competitive bidding in which contractors 
obtain their jobs from the market is represented as the mechanism of market competition.  
It is hypothesized that the heterogeneity in organizational risk attitude leads to 
differences in contractors’ risky decisions (risk-taking behaviors) in competition, and 
different decisions by contractors would result in differentiated performances through 
the competition.  Also, some aggregate effects could be observed at the industry level 
since risk-taking under competition is an essential element of construction business for 
all individual contractors.  These dynamics in a population caused by competition in a 
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market are observed at the population level, whereas it is not easy to observe a specific 
pattern at the individual firm level.   
Within the evolutionary approach, the current study takes multiple perspectives 
from individual to population levels and a long-term view to consider the process of 
evolution and the above expected effects.  It will reveal underlying linkages between 
causes and effects between organizational risk attitude and firm performance.  Following 
are issues to be considered at different levels in the current study. 
 
Individual Levels 
 Depending on their own risk attitude, individual contractors can perceive the 
same risky situation differently, and then they can react to it differently;    
 Individuals compete with each other to obtain jobs in competitive bidding 
where they make go/no-go decisions, which depend on their own risk 
perceptions; 
 Individuals’ economic performance will be differentiated through the 
competition; and  
 Individuals can grow/diversify or contract and they can also exit a market 
depending on their own performance over time.  
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Aggregate Levels 
 A population consists of individual contractors competing with each other in a 
market.  And, they share common resources, i.e., construction jobs available in 
the market.   
 Among the population, some contractors are more successful than others.  
Successful firms survive, grow, diversify, or live longer and others contract in 
size and fail sooner, which develops aggregate patterns such as the size 
distribution of contractors, age distribution, overall industry capacity changes, 
diversification patterns, etc.   
 
In order to take these multiple perspectives, the current study needs to perform 
the following tasks: 
 Representation of differences in risk-taking among contractors depending on 
their own risk attitudes;  
 Representation of competition among multiple contractors assuming 
competitive bidding environment;   
 Measurements of individual contractors’ performances;  
 Monitoring individuals’ organizational changes depending on their financial 
performance; and 
 Monitoring any aggregate-level changes and effects that evolve over periods, if 
there are any.   
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The representation of contractors’ different risk attitudes and their risk-taking 
behaviors is discussed in Sections 5.3 through 5.5 in this chapter.  Other tasks on the 
above list are discussed in detail in Chapter VI.  
 
 
5.2  Risk Attitude in Uncertain Situations 
Expected value theory maintains that people make a choice to maximize 
expected present value of a future event when they face uncertainty.  However, people 
do not always behave as if they were maximizing expected value.  Depending on 
personal differences in their attitude toward uncertainty, some people take the less risky 
choice while others take the more risky choice even though the choices have the same 
expected value.   
For example, suppose there are two risky choices and the possible consequences 
of each of the two choices can be described by probability density distributions.  The 
two probability distributions have a same mean, but different variances.  Then, there 
should be no differences in individuals’ decisions on these two risky choices according 
to expected value theory since they have the same expected value (mean).  However, 
some individual would be concerned more about downside uncertainty which is 
indicated by a long tail (with a greater variance) toward the downside in the probability 
distribution.  This risk-averse individual will choose the alternative with the smaller 
variance.  On the contrary, a risk-seeking individual will choose the other choice with 
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the larger variance (a long tail toward the upside).  If the individual is risk-neutral, the 
variance does not matter.    
To resolve this discrepancy between how people actually behave and the 
behaviors based on expected value theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 
focused on expected utility theory in their book The Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior.  Utility theory allows different risk attitudes for individuals and explains how 
individuals make different decisions under an identical risky situation.  Details on the 
expected utility theory and utility functions are discussed in Section 5.3.   
Later, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced prospect theory and proposed a 
modified shape of utility function to overcome the criticisms of utility theory that people 
have inconsistent preferences about gain and loss: the certainty effect and the isolation 
effect.  By the certainty effect, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in 
comparison with outcomes that are certain.  By the isolation effect, people tend to ignore 
components shared by different choices under consideration, so people focus on 
distinctive components between choices.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that 
these tendencies lead to inconsistent preferences with respect to the same risky choice 
when the choice is presented in different forms.  To represent these effects, the value 
function proposed in prospect theory portrays different evaluations of prospects: concave 
function for gains and convex function for losses.  Refer to Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) for details.   
Both expected utility theory and prospect theory are complex and they are 
difficult for practitioners to understand and use for a real decision.  And, the 
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development of a utility function with concave and/or convex curvatures for individuals 
could be difficult and somewhat arbitrary.  Also, a firm’s risk attitude may be implicit in 
the corporate culture and not explicitly identified.  Due to these difficulties, empirical 
studies using actual data have been limited.  An easy and simple method needs to be 
devised to deal with construction contractors’ risk attitude for real applications.   
In economics, management studies found the presence of heterogeneity in risk 
attitude among firms (Pennings and Smidts, 2000; 2003).  Managers’ different risk 
attitudes can explain the differences in how firms do their business, especially in trading 
behaviors (Pennings and Smidts, 2000) and the global shape of a decision maker’s utility 
function reflects his strategic decision structure (Pennings and Smidts, 2003).  Risk 
attitude of an organization is a part of organizational culture and it governs 
organizational behaviors in risk-taking in business.  Consequently, questions can be 
raised about the effects of heterogeneity in risk attitude on the differences in the 
performance among economic organizations.   
Sections 5.3. and 5.4. discuss how to represent different risk attitudes using two 
different methods: the conventional method using expected utility and a new method 
proposed in the current study using Value at Risk.  In Section 5.5, the current study tests 
these methods to describe contractors’ risk-taking behaviors, i.e., go/no-go decisions in 
competitive bidding.   
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5.3  Expected Utility Theory and Utility Functions 
In the literature, differences in risk preference among individuals or 
organizations have been described using expected utility theory and utility functions 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).  Expected utility theory is prescriptive: a 
decision maker is supposed to choose the policy that maximizes his expected utility over 
all possible outcomes.    
5.3.1 Expected Utility Theory 
Using expected utility theory, different risk attitudes are classified into risk-
averse, risk-neutral, and risk-seeking, each of which is discussed below.  
 
Representation of Different Risk Attitudes 
Consider a hypothetical situation as follow.  A variable x can be x1 or x2 with 
probability p and (1-p).  The expected value of this random condition is defined in 
Equation 5.1.  
 
1 2[ ] (1 )E x px p x= + −        [5.1] 
 
Let U(x) be a utility function of x, the function that a decision maker tries to maximize.  
The expected utility is defined as in Equation 5.2.  
 
1 2[U( )] U( ) (1 )U( )E x p x p x= + −      [5.2] 
 
 
 
137
A special condition when expected value theory and expected utility theory 
provide the same result is explained below.  This applies when an individual or an 
organization is risk-neutral.  According to expected value theory, E(x) is a linear 
combination of x1 and x2 as in Equation 5.1, which can be seen on the x axis in Figure 
5.1.  Figure 5.1 has a straight line AEB, which is a utility function.  If U(x) = x, then 
U(x1) = x1, U(x2) = x2, and E[U(x)] = E[x], as shown on the y axis.  Thus, expected 
utility is identical to expected monetary value.   
Consider two lotteries:   
 Lottery 1 pays the expected value 1 2( ) (1 )E x px p x= + −  with certainty. 
 Lottery 2 pays either x1 with probability p or x2 with probability (1-p). 
 
If a decision maker has the utility function in Figure 5.1, the individual will be 
indifferent between the two lotteries and the individual is called risk-neutral.  Therefore, 
a risk-neutral decision maker will make a choice as consistent with expected value 
theory.  
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Utility, U(x)
E[U(x)] = E[x]
U(x1) =  x1
U(x2 ) = x2
A
B
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P
1 - P
x
x1 x2E[x]
P 1 - P  
Figure 5.1  Utility Function – Risk-neutral 
 
Next, consider a risk-averse decision maker who has a concave utility function 
such as the curve ACDB in Figure 5.2.  Figure 5.2 describes how E[x] and E[U(x)] can 
be different and how a decision can be made differently depending on individuals’ risk 
attitude, in particular the risk-averse case.  In the figure, A  is the point on the utility 
function corresponding to U(x1).  B is the point on the utility function corresponding to 
U(x2).  On the curve ACDB, the point D corresponds to U[E(x)], the utility of the 
expected value. Meanwhile, the point C corresponds to E[U(x)], the expected value of 
the utility.  
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Figure 5.2  Utility Function – Risk-averse 
 
As shown on the y axis in Figure 5.2, U[E(x)] is greater than E[U(x)] as in 
Equation 5.3.  Using Equations 5.1 and 5.2, Equation 5.4 is derived.  
U[ ( )]  [U( )]E x E x>        [5.3] 
1 2 1 2U( (1- ) ) U( ) (1- )U( )px p x p x p x+ > +     [5.4] 
 
Equations 5.3 and 5.4 explain that the utility of the expected value is greater than 
the expected value of the utility using the concave utility function in Figure 5.2.    
Consider again the same lotteries discussed above now for a risk-averse decision 
maker.   
 Lottery 1 pays the expected value 1 2( ) (1 )E x px p x= + −  with certainty. 
 Lottery 2 pays either x1 with probability p or x2 with probability (1-p). 
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As described in Equation 5.4, the utility that the risk-averse decision maker will 
have, if he/she obtains E(x) with certainty, is greater than expected value of the 
combination of U(x1) and U(x2) with probability p and (1-p).  Therefore, this decision 
maker will choose lottery 1.  The decision maker prefers certainty to uncertainty even 
though lottery 2 could pay more.   
In contrast, for a risk-seeking decision maker, if such an individual exists, the  
utility that the decision maker will have, if he/she obtains E(x) with certainty, is smaller 
than expected value of the combination of U(x1) and U(x2) with probability p and (1-p).  
Therefore, the decision maker will choose lottery 2.  The decision behaviors by a risk-
seeking decision maker can be represented by a convex curve, which has the mirror 
image of the concave curve against in the straight utility function AED in Figure 5.2.  
 
Risk Premium  
For a risk-averse decision maker, U[E(x)] > E[U(x)].  The decision maker 
perceives U[E(x)] more valuable than E[U(x)].  How much more does the decision 
maker value U[E(x)] than E[U(x)]?  The equivalent amount of monetary value when the 
decision maker chooses Lottery 1 is CE(x), the certainty equivalent of x, which can be 
calculated using an inverse function, as shown in Figure 5.2.  If the difference between 
E(x) and CE(x) is paid to the risk-averse decision maker, the decision maker would be 
willing to take the risky choice, lottery 2.  In fact, the decision maker becomes 
indifferent between the two lotteries.  The difference between the expected value and 
CE(x) is called the risk premium (RP) as in Equation 5.5.   
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In order to let a risk-averse decision maker choose Lottery 2 instead of Lottery 1, 
someone needs to pay the risk premium to the risk-averse decision maker.  In general, 
without providing the risk premium or extra benefit, the risk-averse decision maker 
would not choose a risky choice (lottery 2 in this example).     
 
RP(x) = E[x] – CE(x)       [5.5] 
 
Therefore, different risk attitudes can be classified by the value of the risk 
premium as below:  
 RP(x) > 0 for all values of x for a risk-averse individual or organization 
 RP(x) = 0 for all values of x for a risk-neutral individual or organization 
 RP(x) < 0 for all values of x for a risk-seeking individual or organization 
 
5.3.2 Utility Functions 
There are different types of utility functions used in the literature.  As explained 
above, the utility function is a function that a decision maker maximizes in his/her 
choice.  So, a utility function depends on an individual’s risk preference.  Note that once 
U(x) has been defined, making a decision is a purely mathematical operation 
(optimization) and no choice is left to the decision maker.  Consequently, if U(x) is 
known, the decision made by the decision maker can be predicted with perfect accuracy.   
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Frequently used utility functions are exponential functions, power functions, and 
quadratic functions.  Among them, exponential functions (Pratt, 1964) are most 
frequently used (Walls and Dyer, 1996), and are discussed below.  
The general form of exponential utility functions is found in Equation 5.6.  
 
U( ) (0 )cxx a e x−= − ≤ ≤ ∞       [5.6] 
Where, a is a constant to make the utility positive (if so desired); and  
c is the risk-aversion coefficient.  c = 0 indicates risk-neutrality and large values 
of c indicate greater risk-aversion (greater curvature of the utility function).  
 
The coefficient c is to decide the degree of risk-aversion.  The main reason for 
the frequent use of these exponential functions is their simplicity: the function needs 
only one parameter, the risk-aversion coefficient c.  Figure 5.3 provides a set of 
exponential functions with different risk-aversion coefficient values and the constant a = 
1, for example.  Utility functions of real people would vary.   
In Figure 5.3, as the risk-aversion coefficient c increases, the functions have 
more curvature, which means that U[E(x)] becomes higher than E[U(x)], requiring 
greater amount of risk premium for a risk-averse decision maker.  A more concave 
curvature in a utility function represents a more risk-averse attitude.   
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Figure 5.3  Example of Exponential Utility Functions (Risk-averse Case) 
 
 
5.4  Value at Risk and Maximum Loss Allowance 
The current study proposes a new and simple method to represent contractors’ 
risk-taking behaviors depending on different risk attitudes using VaR and maximum loss 
allowance.   
 
5.4.1 Value at Risk (VaR) 
Value at Risk traces its origin to the infamous financial disasters of the early 
1990s that made people concerned about how much possibly can be lost in the financial 
market.  VaR measures the expected amount of loss over a given time horizon.  VaR is 
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being adopted by many financial institutions (Jorion, 2001).  The advantage of using 
VaR is that it summarizes the downside risk in a simple manner, the amount of possible 
loss, i.e., dollars.  VaR can be used to describe business managers’ perceptions of risks 
since managers usually perceive their business risk as exposure to possible losses and 
levels of risk are expressed by the amount of possible loss.  This concept should be 
easily understood by construction practitioners.   
Suppose a case when a contractor has his budget for a task to be performed and 
the actual cost of the task is not known.  The contractor suffers a loss if the actual cost of 
the task is greater than the budget.  Let x be the actual cost of the task and f(x) the 
probability density function of the actual cost.  So, the possible outcomes may have a 
probability distribution as shown in Figure 5.4.   
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Figure 5.4  Probability Distribution of Possible Outcomes 
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The expected value of the actual cost is calculated using Equation 5.7.  
 
E[x] = ∫∞
∞−
dxxxf )(        [5.7] 
 
The decision maker has budget B for the task.  The probability that the actual 
cost overruns the budget B is calculated using Equation 5.8 to account for the shaded 
right-hand side tail in Figure 5.4, the probability that x B≥ for all values of x.  
 
P{x > B} = α  = ∫∞
B
dxxf )(       [5.8] 
 
The possible overruns beyond budget B and the probabilities that the overruns 
occur can be combined for the calculation of the expected value of loss as in Equation 
5.9.  It is the integration of the products of cost overrun and corresponding probabilities.  
In other words, Value at Risk represents the combined effects of undesirable results (cost 
overruns) and the probabilities of cost overruns.   This method describes how real 
contractors express risks: they express business risks in dollars not in utiles (units of 
utility). 
 
VaR = ∫∞
B
dxxxf )(        [5.9] 
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5.4.2 Maximum Loss Allowance (MLA) 
One of the important decision criteria for a go/no-go decision would be how 
much loss a contractor can allow from a job under bid.  The possible loss from a job can 
be measured using VaR.  An individual contractor may have its own decision standard 
when it makes this risky decision.  If the possible loss from a job is expected to be 
greater than the firm’s decision standard, the firm would decide not to bid and to wait for 
new jobs.  In the opposite case, the firm would decide to bid.    
By defining the amount of possible loss that a firm is willing to allow in its risky 
choice, the firm’s decision standard can be expressed in a quantitative measure.  Then, 
the measure describes how much risk-averse or risk-tolerant a firm is.  For example, 
more risk-averse firms allow small amounts of possible loss in their risky decision 
situations.  In contrast, more risk-tolerant firms are willing to accept possibly large risks 
for potentially large profits.  Therefore, individuals’ different risk attitude can be defined 
by the amounts of possible loss that each individual allows in his/her risky choice.   
The current study proposes a new term to describe this decision criterion of 
contractors, Maximum Loss Allowance, defined as the maximum amount of loss that a 
contractor allows for a job.  Using this concept, different risk attitudes for contractors are 
represented in a quantitative measure (in dollars) in the model.  Using the new term, 
more risk-averse contractors have small values of MLA while more risk-tolerant 
contractors have large values of MLA.   
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5.5  Contractors’ Go/No-go Decision 
This section explains two different methods to present contractors’ different risk-
taking behaviors in their go/no-go decision.  In the conventional method using expected 
utility, different risk attitudes are classified into three generic types: risk-averse, risk-
neutral, and risk-seeking.  Meanwhile, the proposed new method describes different risk 
attitudes of contractors by different amounts of maximum loss allowances, which 
represent various degrees of risk attitude, i.e., how much risk-averse or risk-tolerant a 
contractor is.   
 
5.5.1 Go/No-go Decision Using Utility Functions 
Consider a contractor that decides the fixed price of a job before performing the 
job.  The actual cost of the job is subject to uncertainties at the time of decision and the 
true cost will be determined at the completion of the job.  The contractor is responsible 
for all cost risks (actual cost greater than the price) and the owner takes no cost risk.  The 
contractor’s price setting is a risky task since the contractor does not know the actual 
cost of the job.  But, the contractor has some knowledge about possible range of actual 
cost and probability, i.e., a probability distribution of actual cost, as in Figure 5.4.   
Let the expected cost of the job be E(x), which is based on contractors’ 
probability distributions.  In the go/no-go decision for a job, a risk-neutral contractor 
would proceed to bid at a bid equal to E(x), which has a 50% chance of gain and a 50% 
chance of loss.  The contractor’s go/no-go decision simply depends on E(x), which is 
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based on expected monetary value theory.  The contractor would not care about 
downside and upside uncertainties.  
However, risk-averse or risk-seeking contractors would have different 
perceptions on the downside and upside uncertainties.  A risk-averse contractor would 
proceed to bid if its bid is greater than E(x) + its risk premium.  On the other hand, a 
risk-seeking contractor would proceed to bid unless its bid amount is smaller than E(x) – 
its risk premium.  The amount of risk premium varies depending on the degrees of risk-
aversion or risk-seeking of the contractors.  So, contractors having different risk attitudes 
would have different budget thresholds in their bid decision, which can be represented 
by E(x) ± risk premium.   
Utility functions can be used to represent these contractors’ different risk 
attitudes and to quantify the magnitude of risk premiums.  In the following description, 
for simplicity of comparison, it is assumed that all jobs are identical and bid decisions by 
contractors are independent and repetitive.  Then, contractors’ utility functions need to 
be normalized so that possible values of utility lie between utility zero and utility 1.0.  
This normalization is a common method to apply utility functions for different 
individuals evaluating the same subject.  Equation 5.10 shows the normalized 
exponential utility function.  The shape of utility functions varies depending on the value 
of risk-aversion coefficient r as listed in Table 5.1.    
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− − −≠ = − − −
−= = −
     [5.10] 
Where, r is the risk-aversion coefficient to define risk attitude; 
x is the wealth (contractor’s bid) and x > 0; 
a is the minimum value of wealth (associated with the minimum bid); and 
b is the maximum value of wealth (associated with the maximum bid).  
 
Table 5.1  Risk-aversion Coefficient and Characteristic of Utility Functions 
Value of coefficient Curvatures Risk attitudes 
r > 0 Concave Risk-averse 
r = 0 Straight Risk-neutral 
r < 0 Convex Risk-seeking 
 
Figure 5.5 provides an example of the normalized utility functions.  The assumed 
value of expected cost E[x] is $10M.  A contractor’s minimum bid that attains the 
minimum utility (0.0) and the maximum bid that attains the maximum utility (1.0) are 
assumed to be $6.0M (the value of a) and $14.0M (the value of b) in Equation 5.10, 
respectively.  As shown in Figure 5.5, positive values of the risk-aversion coefficient 
develop concave curves, indicating risk-aversion.  In contrast, negative values of the 
coefficient develop convex curves, indicating risk-seeking.   
Individual contractors could have different estimates for an identical job even if 
they have similar levels of estimating capability.  A contractor’s bid may take any value 
within the ranges specified on the x axis in Figure 5.5.   
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Figure 5.5  Example of Normalized Exponential Functions 
 
Calculation of Risk Premium 
This section provides a detailed procedure for the estimation of the risk premium 
for contractors that have different risk attitudes using the normalized exponential utility 
functions as follows:  
1) Define a contractor’s utility function by choosing a value of risk-aversion 
coefficient r.   
2) Assume a probability distribution of actual cost and define the expected cost of 
the job, E(x) from the distribution.  Also, define the maximum and the minimum 
values for wealth in Equation 5.10.    
3) Calculate the utility of the expected cost, U[E(x)] using the normalized utility 
function with the specified coefficient r.  
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4) Calculate the expected value of the utility of x, E[U(x)] using the normalized 
utility function with the coefficient r = 0 (risk-neutral).  
5) Calculate the certainty equivalent (CE) using the inverse function of the utility 
function.  Equation 5.11 is the general form of the inverse function of the 
normalized exponential utility function defined in Equation 5.10.  
[ ]
0, ( )
10, {1 U( )(1 exp( ( ) )}
if r x y b a a
if r x a LN x b a r
r
= = − +
≠ = − − − − −    [5.11] 
6) Calculate the risk premium: RP = E(x) – CE 
The value of the risk premium can be positive, negative, or zero, depending on 
the individual contractor’s risk attitude.   
7) Calculate budget threshold: BT = E(x) + RP 
Then, go/no-go decisions by an individual contractor can be made given the 
contractors’ bid amount considering the individual’s risk attitude.  The decision is based 
on the comparison of the bid amount with the individual’s own budget threshold as 
below:  
 Proceed to bid, if the bid amount ≥ BT since the contractor perceives the risk 
acceptable.  
 Decline to bid, if the bid amount < BT since the contractor perceives the risk 
unacceptable.   
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5.5.2 Go/No-go Decision Using Value at Risk 
Suppose a contractor has its budget for a job.  The contractor’s bid amount will 
be its budget when it bids and wins the job.  The contractor will suffer a loss if the actual 
cost of the job turns out to be greater than its budget (contract price).  But, the contractor 
will gain a profit in the opposite case.  So, there are uncertainties in the contractor’s 
decision; downside uncertainties of losses and upside uncertainties of gains.  
VaR can be calculated as follow.  First, consider a unit normal variate t .  t  is 
distributed as the normal variate with mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1.  The unit 
normal probability density function is shown in Equation 5.12.  
 
2 / 2
( )
2
ef
τ
τ π
−
=         [5.12] 
 
For simplicity, connote this unit normal function as ( )tφ .  Given some budget B, 
the probability α  that actual cost overruns k is the area under the Unit Normal curve 
from t B= to t = ∞ is 
 
( )
B
dα φ τ τ∞= ∫         [5.13] 
 
and the VaR for this unit normal is 
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∞ ∞ −= =∫ ∫      [5.14] 
 
We may take note of the identity: 
 
u ue du e=∫         [5.15] 
 
Letting u = 2 / 2τ− , substituting this into Equation 5.14, and then applying Equation 
5.15 gives: 
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1 1 1
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e B
τ
τ τ
τπ π π
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− ∞
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= − =
∫ ∫     [5.16] 
 
Therefore, the Value at Risk function for the unit normal distribution is simply 
the value of the unit normal as shown in Equation 5.17.  Figure 5.6 shows α and VaR 
for the unit normal distribution.  In the figure, VaR increases as the budget amount 
decreases, and vice versa.   
 
( )VaR Bφ=         [5.17] 
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Figure 5.6  Alpha & VaR for Unit Normal Distribution 
 
In most cases, normal variates such as cost are more interesting than unit normal 
variates.  Suppose x to be the cost which follows a Normal distribution 2( , )c cN μ σ .  
Define the unit normal variate t as in Equation 5.18.  
 
xt μσ
−=         [5.18] 
 
Then, ;x t dx dtμ σ σ= + =    
Suppose a budget B is k standard deviations above the mean.  Then,  
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,k B
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σ μ
μ
σ
= −
−∴ =         [5.19] 
 
It was found that Value at Risk function for the unit normal distribution is simply 
the value of the unit normal as shown in Equation 5.17.  Substituting k with the budget B 
gives Equation 5.20: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
k k k
x dxd f x dxμα φ τ τ φ σ σ
∞ ∞ ∞−= = =∫ ∫ ∫     [5.20] 
 
In a similar way,   
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  [5.21] 
 
For VaR,  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
B k
VaR xf x dx d kσ τφ τ τ μα σφ μα∞ ∞= = + = +∫ ∫   [5.22] 
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Now, Value at Risk can be calculated for any normal distribution with mean and 
variance by evaluating: 
 
1 ( )
( )
( )
Bk
k
k
VaR k
μ
σ
α
φ
σφ μα
−=
= −Φ
= +
       [5.23] 
Where, ( )kΦ is the cumulative unit normal probability function.   
 
To make a go/no-go decision for a job, a contractor estimates Value at Risk 
based on its cost estimate.  If VaR associated with the bid amount is greater than the 
contractor’s MLA, the contractor would not bid for the job because the contractor does 
not allow risks greater than its maximum loss allowance.   
In the opposite case, if VaR associated with the bid amount is smaller than the 
contractor’s MLA, the contractor will bid because the contractor allows risks smaller 
than its maximum loss allowance.  The contractor will bid while expecting potential 
profits under the assumption that the possible loss would not be significant from his own 
perspective: VaR < its own MLA.  However, obviously, the contractor does not know 
the actual cost when it makes this decision.   
Figure 5.7 simplifies the go/no-go decision discussed.  Contractors decide to bid 
or not to bid depending on their own risk attitude that is represented by their own 
maximum loss allowances.  The decision is based on the comparison between the 
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contractor’s own maximum loss allowance and the amount of expected loss from a job 
(Value at Risk), which is subject to their own estimates.  
 
Estimating
Possible Loss: VaR
He perceives an unacceptable 
possible loss
He perceives an acceptable 
possible loss
No-Go
Wait for another
Job
Go
Make a Bid
His own MLA < VaR for the job
His own MLA ≥ VaR for the job
 
Figure 5.7  Representation of Go/No-go Decision Making 
 
Setting a target or reference points for decision makers in the proposed method 
for contractors’ go/no-go decision making is consistent with the ideas found in recent 
studies in behavioral decision theory.  These studies maintain that individuals use their 
targets, or reference points in evaluating risky choices (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988).  
The proposed method is simple and easy for practitioners to understand compared to the 
alternate method using expected utility and concave or convex utility functions.  
 
 
5.6 Development of Hypotheses 
Heterogeneity in contractors’ risk attitudes can be illustrated within a spectrum 
from the most risk-tolerant to the most risk-averse.  For simplicity in comparison, since 
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how much more or less risk-tolerant/risk-averse is a relative measure, in the current 
study, different risk attitudes are grouped using relative classifications:  
 Most (or highly) risk-tolerant;  
 Moderately risk-tolerant;  
 Moderately risk-averse; and  
 Most (or highly) risk-averse.   
In competitive bidding, there are always possibilities of profit/loss from a job.  If 
a contractor anticipates a large amount of possible loss from the job, the contractor does 
not bid and waits for another job.  Otherwise, the contractor would make a bid.  The 
contractor’s anticipation is affected by his perception of risk.  Thus, the contractor’s 
go/no-go decision depends on his own risk attitude, i.e., how much possible loss he 
allows in his risky decision.    
Using the above classification, most risk-tolerant contractors accept large risks in 
order to gain potentially high profits.  Moderately risk-tolerant contractors behave 
similarly, but they accept smaller risks than most risk-tolerant contractors.  Both types of 
contractors have larger amounts of MLA than risk-averse contractors.  In contrast, most 
risk-averse and moderately risk-averse contractors avoid the risks of large losses, but 
simultaneously they lose opportunities for large profits.  These contractors are similar, 
but moderately risk-averse contractors are less risk-averse so that they accept some 
minimum level of risks more than most risk-averse contractors.  These contractors have 
smaller amounts of MLA than risk-tolerant contractors.   
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Assuming that contractors’ cost estimates are randomly drawn from a same 
distribution 2( , )e eN μ σ , which means no difference in their estimation capability, 
extensions of the above idea follow:   
 Risk-tolerant firms would bid more often than risk-averse firms because they 
allow larger amounts of possible loss, and the bids from risk-tolerant firms would 
tend to be lower on average than those from risk-averse firms.  Hence, they win 
more jobs; 
 Compared to most risk-averse and moderately risk-averse firms, most risk-
tolerant and moderately risk-tolerant firms would obtain more jobs while having 
lower profits per job on average.  Sometimes most risk-tolerant firms would 
suffer large amounts of losses.  Moderately risk-tolerant firms are also exposed to 
the risks of large losses, but less than the most risk-tolerant firms; and  
 Compared to most risk-tolerant and moderately risk-tolerant firms, most risk-
averse and moderately risk-averse firms would enjoy higher profits per job while 
obtaining a smaller number of jobs.  Sometimes most risk-averse firms would 
suffer losses due to continuing overhead burden with too few jobs to cover it.  
Similarly, moderately risk-averse firms are also exposed to risk of overhead 
burden, but less than the most risk-averse firms.     
 
Table 5.2 provides the relative classification of risk attitude and descriptions for 
each group.  Most risk-tolerant contractors would enjoy high success rate, but could 
suffer low average profit per job and possible large losses.  In contrast, most risk-averse 
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contractors would enjoy high average profit per job, but could suffer low success rate 
and high overhead burden.  Each of the extreme risk attitude groups has its own 
advantages and disadvantages as listed in the table.   
High overhead burden is expected for most risk-averse contractors if they do not 
obtain enough jobs while they are reluctant to contract their capacity.  Maintaining 
capacity level requires contractors to spend a fixed amount of money on overhead for 
personnel, space, etc., even though they do not utilize their capacities.   
 
Table 5.2  Relative Classification of Different Risk Attitudes 
 Most (Highly) Risk-tolerant 
Moderately 
Risk-tolerant 
Moderately  
Risk-averse 
Most (Highly) 
Risk-averse 
Characteristics 
Accept large risks 
in order to gain 
potentially high 
profits 
Between the two extremes 
(most risk-tolerant  
and most risk-averse) 
Avoid risks of large 
losses, but may lose 
opportunities for 
large profits by not 
bidding or bidding 
too high 
Maximum Loss 
Allowance Largest MLA 
Relatively 
Large MLA 
Relatively 
Small MLA Smallest MLA 
Bid Frequency 
Bid more often 
since they tend to 
make go decisions 
frequently 
Relatively 
often 
Relatively 
less often 
Bid less often since 
they tend to make no-
go decisions 
frequently 
Bid Amounts Low Relatively low Relatively high High 
Success Rate High Low 
Average Profit 
per Job Low High 
Possible 
Threats 
Possible large 
losses on projects
Trade-offs  
between the two extremes 
Overhead burden 
 
In Table 5.2, moderately risk-tolerant and moderately risk-averse contractors 
locate between the two extreme risk attitudes.  These contractors would make trade-offs 
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between the advantages and disadvantages of the extreme risk attitudes.  The following 
hypotheses are proposed about expected relationships between contractors’ risk attitude 
and their performances.   
 
H1. Profitability vs. Risk Attitude: Moderately risk-averse contractors have more 
firm profits than other contractors. 
For a contractor to be most risk-tolerant or most risk-averse, there are apparent 
advantages as well as disadvantages: more jobs with lower profit per job versus higher 
profit per job with fewer jobs.  Moderately risk-tolerant contractors are exposed to risks 
of large losses, even though their risks are smaller than those of most risk-tolerant 
contractors.  In the highly risky construction business, a large loss could affect a firm 
badly.  Being moderately risk-averse could be beneficial in the trade-offs between the 
profit per job and the amount of jobs won.  These contractors avoid risk of large losses.  
Moderately risk-averse contractors could have overall higher profits than most risk-
tolerant, moderately risk-tolerant, and most averse contractors.  
 
H2. Survival vs. Risk Attitude: Moderate risk-aversion is advantageous for 
survival in the construction market.  
Moderately risk-averse contractors could avoid the disadvantages of being most 
risk-tolerant or most risk-averse: either a large amount of possible loss or a small amount 
of jobs won under overhead burden, which could result in financial problems.  While 
moderate risk-tolerance assumes risk of large losses that could result in firm failure, 
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moderate risk-aversion could decrease risks of overhead burden by taking relatively 
more risks than most risk-averse contractors.  Therefore, moderately risk-averse 
contractors would have more stable business operations and would survive longer.  
 
H3. Growth vs. Risk Attitude: Moderate risk-aversion is in favor of growth in the 
construction market.   
Most risk-tolerant contractors would have difficulty in growing due to the 
volatility in profitability even though they could obtain higher market share.  Most risk-
averse contractors would also have difficulty in growing because they would not bid 
often to obtain more jobs: they are selective in bidding.  But, thanks to the stability in 
business (as proposed in Hypothesis 2 and more overall profits (as proposed in 
Hypothesis 1), moderately risk-averse contractors could accumulate financial resources, 
spend them for expansions, and continue stable operation without putting assets at risk 
by accepting risky jobs.  
 
H4. Diversification vs. Risk Attitude: Moderate risk-aversion is in favor of 
diversification.  
Goals of market diversification can vary: firms can diversify to reduce 
diversifiable market risks, to grow, or to improve profitability.  Whatever the goal of 
diversification by a firm is, diversification means additional competition by opening new 
establishments in new sectors.  The success of diversification will depend on how a new 
establishment competes in a new sector.  Establishments within a firm inherit the 
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organizational characteristics including corporate risk attitude.  Then, based on the 
reasoning in H1 and H2, moderately risk-averse establishments would perform better in 
terms of profitability and survival.  Therefore, moderately risk-averse contractors would 
have higher probability of success in their diversification than most risk-tolerant, 
moderately risk-tolerant, and most risk-averse contractors.  
 
H5. Diversification vs. Survival: More diversified contractors have longer 
longevity.  
A firm’s establishments can share and develop together with the parent firm’s 
financial resources.  If moderately risk-averse contractors are successful in 
diversification as proposed in H4 and they survive longer as proposed in H2, more 
diversified firms would enjoy longer longevities.  Every contractor may have bad years 
and good years.  But, for diversified contractors, they have more chance to survive when 
their businesses go bad since they have their establishments as multiple buffers against 
firm failure.   
 
 
5.7  Summary 
Chapter V presented detailed descriptions of the methodologies and the 
hypotheses developed for the current study.  The procedure in the current investigation is 
summarized as follows: 
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 Build a simulation model based on evolutionary theory and represent 
competition among contractors having different risk attitudes; 
 Observe the effects of risk attitude in industry-wide patterns that evolve as 
results of competition in the model and compare the model results to the patterns 
observed in the actual U.S. construction industry data in Chapter IV; and 
 Test hypotheses using the developed evolutionary model and make 
recommendations for construction contractors.  
Using evolutionary approach, the current study considers contractors as 
individual entities competing with each other for common job opportunities in a 
construction market.  Considering that contractors may have different risk attitudes and 
that risk attitude is a universal trait, it is hypothesized that individual contractors’ 
different perceptions of risk and resulting different risk-taking behaviors in competition 
could affect competition among themselves and their own performances.  The current 
study also takes multiple perspectives from the individual levels to the aggregate levels 
for the population of contractors.  And, success of a contractor is analyzed within the 
domain of competition for the long-term.     
Conventionally, different risk attitudes have been represented using expected 
utility theory.  However, the theory and the method are not easy for practitioners to 
understand and it is also difficult to construct utility functions for individual contractors.  
It has been 60 years since the concept was introduced and few practitioners have learned 
it yet.  There are few studies that measured risk attitudes for a large sample of 
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contractors.  Consequently, the effect of risk attitude on competition has not been studied 
for construction contractors.   
The proposed new representation method uses the concept of Value at Risk that 
is easy for practitioners to understand and apply to real business decisions.  Value at 
Risk measures the expected value of loss in a simple manner by combining the effects of 
undesirable results such as cost overrun and probabilities that the undesirable results 
occur.  For the new method, a new term, maximum loss allowance is introduced.  It is 
defined as the maximum amount of loss that an individual firm can allow for a job.  
Using different amounts of MLA denominated in dollars, contractors’ different risk 
attitudes are simply and quantitatively expressed.  Risk-tolerant contractors allow risks 
of losses to obtain potentially large profits, so they have large amounts of MLA.  Risk-
averse contractors do not allow possibly large losses, so they have small amounts of 
MLA.  VaR and MLA have the same metric, dollars.  Based on the comparison of these 
two measures, contractors’ go/no-go decisions can be easily described.   
Five hypotheses were developed for the investigation of the effects of risk 
attitude on contractors’ competitive success in construction.  The hypothesized effects 
by different risk attitudes are about the differentiations of performance among 
contractors (winners vs. losers) in a market.  The differentiations are expected to be 
observed in their profitability, survival, growth, and diversification level.  Moderately 
risk-averse contractors would make trade-offs between the two extreme risk attitudes 
(most risk-tolerant and most risk-averse) better than moderately risk-tolerant contractors 
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that could suffer large losses.  The developed hypotheses anticipate outperformance of 
moderate risk-aversion in the construction market.      
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CHAPTER VI 
AN EVOLUTIONARY SIMULATION MODEL 
 
6.1  Development of an Evolutionary Model 
The current study develops an evolutionary simulation model in which 
contractors compete with each other in the competitive bidding environment.  The main 
purpose of the model is to investigate how contractors’ risk attitudes affect the 
competition among them, their performances, and the structure of the industry itself by 
tracking individual behaviors that depend on their own risk attitude and their 
performances and by measuring aggregate patterns that evolve at the population level.   
Comprehensive competition studies are complex because this type of study needs 
to consider multiple aspects such as how individuals behave in their competition and 
what results through the competition at the individual level as well as at the aggregate 
population level.  Simulation is one of the most advantageous methods to analyze 
competition in which individual behaviors need to be considered, due to the complexity 
of the solutions (Sounderpandian, 2007).  Since it is impossible to test contractors’ 
competition in the real world and the absence of longitudinal data on individual firms, 
simulation is the only feasible approach for the current investigation.     
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6.1.1 Uses of Empirical Findings 
A large longitudinal data set on multiple contractors’ business activities over 
long time periods would be very helpful for the current investigation.  However, there 
are few data available for such a longitudinal study in construction.  Even if actual data 
were available, it would be not easy to analyze contractors’ risk management, their risk 
attitudes, and competition among them since any historical data do not provide 
information about how contractors perceive risks and how they decide their risk-taking 
at the time of decision making.  As found in Chapter III, many empirical studies on risk-
return association and organizational performance found controversial results due to the 
limitations on the measurement of risk (ex-ante vs. ex-post) and the qualitative 
characteristics of organizational issues.   
Despite a limited amount of data and short time span, the analysis of the 
construction industry data performed in Chapter IV provides valuable information.  Even 
though the data themselves do not provide direct information about contractors’ 
competition and their organizational risk attitudes, it is considered that the empirical 
findings from the industry data are resultants of competition among the contractors in the 
market place.  That is, risk attitude of contractors can be inferred from the aggregate 
behavior of the industry.  The patterns of interest include the size distribution of 
construction contractors, their diversification pattern, and the changes in the industry 
capacity by individuals’ organizational expansions, contractions, deaths, and births, 
which are caused by competition.     
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6.1.2 Population of Contractors in the Model 
The firm rank in the ENR data is based on 400 individual contractors’ gross 
revenues every year.  The contractors’ gross revenues are results of competition with 
their competitors in the market.  Of course, the competition invisible in the data occurs 
within a larger population than the 400 largest contractors.  By year, some contractors 
are added to the list of top 400 firms thanks to better performance, i.e., increased gross 
revenues.  Some successful and large firms stay on the list over many years.  Meanwhile, 
others disappear from the list due to bad performance, i.e., decreased gross revenues.  
But, a disappearance from the list does not necessarily mean a firm death.  Some firms 
keep entering into and exiting out of the list around the rank 400.  These entrances and 
exits also relate to the competition among the contractors.   
To take account of this scope of competition within the population, the 
population in the current model has 500 contractors in an assumed market.  Initially, the 
500 firms are located uniformly over the eight market sectors, i.e., 62 or 63 firms per 
market sector.  The model measures performances of the contractors that are ranked 
between 1st and 400th for comparison with the empirical findings in the ENR data.  
Business failures are replaced by new firms so that the model keeps the total number of 
contractors at 500.  In the model, the industry has eight market sectors as classified in 
the ENR data.   
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6.2  Description of the Model 
This section provides detailed descriptions of the structure and the algorithms in 
the developed evolutionary simulation model.  There are 500 competing contractors in 
the model to obtain construction jobs available in the market through competitive 
bidding.  Individual firms’ organizational changes (growth, contraction, death, and 
diversification) are based on the individuals’ performances that are determined through 
competition in the market place.  The evolutionary model represents these dynamics.  
Figure 6.1 shows a simplified flow chart of the evolutionary simulation model.   
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Figure 6.1  Flow Chart of the Evolutionary Model 
 
To take the long-term perspective on the market competition and success of firms, 
the simulation runs for long periods (200 periods).  These periods do not represent any 
specific times or years.  They represent updates to the industry configuration, using a 
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number of periods necessary to achieve a steady state condition to be compared with the 
cross-sectional data for the industry, which were found in Chapter IV.   
The stochastic simulation model takes account of the uncertainties that 
contractors face.  The major uncertainties are represented in contractors’ cost estimates 
and actual costs of jobs.  The simulation runs for multiple iterations (200 iterations) to 
achieve convergence.  Following are detailed descriptions of each component in the flow 
chart in Figure 6.1.   
 
6.2.1 Initial Conditions and Differentiation by Risk Attitude 
At the beginning of the simulation, the model generates an initial population of 
500 firms.  All firms are given identical conditions and characteristics, except for their 
own risk attitudes.  The identical conditions for the contractors are their initial sizes (i.e., 
the same number of employees), estimation capability, productivity, overhead rate, 
initial wealth (cash reserve), and decision rules on corporate strategic behaviors (firm 
expansion, contraction, death, and diversification).  Initially, each contractor has only 
one establishment in one market sector (its original sector).  Each sector has the same 
number of contractors (firms).  Individual firms may extend their business by growth in 
their original sectors or by diversification (opening new establishments in other sectors).   
Risk attitude is considered as a universal and genetic characteristic of contractors.  
But, individuals may have different levels of risk attitude.  By differentiating risk 
attitude among contractors but maintaining all the other conditions and characteristics 
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the same, the model isolates the effects of risk attitudes on contractors’ competitive 
success.   
Each firm’s risk attitude is represented by a quantitative measure, MLA, which is 
the maximum amount of possible loss which a firm allows from a job.  For example, a 
contractor’s MLA can be 30% of the expected cost for a job.  Then, its MLA will be 3M 
assuming $10M to be the expected cost.  Individual firms’ MLAs (in dollars) are 
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution (which is the least informative of all 
distribution) at their founding as their own genetic feature.  Different prior distributions 
other than the uniform distribution are tested in Chapter VII as a part of model validation.   
Any vacancy due to firm deaths is filled by firm births to keep the total number 
of firms at 500.  The random assignment of risk attitudes is applied to new firms at their 
founding in the same way using the same uniform distribution.  For a diversified firm, its 
establishments inherit the parent firm’s risk attitude.   
 
6.2.2 Bid Opportunities and Selection of Bidders 
The current model tracks all individual firms’ risk-taking behaviors in bids.  Each 
period, a constant market demand is assumed with the same number of jobs and the 
same size of jobs.  All jobs are assumed to be identical to focus on the effects of risk 
attitude.  The amount of available jobs is equal for all of the classified sectors.   
For each job under bid, a fixed number of firms, assumed to be 6 in the model, 
are randomly selected.  Initially, all firms have the same capacity (represented by the 
same number of employees).  Therefore, all firms have same random chance to be 
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selected to be a bidder.  While competing with other firms and performing jobs, 
individual firms may expand or contract depending on their monetary performance over 
multiple periods.  Some firms with profits would expand while others with losses would 
contract in size.  Then, the initially identical firms become heterogeneous in their size 
over periods.   
Thus, the random selection of firms for bids takes account of this variability in 
individual firms’ capacity.  The model represents the general relationship between the 
size of a firm and the number of jobs that the firm pursues: large firms look for more 
jobs than small firms.  In a real market, the amount of jobs that a firm can perform is 
limited by the firms’ bonding capacity.  A firm’s bonding capacity would be 
proportional to the size of the firm, which is represented by the firm’s employment size 
in the current model.  To represent the variable firm sizes, the model defines the relative 
size of individual firms’ capacity in the total industry capacity.  Individual firms’ relative 
sizes are defined using Equation 6.1.  
 
n
i
i=1
i
i
Total industrycapacity = firm capacity
capacityof firmRelativesizeof capacityof firm =
Total industrycapacity
' (1 500)i firm s index i= ≤ ≤
∑
  [6.1] 
 
The actual selection process in the model is explained below.  Each firm’s 
relative size is measured using Equation 6.1 each period since the firms’ size may vary.  
Their relative sizes change over periods by the individual firm’s expansion or 
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contraction, as well as by deaths and new entrants.  The decision rules for individual 
firms’ capacity changes are discussed in later sections.   
Note that the total sum of the firms’ relative sizes is always 1.0.  Then, the 
individual firms’ relative measures can be placed on a horizontal line shown in Figure 
6.2, a graphical representation of the total industry capacity.  Each firm is given its own 
range.  Larger firms have wider ranges than smaller firms.  For the selection of bidders, a 
number is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution [0.0, 1.0].  A firm that has its 
range in which the random number lies is selected for cost estimates.  Firms are 
randomly selected but the selection is correlated to their relative sizes, so that larger 
firms bid more often than smaller firms.  The process continues to select firms to have 
the fixed number of bidders for each job.  Of course, this selection algorithm avoids the 
case that any firm is selected more than once.     
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Figure 6.2  Composition of Firms in the Industry Based on Their Relative Sizes 
 
6.2.3 Contractors’ Cost Estimates and Go/No-go Decisions 
For each job, a fixed number of contractors are chosen based on the selection 
process discussed above.  However, the actual number of final bidders for each job may 
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vary depending on contractors’ go/no-go decision making.  This section discusses 
individual firms’ cost estimates and their go/no-go decisions in the model.  
 
Cost Estimates 
In the real market, jobs are different in size, complexity, etc.  However, in the 
current model, all jobs are assumed to be identical in every aspect, except for their actual 
costs.  Contractors may have different cost estimates for an identical job.  According to 
Seydel (1994), there are three basic reasons for the variation in competitor behaviors in 
bidding situations:  
 Variation in costs among competitors;  
 Variation in markup level among firms due to different strategies; and  
 Difference in projects with respect to desirability, risk involved, and complexity.   
The current model represents the variation among contractors’ estimates and 
uncertainties in actual costs.  As assumed in the initial conditions, all firms have the 
same estimating capability.  However, individual firms’ estimates have stochastic 
characteristics due to estimation errors, estimator’s bias, omissions, etc.  To represent the 
variation, firms’ cost estimates are randomly drawn from the same distribution 
2( , )e eN μ σ .   
The model does not represent the variation in markup level among firms.  The 
variation could be due to individual firms’ different strategies or different internal 
conditions.  However, the model does not differentiate firms’ specific strategies.  The 
specification of individuals’ strategies requires additional assumptions and makes the 
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model more complex.  To isolate the effects of risk attitude, the same fixed percentage 
markup is assumed: all firms apply the same fixed markup percentage to their own cost 
estimates to decide the bid amount.   
 
Go/No-go Decisions 
Suppose there are only two bidders (contractors A and B) for a job and their 
estimates are different.  To represent the variation of the cost estimates by the firms, a 
normal distribution 2( , )e eN μ σ is assumed as shown in Figure 6.3.  Note that the two 
contractors have a same estimation capability and there exists variation in their estimates.  
The figure provides a comparison of cost estimates by the two contractors and 
corresponding VaR based on their cost estimates.  Contractor A has a cost estimate 
greater than eμ  while contractor B has its estimate smaller than eμ .  So, contractor B’s 
VaR is greater than contractor A’s.  However, it does not indicate that contractor B 
would not bid and contractor A would bid.   
  Contractors’ go/no-go decision does not solely depend on the amount of VaR, 
the expected value of possible losses.  Their decisions depend on their own risk attitudes, 
which lead to different perceptions of risk or possible loss from a job.  If contractor B 
has its MLA greater than the VaR associated with its cost estimate, contractor B will bid.  
If contractor A has its MLA smaller than the amount of the current VaR associated with 
its cost estimate, contractor A will not bid.  Depending on the amounts of MLA that 
represent the contractors’ risk attitude, their decisions may vary.   
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Figure 6.3  Comparison of Two Contractors’ Cost Estimates and VaRs 
 
Due to contractors’ go/no-go decisions, the number of final bidders varies even 
though a fixed number of firms are selected for each job.  To keep a minimum level of 
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competition in the market, the minimum number of final bidders in the model is set at 
two.   
 
6.2.4 Competition and Actual Costs 
Competitive bidding for lump sum contracts is the major competition mechanism 
in the current model.  Bidders do not know actual costs when they bid for a job.  When a 
contractor wins a job, the fixed price contract for the job is the risk transfer from the 
owner to the contractor.  In the model, actual costs are randomly drawn from a normal 
distribution 2( , )c cN μ σ  to represent the uncertainties inherent in the construction 
business.   
When a contractor bids for a job, it incurs a bidding cost.  Frequent bidding 
without obtaining jobs will cause an unfavorable effect on firms’ monetary performance.  
Therefore, there will be effects on individual firms’ performance with respect to bidding 
costs, the bid frequencies, the probability of winning, and the average profitability from 
jobs.  Competition occurs for each job among multiple contractors that estimate job costs 
and make go/no-go decisions depending on their own risk attitude.  The flow chart in 
Figure 6.4 describes the competition among contractors for each job.   
As shown in Figure 6.4, contractors spend general overhead expenditures 
regardless of their go/no-go decisions.  Final bidders spend bidding costs and the winner, 
the lowest bidder, earns a profit or loss depending on the actual cost of the job.  Each of 
individual contractor’s monetary performance is measured over all jobs and summarized 
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at the end of each period for their decisions on expansion, contraction, or death, which 
are described in detail in the next sections.    
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Figure 6.4  Flow Chart – Competition 
 
6.2.5 Decision Rules for Contractors’ Strategic Behaviors 
At the end of each period, firms may expand, contract, go out of business, or 
diversify into new sectors depending on each individual firm’s performance and 
financial condition.  All business failures are replaced by new firms to keep the total 
number of firms constant at 500.  New firms have the identical initial conditions that the 
firms in the initial population.  New firms compete with existing firms to obtain jobs 
through competitive bidding and they also may expand, contract, or go out of business.   
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Rules of the individuals’ behavior in an evolutionary model should be plausible 
and simple (Metcalfe and Foster, 2004).  Following are the basic decision rules of the 
contractors’ strategic behaviors.  The parameters in the following descriptions are 
determined by fitting the model outputs to the industry patterns found in the actual data.   
 
Decision Rules on Establishment Expansion and Contraction 
Organizational expansions and contractions occur at the establishment level at 
the end of each period depending on the performance of individual establishments.  The 
rule is simple: an establishment expands when it obtains a profit and contracts when it 
suffers a loss.  In general, contractors desire to grow in a market but they are not willing 
to shrink in size (Kim, 2004).  Sometimes, they are too optimistic about the market.   
In the model, contraction of an establishment is restricted by random chances, 
a% (less than 100%) in order to represent the contractors’ relectance to contract  in size, 
while expansion of an establishment occurs whenever the establishment obtains a profit.   
 Probabiltiy of expansions with profits: 100% 
 Probability of contractions with losses: a% < 100% 
For each establishment, the size of expansion or contraction is determined in  
proportion by b (in Equations 6.2 though 6.5) to the amounts of profit/loss at the 
establishment level.  Large profits increase the size of expansions while large losses 
increase the size of contractions.  Also, the size of expansions and contractions may be 
related to parent firm’s financial condition, i.e., cash reserves.  For example, the size of 
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expansions at an establishment could be greater when it obtained a profit and its parent 
firm is in a better financial shape.   
For an establishment in the model, with the probabilities of expansions and 
contractions discussed above, if its parent firm has cash reserves more than the parent 
firm’s overhead, the establishment expands more (by c > 1.0) if it earned a profit, 
meanwhile the establishment contracts by normal size (without adjustment, ie., c = 1.0) 
when it earned a loss.  On the other hand, the size of contraction at an establishment 
would be greater when its parent firm is in a bad financial shape.  For an establishment, 
if its parent firm has cash reserves lower than the firm’s overhead, the establishment 
contracts more (by c > 1.0) if it earned a loss, meanwhile the establishment expands by 
normal size (without adjustment, i.e., c = 1.0) when it earned a profit.   
Based on these general concepts, size of an expansion at the establishment level 
is decided as below when an establishment earned a profit:  
 If a firm has cash reserve greater than its overall overhead:  
b (employees/$M) × the amount of profit ($M) ×c    [6.2] 
 If parent firm has cash reserve smaller than its overall overhead:  
b (employees/$M) × the amount of profit ($M) ×1.0   [6.3] 
 
Size of a contraction with the probability of contraction a at the establishment 
level is decided as below when an establishment earned a loss:  
 If a firm has cash reserve greater than its overall overhead:  
b (employees/$M) × the amount of profit ($M)  ×1.0   [6.4] 
 
 
 
183
 If a firm has cash reserve smaller than its overall overhead:  
b (employees/$M) × the amount of profit ($M) ×  c   [6.5] 
 
Decision Rules on Establishment/Firm Death 
When a firm fails to maintain its cash reserves above zero, the firm closes its 
establishments that produce losses.  In this decision, a parent firm and all its 
establishments may go out of business if all of the firm’s establishments suffer losses.  A 
death decision can be made at the establishment level.  Even though a parent firm has 
positive cash reserves, the parent firm may want to close its establishment(s) if an 
establishment suffers a large amount of loss, e.g., larger than (d) times its annual 
overhead (establishment overehad) as in Equation 6.6 below.  So, a death decision at the 
estabishment level can be defined as:   
 
Establishment death, if profit < -(d) ×annual overhead  [6.6] 
 
Whenever there is a firm death, a new firm enters into the market so that the total 
number of firms is maintained constant (500).  A new firm has only one establishment at 
its founding.  The birth occurs in the same market sector in which a firm death occurred.  
If successful in competition, the new firm will grow and diversify by opening 
establishments.  Otherwise, it will suffer loss and may go out of business.   
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Decision Rules on Market Diversification 
There have been few studies about contractors’ diversification and general rules 
for contractors’ market diversification is not available in the literature.  Nevertheless, in 
general, contractors would diversify if they have earned profits and built financial 
resources enough to open a new establishment in a new sector.  Using this general 
concept, contractors’ market diversification is represented in the current model.   
In the model, initially every firm has only one establishment in the model.  
Individual firms may come to have more than one establishment by diversification.  A 
firm may open one new establishment when it has cash reserve greater than (e %) of its 
overall overhead.  However, the frequency of diversification is restricted by random 
chances, (f %), since it can be reasonably assumed that having enough cash does not 
always lead to a contractor’s diversification.  Different contractors could have their own 
diversification strategies in a real market.  However, specification of their different 
strategies would make the model unnecessarily more complicated and would require 
additional variables and assumptions.   
Different methods are found in economic models to represent the size 
distribution of entrants to a market.  Hannan et al. (1990) used an approximatly 
lognormal distribution skewed to the right (larger sizes) to determine the random size of 
each entrant.  Kwasnicki& (1998) simply assumed the initial market share of an entrant is 
not larger than 0.5%.  And, Nelson and Winter (1982) used a uniform distribution with a 
range of relatively smaller values than existing firms to decide the size of entrants.  In 
the current model, the minimum size of a new establishment is assumed to be 100 
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employees and the sizes of new establishments are assumed to be exponentially 
distributed (skewed to the right) with the mean value (h in Equation 6.7).  
In addition, the size of new establishments is proportional (by g in Equation 6.7) 
to firm cash reserve since financially strong firms can open large establishments.  For the 
contractors’ market diversification, the current model decides the size of new 
establishments using Equestion 6.7:  
 
Size of new establishment (number of employees)
= Exp( )  CR($M) (1/$M) + 100h g× ×    [6.7] 
Where, Exp(h) is a random variable from an exponential distribution whose 
mean is assumed to be (h) and CR is parent firm’s cash reserve.  
 
All 500 firms in the model follow these simple rules discussed above for their 
strategic behavior: expansion, contraction, death, and market diversification.  There are 
eight model parameters (a ~ h) to be specified.  The value of each parameter has been 
decided by fitting the model behaviors to the industry patterns found in the actual U.S. 
construction industry data analyzed in Chapter IV.  The determined parameter values for 
the contractors’ strategic behaviors are presented in Section 6.3. 
Compared to the complexity in contractors’ strategic behavior in the real market 
competition, the number of parameters in the current model is kept very small.  The 
simplicity of these behavior rules eliminates unnecessary factors in the competitive 
system and helps the current study focus on the main issue, the effects of firms’ risk 
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attitude on competition.  The model does not attempt to replicate the complexity of the 
real world or the behavior of specific contractors; hence the model does not specify any 
complicated model parameters such as level of competitiveness (Dosi et al., 1995), 
stochastic functions for growth rate (Gibrat (1931); Simon and Bonini (1958)), 
acquisition of jobs by means other than fixed price contracts and winner-take-all bidding, 
functions of production (Jovanovic (1982); Kwasnicki&  (1998)), founding and mortality 
rates (Hannan et al., 1990), etc which are frequently observed in such economic models.    
 
6.2.6 Firm Performance 
Performances are measured individually for each of the firms and their 
establishments.  The only difference among model firms lies in their own risk attitudes 
that affect their go/no-go decision in competitive bidding.  The model tracks the firms’ 
performances differentiated through competition.   
The firms obtain jobs and are paid based on the contract price which was decided 
when the job was awarded.  If the actual cost of a job is greater than the contract price, 
the contractor faces a loss, and vice versa.  Firms pay their overhead expenditures which 
are proportional to their own capacity size (the number of employees).  When a firm 
grows or diversifies, its overhead burden increases, and vice versa.  The overhead rate to 
firm capacity is estimated using the actual U.S. construction industry data in Section 6.3.   
In the model, profits/losses from jobs, bidding costs, and overhead expenditures 
are measured for each of the establishments.  And, the profits for establishments 
accumulate in their parent firms’ cash reserves.  Cumulative profits and cash reserves are 
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indicative of contractors’ economic performance.  Contractors’ growth and 
diversification level are also measured by their employment sizes and gross revenues in 
the multiple market sectors.  Also, age is a measure of firm performance indicating the 
firm’s survival.  Ages are counted in periods as long as a firm maintains its business with 
more than one establishment in a market sector.   
 
 
6.3  Model Parameters 
There are other factors that could affect construction contractors’ competitive 
success in a market.  They include tangible and intangible factors such as financial 
strength, organizational structure, experience, better management, relationship with 
clients, intelligence, different market strategies, etc.  For each of these factors, feasible 
values or measures among individual contractors would differ.  However, in order to 
identify the effects of contractors’ risk attitude, the current study assumes that these 
possible factors or organizational characteristics are similar for every contractor.  Thus, 
values of the model parameters in the model are determined to represent overall averages.         
The current model aims at reproducing aggregate patterns that are derived from 
the real U.S. construction industry data.  Model parameters have been fitted to reproduce 
the empirical findings.  The following sections discuss the major model parameters.  
Summaries of the model parameters and their values are provided in Tables 6.5 and 6.6.    
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6.3.1 Cost Estimate and Markup 
Contractors estimate the cost of jobs and add their markup to decide their bid 
amounts.  Critical errors in cost estimates could result in significant losses (in case of 
underestimates) or reduced market share (in case of overestimates).  Construction cost 
estimation is an experience-based process which is affected by people’s competence and 
experience and there is no generally accepted method (Hegazy and Moselhi, 1995).   
To figure out the current practices in cost estimation for bid preparation, Hegazy 
and Moselhi (1995) performed a questionnaire survey.  Survey responses were collected 
from 78 large general contractors in the U.S. and Canada.  Most of the surveyed 
contractors have most of their business in the building construction market.  Their 
survey results provide descriptions about the differences in contractors’ cost estimates.   
Contractors have different definitions of markup.  Markup is usually defined as 
an amount added to the cost estimate to provide a contribution to the contractor’s general 
overhead and profit and to cover any contingencies that arise in the job (Benjamin, 1969).  
However, Hegazy and Moselhi (1995) found that contractors consider the application of 
markup differently as shown in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1  Coverage of Markup 
Coverage of Markup Percentage of Respondents 
profit only 44% 
profit + contingency 33% 
profit + general overhead 17% 
profit + general overhead + contingency 4% 
profit + general overhead + project overhead + contingency 3% 
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Also, Hegazy and Moselhi (1995) found that the contractors have divergent ways 
to estimate general overhead (e.g., head office expenses) as summarized in Table 6.2.  
Most of the contractors perform detailed estimates for direct costs, but they do not have 
a commonly accepted method for overhead estimation.   
 
Table 6.2  Estimation of General Overhead  
Estimation of General Overhead Percentage of Respondents 
% of direct costs 31% 
% of the sum of direct costs and project overhead 27% 
Not estimated 19% 
Detailed estimate 18% 
% of project overhead 5% 
 
Based on the results of the survey, Hegazy and Moselhi (1995) derived the 
approximation about relative contribution of cost elements as the percent of the total bid 
amount: direct cost: 80~90%; project overhead: 10~30%; general overhead: 5~15%; and 
markup: 0~10%.  The approximation does not make the total 100%.  In their 
approximation, project overhead, general overhead, and markup are differentiated.  If the 
markup is assumed to cover contingency, project overhead, and general overhead, as by 
some contractors in Table 6.1, the contribution of markup would be much greater.   
For the current model, contractors’ cost estimates are randomly drawn from an 
identical probability distribution while their percentage markups are assumed to be 
identical (a fixed percentage of the cost estimate).  Therefore, it assumes that 
contractors’ estimates may be different due to variation associated with omissions, errors, 
or over- or under-estimates, which are represented by random draws while all 
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contractors have a same level of estimation capability.  So, the random draws are made 
from an identical probability distribution.  In the model, contractors’ direct cost 
estimates follow 2( , )e eN μ σ , $10Meμ =  and $1.5Meσ = .  The distribution is truncated 
with the minimum cost estimate set at $5.5M.  
 
6.3.2 Actual Costs of Job 
Cost overruns and schedule delays are common in the construction business 
(Frimpong et al., 2003).  Skewness in the distribution of actual construction project costs 
is supported in the literature (Benjamin, 1969): it is usually assumed that the probability 
distribution of the ratio of actual as-built cost to the original cost estimate has a longer 
tail (skewed to the right) while a shorter tail at the other side.  Schedule delays that may 
result in cost overruns are also a frequently cited problem in the construction business.    
There have been many studies on the issues.  Kaming et al. (1997) identified 
factors affecting project performance in terms of time and costs for high-rise 
construction projects in Indonesia.  The factors include inflation, inaccurate estimating, 
complexity of work, change orders, low labor productivity, etc.  Akinci and Fischer 
(1998) identified factors affecting cost estimates and the final cost of a project, 
especially uncontrollable risk sources.  Odeck (2004) found a pattern of discrepancy, the 
mean of 7.9% ranging from -59% to 183%, between estimated and actual costs from 
Norwegian road construction projects.  Also, Lee (2008) found the majority of road and 
rail projects in South Korea (total 161 completed projects) similarly experienced 
significant cost overruns.   
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Whatever the reasons for the discrepancies between estimated and actual costs 
are, the phenomena of cost and schedule overruns are prevalent in the construction 
business.  To represent these phenomena, the actual cost of a job is represented as a 
random variable drawn from a truncated normal distribution with the minimum value in 
the area of the left side.  In the current model, actual costs of job are assumed to 
follow 2( , )c cN μ σ , $10Mcμ = and $2.3Mcσ = , and the minimum actual cost is $5.5M.  
  
6.3.3 Overhead Rate 
The Construction Financial Management Association (CFMA) publishes the 
results of their survey about construction firms’ business every year.  Table 6.3 shows 
the collected financial data from the CFMA publication on the contractors’ Selling, 
General and Administrative Expenses.  General expenditures (i.e., overhead) are 
presented as a percent of total revenues.  Contractors classified by type of jobs show 
different levels of overhead percentages.  Industrial and nonresidential contractors have 
a lower average percentage than heavy and highway contractors.  The average of the 
overhead percentages for all construction contractors in their survey is about 6.7%.    
 
Table 6.3  Selling, General and Administrative Expenses (% of Total Revenues) 
Composite Firms 1996 1997 1998 2000 2002 Average
All Companies 6.2% 8.9% 5.7% 6.2% 6.4% 6.68% 
Industrial & Nonresidential 
Companies 4.3% 4.7% 3.8% 3.8% 4.5% 4.22% 
Heavy & Highway 
Companies 7.5% 6.5% 6.6% 8.0% 6.2% 6.96% 
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In the current model, overhead rate is defined as the ratio of general overhead to 
the employment size of a business organization as in Equation 6.8.  The rate is different 
from the common representation of overhead, a percent of total revenues as in the 
CFMA financial data.  The assumption is that organizations having large numbers of 
employees spend more as general overhead, and vice versa.  It considers the existence of 
fixed costs in firm business operations.   
 
($) /Overhead Rate Overhead Expenditures Employee=   [6.8] 
 
Individual contractors in the model expand and contract in size depending on 
their performance.  However, an expansion or contraction may not necessarily mean an 
increase or decrease in firm gross revenues.  A contractor that expanded its capacity 
based on profits earned in the previous period t-1 could face overhead burden in the 
current period t if the contractor does not obtain more jobs to use the expanded capacity.  
Thus, an overconfident expansion could result in critical failure as discussed in Chapter 
III regarding contractors’ business failure.   
Two statistical data sets by the U.S. Census Bureau, 1992 Enterprise Statistics 
and 2002 Economic Census, are used to estimate the overhead rate ($million/employee) 
for the current study.  These data provide the number of employees and the amount of 
total revenues for firms in each size class, but not the amount of general overhead 
expenditures.  The general overhead expenditures are estimated assuming that the 
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average percent of general overhead in total gross revenue would be about 6.7% as 
found in Table 6.3.   
The data in Table 6.4 show the estimated revenue rate (gross revenues per 
employee) and overhead rate (overhead expenditures per employee) for large contractors 
having more than 500 employees.  The revenue rate varies from 0.152 to 0.278.  The 
overhead rate varies from 0.011 to 0.019.  For the current model, contractors’ overhead 
rate is assumed to be 0.014 to fit the model outputs to the actual industry patterns.  
 
Table 6.4  Overhead Expenditures ($Millions) per Employee  
Data 
Sources Sectors 
Revenue Rate 
($Millions/employee)
Overhead Rate 
($Millions/employee)
All Contractors 0.162 0.011 
General Building Contractors 0.278 0.019 
1992 
Enterprise 
Statistics Heavy Contractors 0.152 0.011 
Commercial Building 
Contractors 
Housing Operatives 
Industrial Building 
Contractors 
2002 
Economic 
Census 
Power Communication 
Contractors 
0.241  
(Average) 
0.016 
(Average) 
 
6.3.4 Values of Model Parameters 
The model has been developed using programming language C with Microsoft 
Visual Studio.  Through the simulations, values of model parameters were determined.  
The determined baseline parameters are the best combination that enables the model to 
produce aggregate patterns fitted to the empirical findings from the actual U.S. 
construction industry data.  Table 6.5 provides a summary of model parameters for 
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competitive bidding in the market.  And, Table 6.6 provides another summary of model 
parameters for the contractors’ strategic behaviors.   
The aggregate patterns found in the model using the listed parameter values in 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 are compared with the actual industry patterns found from the real 
U.S. construction industry data in Chapter VII.  Also, all hypothesis tests performed in 
Chapter VII are based on the same parameter values.   
 
Table 6.5  Model Parameters for Firms and Competitive Bidding in the Market 
Parameters Value 
Number of sectors 8 sectors 
Number of jobs per period 1,800 jobs in each sector  (Total 14,400 jobs in the eight sectors) 
Mean of project cost  $10M (= Mean of cost estimate) 
2( , ), $10 ,  $1.5N M Mμ σ μ σ= =  
Contractors’ cost estimates 
Minimum cost estimate: $5.5M 
2( , ), $10 ,  $2.3N M Mμ σ μ σ= =  
Actual costs 
Minimum actual cost: $5.5M 
Contractors’ fixed markup 22% of firm cost estimate 
Bidding cost per bid $50K per bid 
Overhead expenditures 0.014 ×  the employment size 
Firm initial conditions Initial size of capacity: 250 employees Initial cash reserve: $5M 
Random assignment of individual 
contractors’ risk attitude 
Uniform ($2.2M, $9.6M) 
- Min. 22% of the cost mean indicating the most risk-averse 
- Max. 96% of the cost mean indicating the most risk-
tolerant 
6 firms 
Number of firms selected for bid 
Minimum number of final bidders: 2 bidders 
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Table 6.6  Model Parameters for Contractors’ Strategic Behaviors 
Parameters Value 
Establishment 
expansion/contraction 
- Probability of expansion with profit: 100% 
- Probability of contraction with loss: a = 70% 
- Expansion/contraction size multiplier: b = 20.0 
- Proportional factor to firm cash reserve: c = 2.0 
- Firm: cash reserve < $0 
Condition of establishment/firm 
death - Establishment death condition: 
If establishment profit < -1.5 (d)×  establishment overhead 
Condition of diversification - If firm cash reserve > 25% (e) of firm overhead - Restriction by random chance: f = 30% 
Size of new establishment size in 
diversification 
- Exponential random and proportional to firm cash reserve 
- Proportional factor to firm cash reserve: g = 0.05 
- Mean of the exponential distribution: h = 200 
 
 
6.4  Summary 
Chapter VI discussed the structure and the algorithms in the evolutionary 
simulation model in which competition among multiple contractors is simulated and 
analyzed.  Competitive bidding is described as the major mechanism of competition of 
the contractors that are all identical except their organizational risk attitude.  The 
following major characteristics of the model have been discussed:  
 Population of contractors in the model; 
 Identical initial conditions and differentiation of contractors’ risk attitude; 
 Bid opportunities in the market and bidder selection for each job; 
 Contractors’ cost estimates and go/no-go decisions; 
 Representation of uncertainties in actual costs of job; and 
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 Decision rules of contractors’ strategic behavior.   
In the model, all jobs in the market are identical, but actual costs of jobs are 
random, which represents uncertainties inherent in construction jobs.  Depending on the 
winning bid and the actual cost, firms may obtain profit or loss from a job.  Through 
competition, firms that are identical at the beginning of the simulation (in the initial 
population) become heterogeneous through competition in terms of size (capacity: 
employment size), age, profitability, cash reserve, diversification (the number of sectors 
where they have businesses), etc.   
Individual contractors make go/no-go decisions for final bids depending on their 
own risk attitudes.  Also, they make corporate strategic decisions on expansions, 
contractions, deaths, and market diversification.  For these decisions, the developed 
evolutionary model uses general rules that are simple and plausible.  Expansions and 
contractions occur at the establishment level while deaths may occur at the firm level as 
well as at the establishment level.  Firm births occur to fill the vacancies due to firm 
deaths in order to keep the total number of firms constant.  The rules of firm strategic 
behaviors govern all firms while their risk-taking behaviors in competitive bidding are 
dependent of their own risk attitudes.   
Values of the model parameters were determined based on the available actual 
data and the plausible assumptions.  The model behaviors were fitted to the actual 
industry patterns identified.  In Chapter VII, the aggregate patterns in the model are 
compared with the actual industry patterns found in the real U.S. construction industry 
data.  
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CHAPTER VII 
MODEL VALIDATION AND TEST OF HYPOTHESES 
 
This chapter discusses validation of the model and results of the hypothesis tests.   
The aggregate patterns from the simulation results were fitted to the actual industry 
patterns identified in the U.S. construction industry data, which is a part of the model 
validation.  First, the current chapter provides descriptions of the basic model behaviors 
and the fitted industry patterns based on the determined model parameters.   
There is another issue that is validated for the evolutionary simulation model.  A 
test is performed using the proposed new method using VaR to represent contractors’ 
different risk attitudes and corresponding different risk-taking behaviors.  A comparison 
of the two methods (the conventional method and the new method) is provided.  
The five hypotheses developed in Chapter V are tested using the evolutionary 
simulation model to investigate the effects of risk attitude on contractors’ competitive 
success.  In addition, sensitivity analyses are performed to clarify the validity of the 
simulation results.  Three major initial assumptions and conditions in the model are 
tested:   
 Different assumptions on contractors’ risk attitude: the current model considers 
heterogeneity in risk attitude among contractors.  Two different assumptions are 
tested: no risk-aversion and all risk-neutral for contractors.  
 Different prior distributions for random assignment of contractors’ risk attitude.     
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 Different initial sizes of firms.  
The simulation results are based on the parameter values summarized in Tables 
6.5 and 6.6 in Chapter VI.  The simulation is run until the system reaches a steady state, 
which is achieved when organizational responses to competitive selection forces become 
stable so that industry patterns such as size distribution and diversification pattern also 
become stabilized.   
 
 
7.1  Model Behaviors vs. Actual Industry Data 
In Chapter IV, three different types of industry patterns were identified as 
resultants of competition among contractors using the U.S. construction industry data.  
The identified patterns are: 1) size distribution of contractors in the market; 2) 
diversification pattern of large contractors; and 3) industry capacity changes by 
expansions, contractions, deaths, and births.   
The developed evolutionary model produces aggregate industry patterns as the 
resultants of competition among multiple contractors.  The following sections provide 
comparisons between the actual industry patterns and the aggregate patterns that evolved 
through competition in the model.   
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7.1.1 Size Distribution of Contractors 
The size distribution of the model firms reaches a steady state over a number of 
iterations.  Figure 7.1 shows the comparison between the actual size distribution of the 
ENR U.S. top 400 contractors and the size distribution of the 400 largest model firms.  
The distributions are very similar.   
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Figure 7.1  Size Distribution of Firms (Actual vs. Model) 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the same comparison, but in the logarithm.  Figure 7.2 shows 
inverse proportionality between the population density and firm size, indicating the 
existence of a power law.  Considering that the firms in the model are differentiated only 
by their organizational risk attitudes, even though there are a lot of variables affecting 
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contractors’ competition and their success in the real market, the similarity between the 
two distributions is significant.   
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Figure 7.2  Size Distribution of Firms in the Logarithm (Actual vs. Model) 
 
Note that the initial conditions of all model firms (initial size, overhead rate, and 
initial cash reserve) are identical.  Contractors have the same level of variability in their 
cost estimates and they face the same level of uncertainties in actual costs.  Also, the 
model parameters and the decision rules given for the model firms’ business operation 
and strategic behaviors are identical.  The differences in size among the model firms that 
develops the distribution in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 are caused only by their different risk-
taking behaviors in competition, depending on their own risk attitudes.  
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7.1.2 Industry Capacity Changes 
In Chapter IV, the Statistics of U.S. Business by the U.S. Census Bureau provide 
the employment changes by expansions, contractions, deaths, and births at the 
establishment level.  These organizational changes in contractors’ employment size are 
also results of competition in the market place.  The model firms’ employment changes 
are fitted to the actual industry data.  For the comparison, the employment changes were 
measured at the establishment level in the model as in the SUSB data.   
Table 7.1 shows the industry capacity changes (by percentage of the total 
industry capacity) that evolve through competition in the model in comparison with the 
Statistics of U.S. Business data.  The percentage changes from the SUSB data in the 
table are 10 years’ averages for a class of large contractors that have more than 500 
employees, which represents the model firms.  The simulation results are values 
averaged across the 200 iterations.  The results are very close to the actual averages.   
 
Table 7.1  Industry Capacity Changes 
Type of 
Changes 
Statistics of U.S. Business 
10 Years’ Average (1995 ~ 2004) 
Simulation Results 
of 400 Model Firms 
Expansions 13.9% 12.4% 
Contractions 15.0% 13.8% 
Births 4.9% 4.0% 
Deaths 5.3% 5.5% 
No Change 60.9% 64.3% 
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7.1.3 Diversification Pattern of Contractors 
The last aggregate industry pattern to be compared is the diversification pattern 
of the contractors.  Figure 7.3 provides the comparison between the diversification 
pattern of the 400 model firms and the actual industry pattern based on the ENR U.S. 
Top 400 Contractors data.  The overall patterns are similar to each other but there are 
small differences between the two distributions, especially in the frequencies of firms 
that have lower diversity indices (0.1 and 0.2).   
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Figure 7.3  Distribution of Firms by Diversity Index 
 
In the simulation model, it is assumed that all jobs in the market are identical.  
The identical size of jobs is $10 million and the only difference among jobs is defined in 
actual costs.  This assumption allows the current investigation to focus on the effects of 
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risk attitude on competition in the assumed market.  However, every construction job is 
different in the real market.  Usually, large firms exist to perform large jobs.  But, a 
small establishment under a large parent firm could perform small jobs.   
A sensitivity analysis using the model found that assuming smaller sizes for new 
establishments in the firms’ market diversification together with smaller job sizes 
generates diversification patterns more similar to the actual pattern.  The assumption 
enables the model firms to have very small portions of their gross revenues in their 
second or third market sector, which increases the frequency of firms that have lower 
diversity indices in Figure 7.3.  Low values of diversity index such as 0.1 can be attained 
for a firm if the firm has the majority (almost 100%) of its gross revenues in one sector 
and very small percentages of its gross revenues in other sectors.  Refer to the 
normalized diversity index in Figure 4.15 in Chapter IV to see how diversity index 
varies depending on different combinations of firm gross revenues in the assumed two 
market sectors.   
However, the assumption of smaller sizes of establishments and jobs results in 
differences in other industry comparisons, for example, the model predicts more 
establishment deaths at their early ages than occur in reality.  In the model, the bidder 
selection for each job is random, but it is based on the size of establishments.  Therefore, 
in the model, very small establishments at their founding have difficulty in obtaining 
jobs.  In the real market, very small establishments are able to obtain small jobs since 
large establishments usually do not perform the small jobs that the small establishments 
perform.  That is, large construction firms often find it difficult to make a profit on small 
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jobs due to high fixed costs.  This consideration is not included in the simulation model.  
Also, the model does not represent the distribution of jobs in size.  The identical job size 
is kept to be $10 million, which is consistent with the best combination of model 
parameters discussed in Section 6.3.4.   
Another aggregate representation of diversity found in the actual data is the 
number of sectors per firm: how many sectors a firm operates its business in.  Figure 7.4 
shows the comparison between the actual pattern from the ENR U.S. Top 400 
Contractors data and the simulation result.  The two distributions are very similar to each 
other.   
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Figure 7.4  Number of Sectors per Firm 
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In the initial population, all model firms have only one establishment in one 
sector.  Over simulation periods, these firms diversify into other sectors.  The average 
number of market sectors per firm in the ENR US Top 400 Contractors is 2.5.  The same 
average of the 400 model firms is about 2.3, which is the average from the distribution in 
Figure 7.4.  It is clear from the figure that the diversity computed by the simulation is 
virtually identical to the ENR data.   
 
7.1.4 Other Model Behaviors 
This section provides other model behaviors that evolve through the simulated 
competition among contractors.  The behaviors to be discussed are: 
 Distribution of firms by age 
 Diversity index - combination of multiple sectors 
 Industry ratio: industry revenues to industry capacity 
 
Age Distributions of Firms 
Many studies in market ecology and economics have paid attention to mortality 
patterns of business organizations (Singh (1990); Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999)).  The 
model generates a reasonable pattern that has been found in empirical studies.  In general, 
there are a large number of young business organizations and a small number of old 
organizations in a market.  Figure 7.5 shows the distribution of the 400 model firms by 
age over periods.   
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In the initial population, all model firms are new.  Through competition in the 
market, successful firms survive and age while some of unsuccessful firms go out of 
business.  Meanwhile, new entrants start their business and they are young.  The age 
distribution of firms is also a result of competition in the market.   
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Figure 7.5  Age Distribution of Firms 
 
Diversity Index - Combination of Multiple Sectors 
The level of diversification of individual firms is measured by the diversity index.  
By expansion and contraction at the establishment level and market diversification at the 
firm level, individual firms may have different combinations of gross revenues in 
different number of sectors.  The market diversification increases the number of sectors 
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in which a firm operates its business by running multiple establishments.  Meanwhile, 
expansions and contractions change employment sizes at the establishment level.     
Figure 7.6 shows different combinations of multiple sectors that determine 
various values of diversity index for the model firms.  It shows, for firms classified by 
diversity index, in how many sectors firms have their establishments.  Firms with low 
diversity indices operate their establishments in small numbers of sectors.  In contrast, 
firms with high diversity indices have their business in large numbers of sectors.   
For example, consider firms that have diversity index 0.6 in Figure 7.6 
(represented by a dotted line with ‘× ’ in the figure), about 70% of these firms have their 
businesses in four sectors, about 30% of them have their businesses in five sectors, and 
the other remaining firms have their establishments in six or seven sectors.  Note that the 
diversity index varies depending on different combinations of gross revenues in each 
sector as well as the number of sectors where a firm has its business as explained in 
Chapter IV.   
 
 
 
 
208
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Number of Sectors
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(%
)
0.0
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
Diversity
Index
DI  = 0.6
 
Figure 7.6  Distribution of Firms by the Number of Sectors, Classified by DI 
 
 
Industry Ratio: Industry Revenues to Industry Capacity 
A ratio of the industry total revenues to the industry total capacity (total 
employment) is measured in the model.  The value of this industry ratio is about 0.235 
from the simulation.  It means that one employee in the large construction firms in the 
model corresponds to about $235,000 in revenue.  This measure of gross revenues per 
employee is very close to the actual revenue rates (0.241) measured using the real U.S. 
construction industry data in Table 6.4 in Chapter VI.  
It should be noted that the value of the industry ratio is obtained without 
representing any specific variables for the firms’ productivity in the model.  The ratio is 
great at the initial condition since all firms are the same and relatively small compared to 
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the assumed total amount of jobs in the market (constant market demand).  Over periods, 
individual firms grow, diversify, or contract and the total industry capacity finds 
equilibrium associated with the amount of jobs available in the market.  A sensitivity 
analysis is performed on this industry ratio assuming different initial sizes of firms in 
Section 7.4.   
 
 
7.2  Comparison of the Two Methods 
In Chapter V, a new method was introduced to represent contractors’ go/no-go 
decision depending on their risk attitudes.  Since expected utility theory has developed 
its theoretical grounds in the literature over decades and it have been favored in decision 
science and management studies, the new method can be validated by comparing it to 
the conventional method using expected utility theory and utility functions.   
 
7.2.1 Value at Risk vs. Utility Function 
 
Range of Maximum Loss Allowances in the New Method 
In the new method, contractors’ MLA was assumed to be between 22% and 96% 
of the mean of the project cost, which is taken as $10M in the evolutionary model.  Thus, 
the upper limit of maximum loss allowance for any contractor is $9.6M (= $10M × 0.96) 
and the lower limit of the maximum loss allowance is $2.2M (= $10M × 22%).  
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Therefore, the most risk-tolerant contractor in the model makes a go decision unless the 
expected value of loss (VaR) for a job is greater than $9.6M.  In contrast, the most risk-
averse contractor in the model makes a go decision unless the expected value of loss 
(VaR) for a job is greater than $2.2M.   
From simulation of the model, it was found that contractors that have MLA 
smaller than 22% hardly ever make go decisions in bids.  These contractors’ 
participation in competition is meaningless: they hardly ever bid, obtain no jobs, and go 
out of business soon after their founding.      
 
Parameter r in the Utility Function 
The normalized exponential utility function in Equation 5.10 in Chapter V has 
three parameters: a, b, and r.  Below is the reproduced equation of the normalized 
exponential utility function (same as Equation 5.10).     
 
1 exp( ( ) )0, U( )
1 exp( ( ) )
( )0, U( )
( )
x a rif r x
b a r
x aif r x
b a
− − −≠ = − − −
−= = −
     [7.1] 
Where, r is a risk-aversion coefficient to define risk attitude; 
 x is the wealth (contractor’s bid) and x > 0;  
a is the minimum value of wealth;  
b is the maximum value of wealth; and b > a.   
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Values of the parameters can be any value.  Note that the wealth is the value of 
the gain for a single job under consideration, not the total wealth of the contractor.  
Values of the parameters were determined in order to have compatibility between the 
two methods: the same possible range of bids by the model firms and a compatible range 
of different risk attitudes.  The values of the parameters were determined as given below:  
 The risk-aversion coefficient r varies from -0.33 to 0.24 (positive being risk-
averse, negative being risk-seeking, and zero being risk-neutral); 
 The minimum value of wealth (the minimum price, a) = $6.0M; and 
 The maximum value of wealth (the maximum price, b) = $14.0M; 
Figure 7.7 shows the normalized utility functions with the determined parameter 
values and ranges.   
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Figure 7.7  Normalized Utility Functions after the Parameter Adjustment 
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Comparison of Budget Thresholds in the Two Methods 
The two methods are compared in their representation of contractors’ go/no-go 
decisions.  Using the two methods, Figures 7.8 and 7.9 show budget thresholds where 
individual contractors having different risk attitudes make go/no-go decisions depending 
on their perception of risk.  The conventional method uses the above determined 
parameters.    
In Figure 7.8, the maximum loss allowance varies from 22% to 99% of the mean 
of cost $10M (i.e., from $2.2M to $9.6M) in the new method.  Meanwhile, the parameter 
r in the normalized utility function varies from -0.33 to 0.24 in Figure 7.9.  
Corresponding to values on the MLA axis in Figure 7.8, the budget threshold using the 
new method varies from $7.7M to $11.4M.  Using the conventional method, the budget 
threshold varies from $7.9M to $11.7M in Figure 7.9.  In the overall shape, there are 
minor differences in curvature.  The line of budget thresholds using the conventional 
method is straighter than the line of budget thresholds using the new method.   
The locations of risk-neutrality on the horizontal axis are different between the 
two methods.  Risk-neutrality in the conventional method is found at r = 0 in Figure 7.9 
that corresponds to budget threshold $10M (equal to the expected cost).  This value 
corresponds to MLA = $5.6M (56% of the expected cost) as shown in Figure 7.8.  Hence, 
risk-neutrality using the new method corresponds to a threshold of $5.6M.   
 
 
 
 
213
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
12.0
9.
6
8.
9
8.
1
7.
4
6.
6
5.
9
5.
2
4.
4
3.
7
2.
9
2.
2
Firm Maximum Loss Allowance ($M)
B
ud
ge
t T
hr
es
ho
ld
 ($
M
)
Budget Threshold (VaR)
Risk-neutral
More Risk-averse
More Risk-tolerant
 
Figure 7.8  Budget Threshold Using Value at Risk 
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Figure 7.9  Budget Threshold Using the Assumed Utility Functions 
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The comparison of the two methods shows compatible ranges of possible bids 
and various risk attitudes.  Even though there are minor differences in shape and 
curvature, there are no significant differences between the two methods in representing 
contractors’ go/no-go decisions.   
 
7.2.2 Comparison of the Simulation Results 
In order to determine if there are any differences in simulation results using the 
two methods, the aggregate patterns are compared.  Figure 7.10 shows the comparison of 
two distributions of firms by their risk attitudes.  Uniform prior reflects the uniform 
distribution used for the random assignment of risk attitude at the beginning of each 
simulation.  So, higher frequencies represent longer survival.  The most favorable degree 
of risk attitude is found at the mode in each distribution.  The optimum risk attitude is 
found at 0.035 for risk-aversion coefficient r using expected utility and at MLA $4.9M 
using VaR.  The overall patterns are similar and the locations of the most favorable 
degree of risk attitude are indistinguishable.  As found earlier, risk-neutrality 
corresponds to a threshold of $5.6M using VaR and a threshold of r = 0 using expected 
utility.  However, note that the locations of risk-neutrality on the horizontal axis are 
different between the two methods as shown in Figures 7.8 and 7.9.  
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Figure 7.10  Comparison of Two Distributions of Firms, VaR vs. Expected Utility 
 
In addition, the size distributions of firms derived by using the two methods are 
compared in Figure 7.11.  The patterns are very similar to each other.  Another similarity 
is also found in the diversification patterns of the model firms using the two methods, 
which are shown in Figures 7.12. and 7.13.  Figure 7.12 shows the distribution of firms 
by diversity index and Figure 7.13 shows the number of sectors per firm.  The two 
methods yield virtually identical diversification patterns compared to the actual ENR 
data.   
Based on these comparisons, the two methods are similarly usable to represent 
the individual differences in contractors’ risk attitude and their risk-taking behaviors.  
However, the proposed new method has an advantage over the conventional method due 
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to its simplicity and practicality: the risk measures used are dollars and it describes better 
how real managers perceive their business risks.  
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Figure 7.11  Distribution of Gross Revenue 
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Figure 7.12  Distribution of Firm Diversity Index - VaR 
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Figure 7.13  Number of Sectors per Firm – VaR vs. Utility Functions 
 
 
7.3  Test of Hypotheses 
The five hypotheses were developed in Chapter V to investigate latent but critical 
relationships between risk attitude and contractors’ competitive success in the market.  
These hypotheses have been tested using the evolutionary simulation model.  To analyze 
differences in risk-taking behaviors and resultant performance among the model firms 
that have different risk attitudes, the firms are classified by the amount of MLA as 
shown in Table 7.2.  For the classified groups, the same relative classification of risk 
attitude used for the development of hypothesis in Chapter V is applied to describe their 
characteristics: most risk-tolerant; moderately risk-tolerant; moderately risk-averse; and 
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most risk-averse.  Note that, in this simplified classification, group 3 that represents 
moderately risk-averse firms also includes risk-neutral firms with MLA = $5.6M.  The 
simulation results, however, identify difference between risk-neutrality and moderate 
risk-aversion, which is discussed though the hypothesis tests and sensitivity analyses.      
 
Table 7.2  Classification of Model Firms by MLA 
Groups Range of MLAs % of the Mean of Cost Level of Risk Attitude 
Group 1 $7.75M ~ $9.6M 77.5% ~ 96.0% Most risk-tolerant 
Group 2 $5.90M ~ $7.75M 59.0% ~ 77.5% Moderately risk-tolerant 
Group 3 $4.05M ~ $5.9M 40.5% ~ 59.0% Moderately risk-averse 
Group 4 $2.20M ~ $4.05M 22.0% ~ 40.5% Most risk-averse 
 
7.3.1 Distributions of Winning Bids and Success Rates 
Before the hypothesis tests, the study analyzes risk-taking behaviors of different 
firms, which were the basic reasoning of the proposed hypotheses.  Contractors’ 
different risk-taking behaviors can be found in their winning bids.  Figure 7.14 shows 
the distribution of winning bids for different groups of model firms classified by the 
amount of MLA.  Most risk-tolerant contractors (group 1) win jobs with low bid 
amounts and their distribution has the greatest variance compared to the other groups’ 
distributions.  Most risk-averse contractors (group 4) have the narrowest distribution and 
the distribution is skewed to the right.   
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Figure 7.14  Distribution of Winning Bids 
 
The firms classified into four groups in Figure 7.14 have the opposite order in 
their success rates which is defined in Equation 7.2.  Figure 7.15 shows the distribution 
of different risk attitude groups by their success rates.  Most risk-tolerant contractors 
(group 1) have the highest success rate, but with the greatest variance.  In contrast, most 
risk-averse contractors (group 4) have the lowest success rate with the smallest variance.  
The moderate risk-averse contractors (group 3) have some moderate level of success rate, 
which is lower than that of moderate risk-tolerant contractors (group 2).   
 
(%) 100Number of WinsSuccess Rate
Number of Bids
= ×     [7.2] 
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These distributions of winning bids and success rates in Figures 7.14 and 7.15 
show the advantages and disadvantages that were expected in the development of 
hypotheses in Chapter V.  Moderately risk-averse and moderately risk-tolerant 
contractors locate in the middle of the two extreme risk attitude groups (most risk-
tolerant and most risk-averse) in these measures.   
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Figure 7.15  Distribution of Firms by Success Rate, Classified by MLA 
 
7.3.2 Hypothesis 1: Profitability vs. Risk Attitude 
H1. Moderately risk-averse contractors would have more firm profits than other 
contractors. 
Hypothesis 1 expects that moderately risk-averse contractors would make a 
trade-off between the extremes of advantages (more jobs by being most risk-tolerant and 
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more profit per job by being most risk-averse) and disadvantages (possible large loss by 
most risk-tolerant and fewer jobs by being most risk-averse) by taking their business 
risks in a moderate way.  Figure 7.16 shows the distribution of firms’ annual profits 
when the firms are classified by MLA.  Moderately risk-averse firms (group 3) show 
better performance (the longest tail to the right) than other firms.  That is, there is an 
optimum value for risk-aversion such that firms using this strategy are more successful 
than others.   
However, as shown in the figure, group 3 also has longer tails to the left.  It is 
because the moderately risk-averse firms grow based on the better performance and 
perform more jobs in the market.  The longer tails represent that there are always 
uncertainties inherent in construction jobs, and performing more jobs means taking more 
downsides as well as more upsides of risk.   
In addition, Figure 7.17 shows the distributions of firms’ cash reserves when the 
firms are classified by MLA.  The moderately risk-averse contractors (group 3) have the 
most right skewed distribution, indicating their outperformance over other contractors.  
The moderately risk-averse contractors build a better financial strength based on more 
annual profits and reduced risk of loss.  Most risk-tolerant contractors (group 1) show 
the worst financial condition.  Most risk-averse contractors (group 4) show a better 
financial condition than group 1, but worse than groups 2 and 3.   
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Figure 7.16  Distribution of Firm Annual Profits 
 
 
 
 
 
223
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
-1
03 -8
2
-6
0
-3
8
-1
7 5 26 48 70 91 11
3
13
4
15
6
17
8
Firm Cash Reserve ($M)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(%
)
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
Classification by MLA
Group 1: $7.75M ~ $9.60M
Group 2: $5.90M ~ $7.75M
Group 3: $4.05M ~ $5.90M
Group 4: $2.20M ~ $4.05M
 
Figure 7.17  Distribution of Firm Cash Reserves by the Degree of Risk-aversion 
 
7.3.3 Hypothesis 2: Survival vs. Risk Attitude 
H2. Moderate risk-aversion is advantageous for survival in the construction 
market.  
Hypothesis 2 expects that moderately risk-averse contractors would survive 
better than other types of contractors.  The moderately risk-averse contractors would 
have stable business operations since they do not take too large risks, which could result 
in large losses.  Also, they take moderate risks to avoid risks of overhead burden due to 
fewer jobs.  Moderately risk-tolerant contractors make a trade-off between the amount of 
jobs and the profitability of job won.  However, they are exposed to risk of large losses, 
which is more critical than risk of overhead burden.   
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Figure 7.18 shows the distribution of the 400 model firms by their risk attitude 
(represented by MLA).  The figure shows historical changes in the distribution over 
periods.  The shape of the distribution becomes stable after about iteration 40, indicating 
that the steady state has been reached.  The changes are the result of competition.  Some 
contractors survive while others disappear.  It is a graphical representation of the 
evolutionary process within the model.  Moderately risk-averse contractors (group 3) 
become dominant in the population indicating their longer survival while frequencies of 
most risk-tolerant contractors (group 1) and most risk-averse contractors (group 4) 
become low.  The most risk-tolerant contractors and the most risk-averse contractors 
lose their population quickly.  Contractors that are moderately risk-tolerant (group 2) 
increase in population, but not as much as moderately risk-averse contractors.   
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Figure 7.18  Distribution of the 400 Model Firms’ MLA 
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In Figure 7.18, the most favorable level of risk attitude is found to the right of 
risk neutrality (MLA = $5.6M).  The surviving contractors are more risk-averse from the 
risk neutrality.  Among the 400 firms, each group, from groups 1 to 4, has 63 firms 
(15.7%), 108 firms (27.0%), 172 firms (43.0%), and 57 firms (14.2%) at the steady state, 
respectively.  The moderately risk-averse contractors are dominant in the population.  
Based on the analysis, moderate risk-aversion is in favor of survival in the construction 
market.   
 
7.3.4 Hypothesis 3: Growth vs. Risk Attitude 
H3. Moderate risk-aversion is in favor of growth of contractors in the 
construction market.   
Hypothesis 3 expects moderately risk-averse contractors’ growth based on their 
better economic performance (as proposed in H1) and longer survival (as proposed in 
H2).  Figure 7.19 shows the distribution of firm gross revenues by the degree of risk 
attitude.  Moderately risk-averse contractors (group 3) have the most right skewed 
distribution, which indicates their growth at the expense of other groups.  Most risk-
averse contractors (group 4) show the worst performance in growth.  They are selective 
in their bid decisions and cannot obtain enough jobs to grow.  Most risk-tolerant and 
moderately risk-tolerant contractors (groups 1 or 2) also show an unfavorable 
performance in their growth.  They can obtain more jobs by taking risks in their bid 
decisions.  However, they cannot grow as much as the moderately risk-averse 
contractors since they cannot survive longer because they run higher risk of losses as 
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found in hypothesis 2.  Based on this analysis, moderate risk-aversion is in favor of 
growth in the competitive construction market.    
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Figure 7.19  Distribution of the 400 Model Firms’ Gross Revenues 
 
7.3.5 Hypothesis 4: Diversification vs. Risk Attitude 
H4. Moderate risk-aversion is in favor of diversification.  
In Hypothesis 4, moderately risk-averse contractors are expected to be more 
successful in diversification than other contractors.  The success of diversification 
depends on how a new establishment competes in a new sector.  Establishments inherit 
their parent firm’s risk attitude.  Based on the reasoning in Hypotheses 1 and 2 about 
profitability and survival, moderate risk-aversion is expected to outperform at the 
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establishment level.  Therefore, moderately risk-averse contractors have higher 
probability of success in their diversification.  
Figure 7.20 shows the distributions of firms by their risk attitude while the firms 
are classified by their diversification levels.  The classified firms show distinct 
distributions.  Moderately risk-averse contractors (group 3) are diversified more than 
other contractors.  Most of other contractors are less diversified or specialized.  Note that 
the most favorable risk-aversion level is found to the right of risk neutrality.  As a result, 
contractors that are most highly diversified tend to be moderately risk-averse.    
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Figure 7.20  Distribution of Firm Maximum Loss Allowance for Various DIs 
 
Figure 7.21 provides the number of sectors per firm by risk attitude group.  
Moderately risk-averse contractors (group 3) have the highest frequencies with greater 
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number of sectors (5 to 8 sectors per firm) than other groups.  On the contrary, more than 
60% of most risk-tolerant contractors (group 1) operate in only one sector.  Most risk-
averse contractors (group 4) are more diversified than contractors in groups 1 and 2, but 
less diversified than moderately risk-averse contractors.  Therefore, moderately risk-
averse contractors are more successful in diversification than all other contractors.          
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Figure 7.21  Number of Sectors per Firm by Aversion Group 
 
In the real business world, diversified contractors perform different jobs in 
different market sectors, such as residential, non-residential, commercial, power system, 
petroleum, highway, other civil, etc.  The different businesses would have different 
characteristics with respect to business risks and competition.  Note that the multiple 
market sectors in the current model are not differentiated.  Even in the absence of other 
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factors inherent in different types of jobs, the model produces the aggregate patterns 
similar to the actual industry patterns in the size distribution of contractors and the 
pattern of their market diversification at the same time.  It indicates that the effects of 
contractors’ organizational risk attitudes are so critical that the strengths of moderate 
risk-aversion are effective in different market sectors.      
 
7.3.6 Hypothesis 5: Diversification vs. Survival 
H5. More diversified contractors have longer longevity.  
Based on the previous hypotheses, especially Hypotheses 2 and 4 which are 
about the relationships of risk attitude with survival and diversification, moderately risk-
averse contractors are expected to be more diversified and to live longer because a 
diversified firm would have multiple establishments as multiple buffers against market 
risk and subsequent firm failure.   
Figure 7.22 shows the age distributions of firms classified by their diversification 
level.  Note that the ages shown are periods, not years.  The figure shows that more 
diversified firms live longer and less diversified firms fail sooner.  From Hypothesis 4, it 
was found that moderately risk-averse contractors are more diversified.  Therefore, the 
current test extends its result to maintain that moderately risk-averse contractors are 
more diversified and they live longer in the construction market.   
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Figure 7.22  Age Distribution of Firms by Diversity Index 
 
In the real business world, it is found that large firms have been performing their 
business over decades.  They have been successful in their businesses over time periods 
and they have grown.  So, an additional hypothesis can be developed by expecting that 
larger contractors would live longer than smaller contractors.  Figure 7.23 shows the age 
distributions of firms classified by their capacity (employment size).  The figure 
indicates that large contractors live longer: size and age are positively correlated, or that 
contractors that survive longer have the opportunity to grow.   
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Figure 7.23  Age Distributions of Firms by Capacity 
 
 
7.4  Sensitivity Analyses 
Three sensitivity analyses are performed.  The first analysis is performed to test 
different assumptions on contractors’ risk attitude.  The model considers heterogeneity 
in risk attitude among contractors.  Against this, two different assumptions are tested: no 
risk-aversion and all risk-neutral for contractors.  The second analysis is conducted to 
test different prior distributions used for random assignment of risk attitude to individual 
firms.  The last test is about the initial conditions for the firms, especially the initial size 
of firms.  
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7.4.1    Different Assumptions on Risk Attitude 
The current model allows variable risk attitudes for contractors.  What if 
contractors have identical risk attitudes?  By testing different assumptions on 
contractors’ risk attitude, the critical effects of risk aversion are highlighted as below.   
 
Assumption of No Risk-aversion 
No Risk-aversion in Figure 7.24 is the size distribution of the model firms under 
the assumption of no risk-aversion for all firms: the firms always make go decisions 
regardless of risk.  The assumption results in no large firms (luck does not last long 
enough for the firms to grow) and more middle size firms.  The simulation results do not 
match the ENR data, indicating that the assumption of no risk-aversion by contractors 
must be rejected; risk-aversion does matter.   
The no risk-aversion assumption also results in a different diversification pattern 
of the model firms as shown in Figure 7.25.  It shows a comparison between the actual 
industry pattern, the original simulation result, and the simulation result with the no risk-
aversion assumption.  Contractors’ diversification is greatly reduced without risk-
aversion.  No risk-aversion is equivalent to extremely high risk-tolerance.  As a result, 
contractors’ risk attitude matters: without risk-aversion, contractors do not diversify and 
they cannot survive and grow in the long-run in the construction market and moderate 
risk-aversion is critical to firms’ survival and growth.  
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Figure 7.24  Size Distributions – No Risk-aversion 
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Figure 7.25  Diversification Pattern – No Risk-aversion 
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Assumption of All Risk-neutral 
Another assumption is tested: what if all contractors are risk-neutral.  A risk-
neutral contractor is supposed to behave based on expected value theory: a decision 
maker makes a go decision if expected profit of a choice is greater than zero, and vice 
versa.  It is different from the assumption of No Risk-aversion that does not allow no-go 
decisions.   
The assumption of All Risk-neutral is implemented in the model by setting all 
firms’ risk-aversion coefficient r at zero in their utility functions or by setting their MLA 
at $5.6M.  It was found in Figure 7.8 that the value of MLA equivalent to risk-neutrality 
is about 56% of the mean of the expected cost (therefore, $5.6M), whereas the optimum 
risk-aversion corresponds to MLA = $4.9M, found from the hypothesis tests.   
Figure 7.26 shows the simulation result with the assumption of All Risk-neutral.  
This size distribution of all risk-neutral firms shows a better performance of the model 
firms compared to the simulation result with the assumption of no risk-aversion in 
Figure 7.24.  However, compared to the actual size distribution and the original 
simulation result with various risk attitudes, there are still a smaller number of large 
firms than in the real data set.  Therefore, the size distribution of firms under the all risk-
neutral assumption does not match the industry data, which indicates that this 
assumption must be rejected.  Again, the test confirms that risk-aversion does matter.   
In addition, Figure 7.27 shows the diversification pattern of the all risk-neutral 
contractors.  More firms are diversified than the results with the assumption of no risk-
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aversion.  However, there are fewer firms with high diversity indices compared to the 
actual diversification pattern and the original simulation result. 
Therefore, the assumption of All Risk-neutral that all contractors are risk-neutral 
and contractors behave based on expected monetary value should be rejected.  It is clear 
from Figure 7.26 that construction firms must be more risk-averse than risk-neutrality, 
which leads to moderate risk-aversion, to match the actual size distribution.  The test 
also confirms that moderate risk-aversion is favored more than risk-neutrality in firm 
growth and market diversification.   
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Figure 7.26  Size Distributions – All Risk-neutral 
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Figure 7.27  Diversification Pattern – All Risk-neutral 
 
7.4.2 Different Assumption on Market Diversification 
What if contractors do not diversify?  No Market Diversification in Figure 7.28 
shows the size distribution of 400 model firms assuming that the model firms are not 
diversified over different market sectors.  So, all firms compete with their competitors 
within one market sector (their original sectors).  As shown in the figure, without 
diversification, there would be no large firms.   
In Figure 7.28, the curvature in the distribution is greater than those in the size 
distributions in Figures 7.24 and 7.25 that are based on the two earlier assumptions: No 
Risk-aversion and All Risk-neutral.  The population has more middle size firms without 
the largest firms.  Therefore, based on the simulation result, it is concluded that 
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diversification plays a critical role in growth of construction firms in the construction 
market.   
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Figure 7.28  Size Distributions – No Market Diversification 
 
7.4.3 Different Prior Distributions for Risk Attitude Assignment 
One of the most meaningful results in the current study is the survival of 
moderately risk-averse contractors.  Figure 7.18 showed changes in the distribution of 
the firm MLAs over periods starting from the uniform distribution.  In the figure, the 
most appropriate level of risk-aversion in favor of survival is found.  The assumption 
using the uniform distribution was intended to avoid generation of bias about the actual 
distribution.  The uniform distribution is known as non-informative prior distribution 
because it conveys the least information (bias) of all possible distributions.   
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A sensitivity analysis was performed to investigate the effects of using different 
prior distributions.  Figures 7.29 and 7.30 show the distributions of firm MLAs over 
periods using two different triangular distributions.  As shown, the distributions are 
stabilized over the long-term and the ultimate distributions are identical to the size 
distribution using the uniform distribution.  Refer to Figure 7.18 to see the distribution 
with the uniform distribution assumption.  The three initial distributions lead to results 
that are indistinguishable after around period 30.   
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Figure 7.29  Distribution of Firms’ MLA – Triangular Prior I 
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Figure 7.30  Distribution of Firms’ MLA – Triangular Prior II 
 
The identity among the three distributions indicates that the simulation results are 
not sensitive to the initial conditions, in particular prior distributions used for the random 
assignment of risk attitude.  The system in the model quickly reaches the same steady 
state regardless of the initial distribution of the individual firms.  Also, no significant 
differences are found in all other model behaviors with the different prior distributions.   
 
7.4.4 Different Initial Sizes of Contractors 
In the simulation model, initially, all firms are the same size.  The assumed 
identical size for the initial population of firms is 250 employees.  These identical firms 
become heterogeneous in size through competition over periods.  Individual firms make 
employment changes by expansion, contractions, deaths, and market diversification 
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depending on their own performance.  The assumed initial firm size is arbitrary.  What if 
different initial sizes are assumed for the contractors in the model?   
Effects by different initial sizes of firms are tested by monitoring the changes in 
the industry ratio, which was previously discussed using Figure 7.9.  It is the ratio of the 
total industry revenues to the total industry capacity (employment size).  The ratio 
becomes stable over periods and it represents a balance between industry capacity and 
demand in the market.  It was found that the ratio is very close to the actual industry data.  
The equilibrium is attained in the model without any variables or specific rules for firms’ 
productive performance on jobs.  The equilibrium between the industry capacity and the 
market demand is also the result of competition.   
Figure 7.31 shows the simulation results assuming different initial sizes: 500, 
1000, and 2000 employees, compared to the original simulation result with 250 
employees.  For a better view, the figure shows only the changes in the industry ratio 
over the first 20 periods.  Whatever initial sizes of the firms are assumed, the industry 
ratio reaches an identical steady state.  The contractors’ total capacity is balanced with 
the market demand given.  The test confirms that the simulation results are insensitive to 
the assumptions of the initial sizes of the firms in the model.   
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Figure 7.31  Industry Ratio: Total Revenues / Total Capacity 
 
 
7.5  Summary 
Three aggregate patterns were fitted to the actual industry patterns: size 
distribution of contractors, industry capacity changes, and diversification pattern.  The 
model behaviors indicate the high explanatory power of the simple algorithm used in the 
model to represent contractors’ competition in the market.   
The current study proposes a new method for representation of construction 
contractors’ risk attitude.  The new method was validated through the comparison with 
the conventional method.  While the two methods have no significant differences in the 
results, the proposed new method has its advantages over the conventional method.  The 
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new method should be easy to understand and simple since the measures in the method 
are quantitative, i.e., amount of dollars.  The conventional method using utility functions 
uses different degrees of curvature to describe the differences in risk attitude, which is 
not clear as much as the quantitative measure used in the new method.   
The effects of risk attitude on contractors’ competitive success were identified 
though the hypothesis tests.  Moderate risk-aversion is favored in profitability, survival, 
growth, and diversification.  Also, it was found that more diversified firms usually 
survive longer than less diversified firms.   
In addition, sensitivity analyses were performed to figure out impacts by 
different assumptions and model parameters: No Risk-aversion, All Risk-neutral, 
different prior distributions for contractors’ risk attitudes, and different initial sizes of 
firms.  The tests using different risk attitude assumptions confirm that risk-aversion 
matters in the construction business.  And, the tests using different individual conditions 
confirm that the simulation results are not sensitive to the initial conditions assumed for 
firms in the model.   
As a result, the current study clarifies the latent but critical effects of risk attitude 
on competition and on individual contractors’ competitive success, which are not 
available from the previous competition studies.  The most appropriate level of risk-
aversion outperforms risk-neutrality as well as all others: high risk-tolerance, moderate 
risk-tolerance, and high risk-aversion.     
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1  Conclusions 
This study identifies how individual contractors’ risk attitudes affect competition 
and the individuals’ competitive success in the construction market.  An evolutionary 
model has been developed, in which competitive bidding is represented as the major 
competition mechanism for contractors in the market.  The model simulates and analyzes 
competition among multiple contractors that have their own risk attitudes.  The study 
takes comprehensive and multiple perspectives considering effects of risk attitude at the 
individual level as well as the aggregate industry level.  It also takes a long-term 
perspective by analyzing the success of firms within the domain of competition for the 
long-term.   
As identified in this study, risk attitude is one of the most influential elements in 
competition.  The study results confirm that risk attitude is critical to contractors’ 
survival and growth.  Introducing organizational risk attitudes to competition among 
individual contractors develops the unique pattern (power law) in the size distribution of 
contractors that is observed in the actual industry data.  Also, aggregate effects as results 
of competition are identified in industry capacity changes and firms’ diversification 
patterns.  Following are the summarized conclusions.  
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The current study uses relative classification of contractors by the level of risk 
attitude: most risk-tolerant, moderately risk-tolerant, moderately risk-averse, and most 
risk-averse.  Most risk-tolerant contractors are willing to take high level of risks to 
obtain potentially large profits, which is represented by large amount of maximum loss 
allowance.  They make go decisions in bids more often than other contractors.  These 
contractors’ bids tend to be low, therefore they enjoy high success rates.  However, their 
average profit per job is relatively low.  They obtain more jobs, but there are risks of 
losses from the jobs obtained.   
Most risk-averse contractors are more selective in their go/no-go decisions.  They 
desire to avoid the risks of losses, which leads to frequent no-go decisions than other 
types of contractors.  They allow small amount of possible losses, which is represented 
by small amount of maximum loss allowance.  They decline to bid when their perceived 
risk is greater than their own maximum loss allowances, which are small.  These 
contractors have low success rates since their bids tend to be high.  Therefore, they enjoy 
high profits per job if they win jobs, however they cannot obtain many jobs, which leads 
to overhead burden with few jobs.   
Therefore, most risk-tolerant and most risk-averse contractors have critical 
shortcomings even though they also have their own advantages, high success rate and 
high average profit per job, respectively.  The shortcomings are large losses to most risk-
tolerant and moderately risk-tolerant contractors and overhead burden to most risk-
averse contractors.  These shortcomings can threaten individual contractor’s business 
operation and financial condition.  A large loss from a single job can lead a contractor to 
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bankruptcy, a state from which the contractor cannot return.  Overhead burden due to 
few jobs with a high capacity deteriorates a contractor’s business operation.   
Moderately risk-averse contractors can take trade-offs between the extreme 
advantages and disadvantages.  By being moderately risk-averse, contractors can reduce 
risks of large losses or overhead burden, which leads the contractors to longer survival 
and accumulation of profits.  Moderate profits from jobs and moderate success rate are 
better off than obtaining only one of the extreme advantages at the expense of the 
extreme disadvantages.  Based on these strengths of moderate risk-aversion, these 
contractors can survive longer and make more profits to build financial resources.   
Heterogeneity in size among contractors is a result of competition among 
themselves in the market.  Moderately risk-averse contractors are favored in growth 
based on their continuous accumulations of moderate profits.  Building on financial 
resources, these contractors can grow and continue their successful business with an 
increased capacity.  To grow, a firm should survive and maintain its successful business 
over long periods, not transiently.   
By diversification, a contractor (a firm) extends its competition activities to other 
markets by opening new establishments.  A firm and its establishments have an 
organizational standard about what level of risks can be accepted or not within the firm, 
which is organizational risk attitude.  So, establishments under a parent firm behave 
similarly in their risk-taking.  The study results found outperformance of moderate risk-
aversion also at the establishment level.  Thus, moderately risk-averse contractors are 
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successful in their market diversification.  Also, it was found that market diversification 
with moderate risk-aversion enables contractors to grow more.   
In the real market, different market segments may have different characteristics 
such as different levels of risk and competition.  Then, the appropriate level of risk 
attitude for survival and growth might differ.  However, the evolutionary model shows 
that the aggregate industry patterns similar to the actual data can be developed without 
differentiation of the market segments while demonstrating the invariant strength of 
moderate risk-aversion in competitive success.  It indicates that the effects of 
contractors’ risk attitude are so critical in the construction business that the moderate 
risk-aversion is commonly favored in different market segments.    
Successful business operation by each establishment in different market 
segments leads to overall better performance of their parent firm.  Moderately risk-
averse contractors are more diversified and their moderately risk-averse establishments 
are also more successful than other firms’ establishments.  Moderately risk-averse and 
diversified firms have their establishments as buffers against market risks and firm 
failure.  They have longer longevity.   
As a result, as also highlighted based on the sensitivity analyses, moderate risk-
aversion is essential to contractors’ survival, growth, and diversification.  Also, it should 
be noted that, based on the study results, the moderate risk-aversion outperforms risk-
neutrality that is the fundamental basis of the evaluations using expected monetary value 
theory.  Then, a contractor needs to aware of the results of the current study when it has 
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to make a decision under uncertainty relying on such an evaluation using expected 
monetary value theory.   
 
 
8.2  Recommendations for Construction Contractors 
The study uncovers the critical effects of contractors’ risk attitude and provides 
insights for management that have not been available using conventional approaches.  
Based on the current study results, to succeed, construction contractors need to be 
moderately risk-averse in their business decisions, in particular for their bidding 
strategies.  By being moderately risk-averse, a contractor is able to maintain a stable 
business operation while avoiding critical risks.  With some luck, contractors can be 
successful by taking a risk-seeking strategy or a highly risk-averse strategy for a short-
term.  However, the luck does not last long enough to guarantee the firm’s long-term 
survival and success.   
Some contractors succeed during several years and then go out of business.  In 
the ENR U.S. Top 400 Contractors, there have been cases that some contractors were 
ranked within the top 400 and then disappeared from the list after just a couple of years.  
Some of them cannot be found again on the list thereafter.  Such firms may have failed 
and disappeared or, more likely, have been bought up by their competitors, which is a 
form of business failure.  A firm’s success requires a stable business operation and stable 
profit streams over long periods.  Being moderately risk-averse is a way for contractors 
to enhance their chances to have such conditions and performances.  
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The study results are all statistical; they represent statistical association rather 
than causes and effects.  Thus, for example, moderate risk-aversion is associated with 
higher survival rates, higher profitability, greater diversification, longer longevity, etc.  
In the model, firms cannot change their risk aversion; they expand, live, diversify, and 
die with the same risk attitude that they were born with.  However, some firms with 
certain risk attitudes live longer, grow more, diversify more, and are more profitable 
than others.  Therefore, it seems reasonable that if firms could modify their risk attitudes 
they could transfer from a less favorable class to a more favorable class.   
It is not easy to measure organizational risk attitude since an individual 
contractor’s own position in risk attitude is relative within the domain of competition.  
For individual contractors, it is recommended to take an adaptive approach to identifying 
and modifying their own risk attitudes.  If a contractor is satisfied with its current 
situation in terms of profitability and market share, the contractor does not need to 
change its behavior in risk-taking.  If a contractor recognizes that it has satisfactory 
market share, but profitability per job is low, which are phenomena found for most risk-
tolerant or moderately risk-tolerant firms, the contractor needs to try to become more 
risk-averse from its current attitude.  In contrast, if a contractor feels that profitability per 
job is satisfactory but desires to grow, which are phenomena found for most risk-averse 
firms, the firm needs to try to become less risk-averse from its current attitude.  This 
adaptive approach should be taken on the basis of an objective evaluation of a 
contractor’s own performance.  Over time, by making incremental adjustments, a firm 
may be able to modify its culture regarding risks.   
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Self-awareness (understanding current risk attitude) is the first step to managing 
risk attitude (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2005).  Identifying subconscious part of an 
organization is not easy.  However, some approaches such as the following need to be 
taken by a contractor to identify and change its own risk attitude.   
Evaluation of a contractor’s own risk attitude can be performed by conducting 
post-project studies.  The studies allow a contractor to compare and analyze its own 
measure of risk for a project at the time of bidding (ex-ante measure) against the realized 
results at the completion of the project (ex-post measure).  It requires a contractor to 
document relevant processes of risk evaluation, which helps the contractor learn about 
its own risk perception and evaluation.  In a study, cost elements in a bid amount (direct 
costs, overhead (project/general), contingency, profits or markup, etc.) can be compared 
with the actual costs.  The contractor needs to figure out: what risks were 
underestimated; what risks were overestimated; and why.  Based on these, the contractor 
needs to find which elements need to or should have been adjusted with respect to the 
realized results compared to the perceived risks; and which elements can be adjusted in 
terms of risk management (to be more or less risk-averse).    
The current study makes another recommendation to construction contractors: to 
diversify.  Diversification is a corporate strategy for growth.  And, diversified 
contractors live longer since they have more establishments in multiple sectors, which 
are buffers against market risks.  In general, less diversified or specialized contractors 
fail sooner than more diversified contractors since they are directly exposed to market 
risks.   
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However, the current study found that in order to diversify and also to be 
successful in the diversification, a contractor needs to be moderately risk-averse.  Let 
consider most risk-tolerant or most risk-averse contractors, these contractors can also 
expand in size and diversify into other markets when they earn profits.  What is waiting 
after an expansion or a diversification?  An expansion or a diversification means an 
increase in capacity, which leads to needs to obtain more jobs and profits to pay the 
increased overhead with the increased capacity.  If fewer jobs, a contractor’s use of its 
capacity becomes inefficient.  If large losses, a contractor’s financial condition goes 
worse than before it expanded or diversified.  So, a contractor could suffer a large loss or 
go out of business after an unsuccessful expansion or diversification.  To be successful 
in diversification, a contractor needs to be moderately risk-averse.  It enhances the 
contractor’s survival and continuous earnings that are the basis of success in growth and 
diversification.   
 
 
8.3  Contributions 
8.3.1 Investigation on Missing Linkage between Risk-taking and Competition 
A new insight from the current study is that risk attitude is not a single decision 
factor for an individual firm’s bid decision, but it should be considered as the critical and 
universal element of competition from a broad perspective.  Since the main objective of 
previous competitive bidding studies was finding the optimum markup or bid amount for 
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an individual contractor to win a job, these studies took individual perspective for 
individual contractors to win a job.  And, risk attitude has been considered as a decision 
factor that an individual contractor considers for itself.  But, competitors in a 
competition may have their own risk attitude and therefore behave differently in their 
risk-taking under competition, which affects the competition among themselves and 
further the performance of each competitor.  The current study investigated critical 
relationship between risk-taking behaviors and competition by allowing heterogeneity in 
risk attitude among contractors in competition.       
 
8.3.2 New Method to Represent Construction Contractors’ Risk Attitude and Behaviors 
The study proposed a new and simple method to represent risk attitude for 
construction contractors.  The method is advantageous over the conventional method 
using expected utility.  The concepts of maximum loss allowance and VaR are simple 
and easy to understand.  Also, the method represents the way real business managers 
perceive their risks and uses a simple and quantitative measure, i.e., dollars.  The 
proposed new method should be easy for practitioners to understand and apply for their 
practical business.  The new method was validated based on the comparison with the 
conventional method.   
 
8.3.3 Empirical Findings for the Construction Industry 
The study presents new empirical findings in the construction industry: the size 
distribution of contractors and their diversification patterns.  In construction, these 
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patterns have not received enough attention by researchers and practitioners even though 
these are realized effects at the aggregate level by competition in this highly competitive 
industry.  The analyses using the U.S. construction industry data found the presence of 
the power law in the size distribution of contractors and the stable pattern of market 
diversification.  In addition, the data analyses found there are differences in slope of the 
size distributions of contractors between different market sectors, which brings 
opportunity of further studies.  
 
8.3.4 Evolutionary Approach for Comprehensive and Multiple Perspectives 
The applied evolutionary approach to the current investigation allowed 
comprehensive and multiple perspectives.  The developed evolutionary model simulates 
competition among contractors that have individual differences in risk-taking behavior 
depending on their own risk attitude.  The evolutionary model tracks effects of different 
risk attitudes on the competing individuals’ performances and the aggregate patterns that 
evolve at the population level.  Analyses were performed at multiple levels, from 
individuals to the aggregate.  The study results confirm that the empirical findings of the 
industry patterns in Chapter IV are results of the competition among contractors.   
 
8.3.5 Long-term Analysis on Success of Firms 
Success of firms has been analyzed within the domain of competition for the 
long-term considering individual contractors’ life-cycle: birth, survival, expansion, 
diversification, contraction, and death.  The current study showed that the industry 
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overall capacity changes occur by individual contractors’ employment changes and these 
changes are also resultants of competition in the market place.  This comprehensive 
market perspective extended the analysis of contractors’ success from winning a job in 
competitive bidding.   
 
 
8.4  Discussion 
There would be many other factors that may affect competition among 
contractors and the contractors’ competitive success in the real market.  However, the 
developed simulation model produces aggregate patterns that are similar to the actual 
industry patterns without presenting the other factors.  Other competitive factors would 
include expertise in a certain area, better management techniques, learning from more 
experience, good relationships with owners, relationships with good subcontractors and 
suppliers, better cost estimation capability, and so forth.  Of course, no data are available 
on all these factors.  These competitive factors exemplified above should be developed 
within a firm throughout continuous and successful business, which requires the firm to 
survive and to grow.  The current study confirms that moderate risk-aversion is critical 
to firm survival and growth.     
In any model, one tries to keep the number of independent variables to a 
workable number, by the principle of parsimony (Occam’s razor).  The model that best 
predict the dependent variable with the fewest independent variables is the best model.  
The evolutionary model developed in the current study uses as few assumptions as 
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possible and the used assumptions are simple and plausible.  Although any model is a 
simplification, the current study results indicate that contactors can improve their 
performance through growth and diversification by changing their risk attitudes.  If a 
firm can change its culture, then it can change its attitude toward risk and improve its 
performance.   
In the real market, there are some contractors specialized in one market sector 
and they are successful.  Especially, such cases are found in the U.S. highway 
construction market.  How are these specialized firms successful?  The highway 
construction sector has enjoyed a large number of projects from governmental agencies 
due to the increasing needs of infrastructure in the U.S.  In addition, highway 
construction needs a high level of capital, which develops a relatively high entry barrier 
compared to other sectors.  These facts would be the reasons for some highway 
contractors to survive and be successful without diversification.  Further investigation is 
needed to understand their success.      
 
 
8.5  Study Limits and Proposal of Future Studies 
The approaches in the current study can be extended for the uses in other areas 
where competition are concerned allowing the long-term and multiple perspectives.  The 
study needs to be extended to investigate other aspects of market competition and risk 
management, which include contractors’ business failures, growth/diversification 
strategies, owners’ risk management, interactions/competitions between owners and 
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contractors, and industry dynamics.  More hidden linkages between risk management 
and competition in the construction business are waiting for further investigation.  
Following are possible extensions.     
For the last 14 years, the U.S. construction market has been in good shape.  The 
market demand has been increasing steadily.  However, it is natural to predict that there 
will be decreases in the market demand relatively compared to current level of industry 
capacity in some future times.  The construction industry is subject to the general 
economic condition.  Effects of changes in market condition need to be investigated with 
respect to contractors’ risk management and diversification strategy.   
To better understand market diversification, the current study needs to be 
extended to represent differences between market sectors.  Different types of 
construction jobs have different characteristics in terms of difficulty, need of technology, 
size of job, need of large capital or equipment, different overhead rate, etc.  Also, the 
levels of risk and competition could differ.  The differences between market sectors and 
the effects of them needs to be investigated in association with the differences in the slop 
of size distributions of contractors between different market sectors found in Chapter IV 
using the actual industry data.  
As to contractors’ risk-taking and owners’ risk-transfer, there are other contract 
methods used in the industry such as cost plus fee, unit price contract, negotiated price 
contract, CM at fee, CM at risk, etc.  In the current study, competitive bidding, therefore 
lump sum contract, is represented as the major mechanism of competition in the 
construction market.  In fact, many contractors still obtain the majority of their jobs 
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through competitive bidding, especially more in the public sector.  Other contract 
methods and project delivery methods need to be studied within the domain of 
competition considering contractors’ and owners’ risk management.  
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APPENDIX I 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE INDUSTRY BY ENR 
 
The ENR data classify the construction industry into eight sectors as below (ENR, 
2005): 
 General building: commercial buildings, offices, stores, educational facilities, 
government buildings, hospitals, medical facilities, hotels, apartments, housing, 
etc.  
 Manufacturing: auto assembly, electronic assembly, textile plants, etc.  
 Power: thermal and hydroelectric power plants, waste-to-energy plants, 
transmission lines, substations, cogeneration plants, etc.  
 Water supply and sewerage/solid waste 
o Water supply: dams, reservoirs, transmission pipelines, distribution 
mains, irrigation canals, desalination and potability treatment plants, 
pumping stations, etc.  
o Sewerage/solid waste: sanitary and storm sewers, treatment plants, 
pumping plants, incinerators, industrial waste facilities, etc.  
 Industrial process and petroleum 
o Industrial process: pulp and paper mills, steel mills, nonferrous metal 
refineries, pharmaceutical plants, chemical plants, food and other 
processing plants, etc.  
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o Petroleum: refineries, petrochemical plants, offshore facilities, pipelines, 
etc.  
 Transportation: airports, bridges, roads, canals, locks, dredging, marine facilities, 
piers, railroads, tunnels, etc.  
 Hazardous waste: chemical and nuclear waste, asbestos and lead abatement, etc.  
 Telecommunications: transmission lines and cabling, towers and antennae, data 
centers and web hotels, etc. 
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APPENDIX II 
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENR U.S. TOP 400 CONTRACTORS 
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Figure II - 1.  Size Distributions, before Normalization (1994 ~ 1998) 
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Figure II - 2.  Size Distributions, before Normalization (1999 ~ 2003) 
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Figure II - 3.  Size Distributions, before Normalization (2004 ~ 2007) 
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After the Normalization 
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Figure II - 4.  Size Distributions, Normalized (1994 ~ 1998) 
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Figure II - 5.  Size Distributions, Normalized (1999 ~ 2003) 
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Figure II - 6.  Size Distributions, Normalized (2004 ~ 2007) 
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Domestic Contractors 
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Figure II - 7.  Size Distributions, Domestic Firms (1994 ~ 1998) 
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Figure II - 8.  Size Distributions, Domestic Firms (1999 ~ 2003) 
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Figure II - 9.  Size Distributions, Domestic Firms (2004~2007) 
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APPENDIX III 
DIVERSIFICATION PATTERN OF THE ENR U.S. TOP 400 
CONTRACTORS 
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Figure III - 1.  Diversification Pattern, All 400 Firms (1994~1998) 
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Figure III - 2.  Diversification Pattern, All 400 Firms (1999~2003) 
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Figure III - 3.  Diversification Pattern, All 400 Firms (2004~2007) 
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Domestic Firms 
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Figure III - 4.  Diversification Pattern, Domestic Firms (1994~1998) 
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Figure III - 5.  Diversification Pattern, Domestic Firms (1999~2003) 
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Figure III - 6.  Diversification Pattern, Domestic Firms (2004~2007) 
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All 400 Firms vs. Domestic Firms 
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Figure III - 7.  Comparison of Diversification Patterns (400 Firms vs. Domestic) 
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